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Abstract: 
We provide an ―executive-attention framework for organizing the cognitive neuroscience research on the 
constructs of working-memory capacity (WMC), general fluid intelligence, and prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
function. Rather than provide a novel theory of PFC function, we synthesize a wealth of single-cell, brain-
imaging, and neuropsychological research through the lens of our theory of normal individual differences in 
WMC and attention control (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). Our 
critical review confirms the prevalent view that dorsolateral PFC circuitry is critical to executive-attention 
functions. Moreover, although the dorsolateral PFC is but one critical structure in a network of anterior and 
posterior ―attention control‖ areas, it does have a unique executive-attention role in actively maintaining access 
to stimulus representations and goals in interference-rich contexts. Our review suggests the utility of an 
executive-attention framework for guiding future re-search on both PFC function and cognitive control. 
 
Article: 
... the frontal lobes ... with their associated sensory centres, form the substrata of those psychical processes 
which lie at the foundation of the higher intellectual operations. (Ferrier, 1886, p. 467) 
 
Different individuals, under apparently the same conditions, show differences in the degree of attention.. . . [A]s 
a suggestion of the meaning of these general, individual conditions, we might surmise such things as ... the 
frontal lobes or some function thereof, ―mental constitution‖ or organization; or ―intellective energy.‖ 
(Woodrow, 1916, p. 285) 
 
Life definitely reveals two categories of people—artists and thinkers. . . . In the artist the activity of the cerebral 
hemispheres flowing through the whole mass, involve least of all the frontal lobes, concentrating chiefly on the 
remaining parts; in the thinkers, however, the converse is true. (Pavlov, 194 1, p. 113) 
 
The frontal lobes reach their phylogenetic and ontogenetic peak in adult Homo sapiens, where they occupy 
between 30% and 40% of the neocortical area (see, e.g., Brodmann, 1925; Damasio, 1991; Fuster, 1988; 
Goldman-Rakic, 1987). Such evolutionary and physical prominence has led many theorists to assign the highest 
of cognitive capabilities, and even the highest qualities of humanity itself, to the frontal cortex (e.g., Goldstein, 
1936, 1944; Halstead, 1947; Rylander, 1939). However, early clinical research on patients with frontal lobe 
damage indicated that such injury did not affect intelligence, at least as broadly defined by IQ test batteries 
(e.g., Ackerly, 1937; Hebb, 1939, 1945; Hebb & Penfield, 1940). Such null findings stand in stark contrast to 
the everyday cognitive difficulties reported by many patients with frontal dam-age, particularly by those with 
damage to the prefrontal cortex (PFC; see, e.g., J. M. Harlow, 1848; Lezak, 1983; Luria, 1966; Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991a, 1991b). 
 
Indeed, a more recent body of clinical observations and experimental research suggests that PFC injury and 
disease creates a formidable array of cognitive deficits. Such deficits include (but are not limited to) problems 
of attention, motor control, spatial orientation, short-term memory, temporal and source memory, metamemory, 
associative learning, creativity, perseveration, and reasoning (for reviews, see Fuster, 1988; Goldman-Rakic, 
1987; A. C. Roberts, Robbins, & Weiskrantz, 1998; Stuss & Benson, 1984; Wise, Murray, & Gerfen, 1996). 
 
In the sections that follow, we will critically and comprehensively review evidence that general working-
memory (WM) and executive-attention functions are subserved by neural circuits centered in and passing 
through the PFC. There is broad agreement in the literature that PFC circuits, and perhaps dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (dPFC) cells in particular, are critical for WM functions. From our perspective, the role of 
dPFC in WM is to maintain information in a highly active, easily accessible state. This maintenance is 
particularly important in the presence of interference, and it may be crucial in blocking the effects of distraction. 
Moreover, as we have argued elsewhere (e.g., Engle, 2001, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999), 
we view WM capacity, or the capability for executive attention, as the psychological core of the statistical 
construct of general fluid intelligence, or psychometric Gf. In this review, then, we will also evaluate evidence 
suggesting the importance of the dPFC to general fluid ability. We will further speculate that, because dPFC is 
critical to WM capacity and to Gf, normal individual differences in WM capacity and in Gf may be mediated by 
normal individual differences in dPFC functioning (see also Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Engle & Oransky, 
1999). 
 
As the quotes that began this paper may suggest, we do not claim to present a novel theory of PFC function, but 
rather we present an organizing framework for reviewing prior research and suggesting fruitful avenues for 
future work. Indeed, the lens through which we examine the literature has much in common with several 
prominent views of dPFC function, particularly those of Baddeley (1996), Dempster (1991, 1992), Duncan 
(1993, 1995), Fuster (1988, 1996), Goldman-Rakic (1987), Malmo (1942), E. K. Miller & Cohen (200 1), R. J. 
Roberts and Penning-ton (1996), Shallice and Burgess (1991b), Shimamura (2000), Smith and Jonides (1997), 
and Stuss, Shallice, Alexander, and Picton (1995). Our contribution here is novel, however, not just in the 
comprehensiveness of the review, but also in providing a unified perspective on four broad, overlapping 
constructs: WM capacity, attention control, fluid intelligence, and PFC function. Relations within only a subset 
of these constructs have been explored in detail before—for example, among attention, intelligence, and PFC 
(Dempster, 1991, 1992; Duncan, 1993, 1995). Moreover, although aspects of WM function have long been 
linked to the PFC (see, e.g., Jacobsen, 1935, 1936), the individual-differences construct of WM capacity has not. 
 
To summarize our view, the WM construct is assumed to be a hierarchical system involving short-term-memory 
(STM) representational components plus a general, executive-attention component (see Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Cowan, 1995, 1999). ―Span‖ tasks that reflect WM capacity are thought to 
reflect the contributions of both STM and executive-attention components (see, e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 
1980; Turner & Engle, 1989). However, the covariation among WM-span tasks and tasks of higher order 
cognition reflects primarily the executive-attention component in the system, and less the STM components. 
Normal individual differences in WM span are widely found to correlate with many facets of higher order 
cognition, including language comprehension, reasoning, and Gf. We believe that these correlations are driven 
by individual differences in executive attention. Thus, when we use the term ―WM capacity,‖ which we do for 
historical reasons, we are really referring to the capability of the executive-attention component of the WM 
system. 
 
By executive attention, we mean a capability whereby memory representations are maintained in a highly active 
state in the presence of interference, and these representations may reflect action plans, goal states, or task-
relevant stimuli in the environment. Critical to our view is that, while the active maintenance of information can 
be useful in many situations, it is most necessary under conditions of interference or response competition. This 
is because in the absence of interference, task-relevant information, goals, or response plans may be easily 
retrieved from long-term memory (LTM) as needed. Under interference-rich conditions, however, incorrect 
information and response tendencies are likely to be retrieved. Such contexts therefore set the occasion for 
relying on active maintenance of information. 
 
We further suggest that individual differences in executive attention may also reflect the capability to pre-vent 
attentional focus from being captured by mental or environmental distractors, and thus drawn away from the 
actively maintained target information. In interference-rich contexts, a loss of focus on the representation of 
target information will result in its returning to baseline activation levels and its being difficult to recover from 
LTM. Thus, active maintenance and distractor blocking are interdependent features of executive attention that 
we argue form the core of the WM capacity and Gf constructs. We also hope to persuade the reader that these 
dual features of executive attention are dependent on dPFC structures. 
 
We highlight here that our attentional view of WM capacity differs significantly from traditional notions of 
STM or WM emphasizing how large WM capacity is, or how much WM can hold (see, e.g., Daneman & 
Carpenter, 1980; G. A. Miller, 1956). The dependent measure in most WM-span tasks is, indeed, the amount of 
information that can be recalled in a particular context. Nonetheless, we emphasize the importance of WM 
capacity for maintaining access to even a single stimulus, goal, or response production in contexts providing 
potent interference. As we hope to make evident below, WM theories that focus on the size of WM capacity do 
not allow for the predictions or data that are accommodated by our framework. 
 
Below, we will critically review the evidence linking WM capacity and executive attention to the dPFC. How-
ever, we will first summarize the recent behavioral research linking WM capacity, attention control, and fluid 
ability that informs our framework. Subsequently, we will briefly review the difficulties in localizing WM 
functions to PFC circuitry, including considerations of anatomy and physiology, empirical methods, and 
individual differences. 
 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN WORKING-MEMORY CAPACITY AND EXECUTIVE CONTROL 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to review comprehensively the WM and intelligence literatures upon which 
our framework is based (we refer the interested reader to Conway & Kane, 2001; Engle, 2001; Engle, Kane, & 
Tuholski, 1999; Engle, Tuholski, et al., 1999). However, much of the research linking WM capacity, attention 
control, and Gf is relatively recent, and so we will briefly elaborate on our framework by reviewing the 
evidence linking these constructs. 
 
Much of the relevant research has used span tasks as an index of WM capacity. WM-span tasks typically 
require subjects to maintain short lists of items in memory while simultaneously processing other information, 
such as reading sentences or solving equations (see, e.g., Dane-man & Carpenter, 1980; Turner & Engle, 1989). 
Thus, the critical task—a memory-span test—is embedded within a secondary, processing task. Parametric and 
psychometric research has demonstrated that WM-span tasks are reliable and valid measures of the WM 
capacity construct (e.g., Engle, Tuholski, et al., 1999; Klein & Fiss, 1999). Moreover, individual differences in 
knowledge, processing abilities, or strategies used during the span task do not impact the correlations between 
span scores and complex cognitive measures (Conway & Engle, 1996; Engle, Cantor, & Carullo, 1992; Engle, 
Nations, & Cantor, 1990). 
 
Most importantly here, structural-equation-modeling studies show that latent variables representing the common 
variance among WM-span tasks correlate between .60 and .80 with latent variables comprising reasoning and 
Gf tasks (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, et al., 1999; Kail & Hall, 
2001; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Süß, Oberauer, Wittman, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002). In contrast, consider 
STM tasks such as word and digit span, which require immediate memory but do not include additional 
processing. These STM tasks, despite their shared variance with and surface similarity to WM-span tasks, do 
not demonstrate significant links to fluid ability after the contributions of WM are controlled for (Conway et al., 
2002; Engle, Tuholski, et al., 1999). Thus, a considerable body of research now shows that the skills and 
strategies related to either simple processing or simple retention cannot account for the WM span X ability 
relation. 
 
We have therefore proposed that WM is a system consisting of STM and executive-attention components. 
Moreover, only the general, executive-attention element of the WM system, the capability of which we call 
―WM capacity,‖ drives the predictive power of WM-span tasks (Engle, 2001, 2002; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 
1999; Engle, Tuholski, et al., 1999). In this view, WM-span tasks involve most of the processes required by 
STM tasks, represented by the shared variance that is evident between WM and STM constructs.1 In addition, 
WM tasks make greater demands on attention control than do STM tasks, because WM tasks present a 
secondary task to interfere with the primary retention task. We therefore view information maintenance in the 
presence of interference as the critical control function of WM capacity, and as the primary mechanism linking 
WM capacity with higher order cognitive ability. 
 
Quasi-experimental work has provided more direct evidence for an attentional mechanism of WM capacity, and 
one that is particularly relevant to interference. Such research has typically examined differences in attention-
control capabilities between extreme groups of high- and low-WM-capacity subjects (or between individuals of 
high and low intelligence). For example, individuals with low WM spans are more susceptible than those with 
high spans to various forms of LTM interference, such as fan-effect, output, retroactive, and proactive 
interference (Conway & Engle, 1994; Kane & Engle, 2000; Rosen & Engle, 1997, 1998). The same appears to 
be true for Gf, at least with respect to proactive and output interference (Borkowski, 1965; Dempster & Corkill, 
1999; E. Miller, 1984; Phillips, 1997, 1999). 
 
Even outside of traditional memory-tasks contexts, low-span/low-ability individuals demonstrate greater 
vulnerability to interference than do high-span/high-ability individuals in conditions that present potent 
competition between task goals and habitual responses. For example, in dichotic-listening tasks, subjects must 
shadow the message from one ear and ignore the message from the other ear. Here, low spans are over three 
times as likely as high spans to notice their names in the distractor channel, with 65% versus 20% of low versus 
high spans noticing, respectively (Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001). Thus, high spans were better able than 
low spans to resist the lure of the powerful orienting cue of their names being called, in the service of the novel 
task goal. Significant span differences are also seen in the antisaccade task, which presents subjects with a 
conflict between task goals and visual orienting cues (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). In this task, 
subjects saw an attention-capturing visual cue in the periphery and had to move their eyes and attention away 
from the cue, in the opposite direction, in order to detect a target stimulus there. In comparison with high spans, 
low spans erroneously made more eye movements toward the cue, corrected these errors more slowly, and were 
slower to identify the target stimuli. As in dichotic listening, high spans outperformed low spans in a task in 
which a novel goal had to be kept accessible in order to bias responding away from habit. However, high and 
low spans performed identically in a prosaccade condition in which subjects could reflexively look toward the 
cue to identify the target.2 
 
When one considers tasks that demand novel responses in the presence of conflict, the Stroop task inevitably 
comes to mind (see MacLeod, 199 1, for a review). In the Stroop task, subjects name the colors in which words 
or word-like stimuli are presented. When the color and the word conflict, as in the case of the word RED 
appearing in green, color naming is slowed (and more error prone) than when the word or word-like stimulus is 
unrelated to the color (e.g., PIN, or XXX, in green), or when the color and word match (e.g., GREEN in green). 
In fact, successful performance on the Stroop task correlates modestly with Gf measures (see, e.g., Dempster & 
Corkill, 1999; Pati & Dash, 1990; Valentine, 1975) and varies significantly with WM span (Kane & Engle, in 
press). With respect to Gf, Boone (1999) found that, after age was con-trolled for, full-scale IQ accounted for 
13% of Stroop variance. Kane, Sanchez, and Engle (1999) found that a single Gf measure correlated with 
Stroop interference at r = —.49. 
 
With respect to WM span, Kane and Engle (in press) predicted that it should best predict Stroop interference 
when memory-maintenance demands were maximized. They did this by presenting high proportions of 
congruent trials, in which the color and the word matched (e.g., RED presented in red). Kane and Engle (in 
press) reasoned that Stroop tasks that include many congruent stimuli should put a premium on keeping the 
novel task goal active and accessible in comparison with a task that presents only incongruent stimuli. This is 
because, on congruent trials, the word dimension leads to the same response as the color dimension, and so 
―accurate‖ responding can occur despite one’s acting according to habit and failing to act according to the goal. 
In such contexts, responses on rare incongruent trials should be especially sensitive to successful goal 
maintenance; if the goal is lost over many congruent trials, error will be likely on an incongruent trial. Indeed, 
in two experiments, we found that when 75 % of trials were congruent, low spans committed 55 % and 100% 
more word-naming errors on incongruent trials than did high spans. 
 
Our findings from dichotic-listening, antisaccade, and Stroop tasks provide strong preliminary evidence for 
span-related differences in goal neglect due to failed WM maintenance in the presence of interference. Perhaps 
the best evidence for a similar link between fluid intelligence and failed goal maintenance comes from the work 
of Dun-can and his colleagues (e.g., Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996; Duncan, Johnson, 
Swales, & Freer, 1997). In Duncan’s ―attention-switching‖ task, subjects monitor one of two stimulus streams 
on a computer screen for the appearance of letters. Periodically, an abstract cue (a ―+‖ or a ―—‖) is presented 
between the two streams, indicating that subjects should either continue monitoring the same stream or switch 
to monitoring the other. Subjects who reliably switch their attention on cue tend to score substantially higher on 
the Cattell Culture Fair Test of Gf (Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, 1973), with rs ranging from 
approximately .40 to .65. In fact, whereas almost no individuals with Cattell scores above the population mean 
fail to switch, nearly all individuals with scores below one standard deviation of the mean fail to switch (for 
similar findings from related tasks, see Arthur, Barrett, & Doverspike, 1990; Kahneman, Ben-Ishai, & Lotan, 
1973; McKenna, Duncan, & Brown, 1986). Thus, like WM capacity, Gf is a good predictor of the ability to 
maintain stimulus or goal information in an accessible state, particularly in the presence of interference from 
distractors or habit. 
 
COMPLEXITIES OF MAPPING WORKING-MEMORY CAPACITY AND Gf ONTO THE PFC 
Having briefly described the recent evidence linking WM capacity and executive attention to Gf, we now turn 
to the significant difficulties that arise when an attempt is made to map such executive-attention functions onto 
a particular brain structure. Perhaps the most obvious obstacle to applying localization-of-function research to 
the PFC is that the PFC is a structurally and functionally heterogeneous brain region (see, e.g., Barbas & 
Pandya, 1991; Fuster, 1980; Goldman-Rakic, 1987). Thus, we will hereafter focus our discussion on the 
dorsolateral region of the PFC, which has been the region most strongly (but not uniquely) associated with 
general cognitive functioning (see, e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1987). The dorso-lateral region roughly surrounds the 
principal sulcus, inferior convexity, and arcuate sulcus in the macaque monkey (Barbas & Pandya, 1991; 
Goldman-Rakic, 1987). By most accounts, it occupies some combination of Brodmann’s areas and Walker’s 
areas 46, 9, and 10, in humans and macaques, respectively (e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Pandya & Yeterian, 
1999; Petrides & Pandya, 1994). 
 
Limiting our focus to the dPFC does not solve our localization problem, however. This is because the dPFC is 
massively interconnected with other cortical and subcortical brain areas, as is the PFC as a whole (see, e.g., 
Barbas & Mesulam, 1981, 1985; Chow & Cummings, 1999; Fuster, 1980, 1989; Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Nauta, 
1964, 1972; Pandya & Yeterian , 1990). When considered in the context of human neuropsychology, these 
bidirectional projections pose an obvious problem for localizing any singlefunction to one locus within the 
circuit. That is, physical damage to any link in a series of neural connections may manifest itself similarly at a 
behavioral level. Moreover, typical PFC damage in humans, whether from trauma or from disease, is rather 
widespread at both cortical and subcortical levels (see Fuster, 1980; Petrides, 1989). More precise mapping of 
cognitive functions to brain structure, however, is allowed by several in vivo methodologies, such as positron 
emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (f MRI) (for reviews, see Posner & 
Raichle, 1994; Raichle, 1994). These techniques, particularly advances in event-related fMRI, hold great 
promise in revealing brain-behavior relations, but the results must still be interpreted with some caution, 
particularly those from older studies (see Sarter, Bernston, & Cacioppo, 1996; Sergent, 1994; R. P. Woods, 
1996). 
 
In addition to recent imaging work, extensive research with macaques has helped isolate the necessary and 
sufficient brain areas for some behavioral tasks. This work has allowed researchers either to preexperimentally 
deactivate circumscribed brain sites through surgical lesions or to deactivate and reactivate these areas through 
cooling methods, electrical stimulation, or by manipulating specific neurotransmitters (for a review, see 
Goldman-Rakic, 19 87). Nevertheless, with regard to understanding human prefrontal function, the few 
limitations to non-human research are serious ones. First, a relatively narrow breadth of tasks can reasonably be 
explored with monkeys, and sample sizes are necessarily quite small. Second, monkeys require hundreds, if not 
thousands, of trials to learn many of these tasks. It is therefore not clear whether the monkey brain that is 
lesioned after learning is the same brain that existed before learning (O’Reilly, Braver, & Cohen, 1997). 
 
The difficulties discussed above have been noted previously by other authors. However, our theoretical 
framework also raises the important possibility, not considered before, that dPFC damage might have different 
consequences depending upon premorbid individual differences in WM capacity and Gf. If WM capacity, 
executive attention, and fluid intelligence all reflect a common mechanism, and if this mechanism is mediated 
by the prefrontal cortex, then any study of prefrontal function will be complicated by the confluence of 
individual differences and task demands. Thus, whether cognitive deficits on a task are observed after damage 
to dPFC will depend on premorbid individual differences in WM capacity/Gf and on whether that task involves 
sufficient interference to require, or be sensitive to, executive processing. 
 
For example, in some tasks in which high-span individuals outperform low spans (e.g., in verbal fluency, 
proactive interference, and visual selective-attention tasks), adding a secondary load task hurts the performance 
of only the high spans, turning them into functional low spans. Counterintuitively, the performance of low spans 
is unaffected by the secondary task (see, e.g., Bleckley, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2000; Rosen & Engle, 1997). 
Such findings suggest that, in some contexts, high spans engage attentional processing to achieve their superior 
performance, whereas low spans do not, and so only high spans suffer when attention is taxed by the secondary 
task. Low spans, because of their limited executive-attention capabilities, tend to rely more on automatic 
processing, whereas high spans rely more on attentional processing within the same task. We therefore propose 
that in high-WM-capacity/Gf individuals, PFC damage, like an attentional load, will lead to greater behavioral 
deficits than will similar damage in low-WM-capacity/Gf individuals. In effect, dPFC damage, like a secondary 
attentional load, should make a former high-span individual perform like a low-span individual, whereas in 
many cases low spans should be relatively unaffected.3 
 
Despite the interpretive complexities outlined above, we are optimistic that the data from a convergence of 
methods provide at least a crude framework for an understanding of the role of the dPFC in WM capacity, 
executive attention, and Gf. We will attempt to specify this framework throughout by proposing that the 
common variance among WM capacity/executive attention, Gf, and dPFC functioning is the degree to which a 
task requires that a memory representation be maintained in a highly active state. Moreover, individual 
differences in this common construct will most readily be observed in task situations involving interference and 
distraction. 
 
CONVERGING MODELS OF PFC INVOLVEMENT IN WORKING-MEMORY CAPACITY 
Before beginning our review of the relevant empirical findings, we will highlight two recent views of PFC and 
WM function that have had a major impact on our perspective. As discussed previously, Duncan and his 
colleagues have argued that Gf reflects an executive attentional capability that, when deficient, may result in 
―goal neglect‖ in some contexts (e.g., Duncan, 1990, 1993, 1995; Duncan et al., 1996). Similar to the 
supervisory attention system of Shallice (1988; Norman & Shallice, 1986), this view holds that abstract 
(hierarchical) goal representations guide behavior when the environment elicits no particular response or a 
contextually inappropriate response. When goal states are neglected in these contexts, or, as we would argue, 
when they are not actively maintained by WM, behavior will appear disorganized, perseverative, or otherwise 
inappropriate. Critically, ac-cording to Duncan (1990, 1993, 1995), the attentional ―goal-weighting‖ capability 
that allows for coherent, goal-directed behavior is central to psychometric Gf and relies heavily on PFC circuits 
for effective functioning. 
 
We see an important parallel here between Duncan’s (1990, 1993, 1995) theory and the more formal model of 
executive and PFC function proposed by Cohen and his colleagues (e.g., Braver & Cohen, 2000; Cohen & 
Servan-Schreiber, 1992; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; O’Reilly, Braver, & Cohen, 1999). Specifically, Cohen’s 
model implements the control capabilities of the PFC as the ability to maintain context information (or task 
demands) in an active state. Moreover, the active maintenance of task demands has the effect of reducing 
competition from distractors through lateral inhibition. This is precisely the kind of maintenance function we 
have emphasized as critical to understanding WM capacity and Gf (see also R. J. Roberts & Pennington, 1996). 
Cohen and colleagues further suggest that the WM system is a distributed one, specifically involving PFC, 
anterior cingulate, hippocampal complex, and posterior sensory and motor cortex. The PFC is the critical 
component in active maintenance amid interference (Cohen, Braver, & O’Reilly, 1996, 1998; O’Reilly et al., 
1999). 
 
According to the Cohen model, different cortical structures evolved complementary specialties in order that the 
whole brain could best accommodate varied and dynamic processing demands. Posterior sensory and motor 
cortex evolved to allow slow, integrative learning using widely distributed representations. In contrast, the 
hippocampus and PFC developed to operate on more discrete representations. The hippocampus rapidly learns 
arbitrary information and associations by episodically binding stimulus and context information. PFC 
dynamically maintains and updates goal information to bias processing in networked areas and to retrieve goal-
relevant information from those areas as needed. Thus, ―controlled‖ or executive processing emerges from the 
interactions among these complementary brain regions. 
 
Critically, from our perspective, the PFC is what allows for active maintenance and interference control in the 
Cohen model (Cohen et al., 1998; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; O’Reilly et al., 1999). Specifically, interference 
control arises from the interaction of two separate mechanisms. First, PFC representations are strongly 
interconnected and so recurrent excitation leads to their sustained activity (see also Dehaene & Changeux, 
1989). Such recurrent excitation alone, however, would have the side effect of making PFC activity difficult to 
rapidly shift and update, which is clearly not the case. Second, Cohen and colleagues therefore propose that 
dopamine circuits between PFC and midbrain areas (e.g., ventral tegmental area, or VTA) also serve a ―gating‖ 
role (see Braver & Cohen, 2000). That is, descending fibers from the PFC may block task-irrelevant 
representations from interfering with active maintenance. Given that the PFC controls the release of dopamine 
from VTA, it can bias the signals from other brain areas back to itself. For example, the PFC may signal 
dopamine release to increase the signal strength from other brain areas when updating is necessary (e.g., after 
completion of a goal). Or, the PFC may signal dopamine release to increase activity in inhibitory loops when 
updating is not necessary (e.g., before completion of a goal). Although this proposal is somewhat speculative at 
this time, it provides a biologically plausible implementation of the maintenance and blocking/inhibition 
functions of WM capacity that we review here (see also Kimberg, D’Esposito, & Farah, 1997; Luciana, Depue, 
Arbisi, & Leon, 1992). 
 
WORKING-MEMORY CAPACITY AND THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX 
In this section, we comprehensively review the evidence that the dPFC is central to the executive-attention 
processes of the WM system. Our discussion will first focus on findings from tasks in the traditional Baddeley 
and Hitch (1974) approach to WM. In these executive-attention tasks, subjects must maintain information in 
memory while simultaneously processing additional in-formation. We will then consider the research that has 
isolated other executive functions, such as maintaining information while focusing and switching attention. 
Finally, we will review evidence for dPFC involvement in the performance of psychometric tests that reflect Gf. 
 
It is difficult to define an appropriate subject sample (or samples) with which to study dPFC function, and any 
such decision is open to some criticism. Our own choices were influenced by two main goals: to provide a 
rather complete review of the relevant empirical work, and also to keep the size of this potentially mammoth 
literature manageable. In the sections that follow, then, we primarily review studies using the following subject 
samples: (1) nonhuman primates with surgical brain lesions (or temporary deactivation of brain regions); (2) 
adult humans with brain damage due to stroke, tumors or tumor resection, aneurysm repair surgery, or 
penetrating head wounds; and, finally, (3) healthy adult humans studied with various brain-imaging techniques. 
Although a review of related research with neuropsychiatric or developmental populations is clearly relevant to 
present purposes, we must leave it to other authors (see, e.g., Diamond, 1990, 1991; Pennington, 1994; R. J. 
Roberts & Pennington, 1996; West, 1996). 
 
Working-Memory Capacity 
A significant volume of research relevant to our conception of WM capacity has been conducted with non-
human primates as subjects, and so we begin our discussion there. Data have come primarily from three classes 
of macaque subject groups. They are those with surgical lesions to circumscribed brain areas, those with 
implants that temporarily deactivate brain areas through cooling or electrical current, and those with electrode 
implants to allow for single-cell recordings. Following our review of this monkey research, we will discuss the 
corresponding work with human patients and with healthy human adults. 
 
Nonhuman Primate Research 
The WM capacity of macaque monkeys is inferred from delay tasks, with ―delay‖ referring to the interval 
imposed between presentation of a stimulus and testing of a subject’s memory for it. Since Jacobsen’s (1935, 
1936) demonstration that delay-task performance is highly sensitive to PFC damage, the delay tasks most 
commonly employed in this research domain have been the delayed-response task, the delayed-alternation task, 
the delayed matching-to-sample task, and the self/externally ordered memory task (for reviews, see Funahashi 
& Kubota, 1994; Goldman-Rakic, 1987, 1995; Petrides, 1995). In each task, the subject must remember spatial 
or object information across a delay and must update the memory representation of that information from trial 
to trial, particularly because the same stimuli may repeat across trials. 
 
More specifically, on each trial of the delayed-response task, the monkey views two or more possible spatial 
locations while one is randomly ―baited‖ or otherwise deemed relevant. After a delay, in which the locations are 
typically removed from view, the monkey is rewarded for recalling the relevant location, evidenced either by 
reaching or by an eye-movement response. In the delayed-alternation task, the monkey views two possible 
spatial locations (or two objects), one of which is baited out of the monkey’s view; here, baiting is always 
contingent upon the previously baited location or object. That is, if on one trial the monkey is rewarded for 
selecting one location or object, on the next trial it will be rewarded for selecting the opposite location or object. 
Critically, a delay is imposed between successive responses. In the delayed matching-to-sample task, the 
monkey views a sample object that is then removed from view for some time. At test, the monkey views two 
objects, one of which is the sample, and it is rewarded for responding to the sample. The delayed matching-to-
sample task is particularly interesting with respect to our executive-attention framework. It not only requires 
monkeys to maintain information across a delay, but it also forces them to inhibit their natural tendency to 
respond to novel stimuli in the environment. Finally, in the self/externally ordered memory task, the monkey 
views series of sample objects, or series of sample locations, and must choose a sample on each trial that had 
not yet been chosen on any previous trial. Here, then, monkeys must maintain and update a representation of 
previously selected objects in order to avoid responding to them in the future. 
 
These delay tasks may appear to have more in common with STM tasks than with WM-span tasks. That is, they 
involve only information storage and do not additionally demand simultaneous processing of other information, 
as do human WM-capacity tasks (although the delayed matching-to-sample task does additionally require 
monkeys to withhold a prepotent response). Recall that, whereas WM-capacity tasks require people to study and 
recall stimulus lists while processing unrelated information, STM tasks do not, and only WM-span tasks 
consistently correlate with measures of complex cognitive ability (see, e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; 
Engle, Tuholski, et al., 1999; Turner & Engle, 1989). 
 
However, we note that in the delay tasks with monkeys, attentional focus is typically drawn away from the to-
be-recalled stimuli during the delay. This is done either by placing an opaque physical barrier between the 
subject and the stimuli, thus requiring eye fixation on a nontarget location, or by requiring a maintained 
reaching response to a nontarget location (see, e.g., Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; H. F. Harlow, 
Davis, Settlage, & Meyer, 1952; Niki, 1974b). Such distractions are not present in human STM tasks, such as 
digit-span tasks, in which recall is tested immediately. Thus, delay tasks do seem analogous to human WM-
capacity tasks, in that successful performance on the task requires that information about the stimulus be 
maintained for use in the presence of distracting elements in the environment, as well as in the presence of 
interference from prior-trial information at retrieval. 
 
When the opaque physical barrier is placed between the monkey and the stimuli, or when a maintained response 
is required to a location other than that of the stimuli, the monkey is distracted by other elements in the 
environment. That is, the monkey may simply ―think‖ about something other than the stimuli. And, while 
―thinking‖ about something else, the monkey loses the previously highly active representation of the target 
stimulus. Indeed, in healthy monkeys, illuminating the testing chamber during the delay reduces memory 
performance in comparison with darkened delays (see, e.g., D’Amato & O’Neill, 197 1; Harper & White, 1997; 
Salmon & D’Amato, 1981; Worsham & D’Amato, 1973). This is presumably because illumination allows 
visual distraction during the delay, whereas darkness minimizes it. Therefore, the presence of a distraction 
during the delay, and the potential for retrieval interference from the repetition of stimuli and locations across 
trials, make these delay tasks reasonable analogues of human WM-capacity tasks. We should also note, in this 
regard, that the task demands required to tap a particular construct in adult humans (here, WM capacity) may be 
quite different from those required to tap that construct in nonhuman primates, or even in human children (see 
Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Engle, Tuholski, et al., 1999). 
 
To return to the PFC literature, dorsolateral prefrontal areas—particularly those anterior to the arcuate sulcus 
and surrounding the principal sulcus—are critical to normal performance in all of the delay tasks described 
above (see Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Rosenkilde, 1979). Accuracy drops to near-chance levels in monkeys with 
lesions to Walker’s areas 9, 10, and 46, even with delays of mere seconds (see, e.g., Battig, Rosvold, & 
Mishkin, 1960; Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1993; Goldman & Rosvold, 1970; Goldman, Rosvold, 
Vest, & Galkin, 1971; Mishkin & Pribram, 1955, 1956; Oscar-Berman, 1975; Pribram & Mishkin, 1956; W. A. 
Wilson, 1962; but see Petrides, 1995). Similarly, macaques with temporary dorsolateral ―lesions‖ brought about 
by cortical cooling or electrical current show significant delay-task impairments (see, e.g., Bauer & Fuster, 
1976; Fuster & Bauer, 1974; Quintana & Fuster, 1993; Shindy, Posley, & Fuster, 1994; Stamm, 1961; Stamm & 
Rosen, 1973). However, lesions to many other brain areas, even in more ventral or superior PFC, often do not 
produce such deficits (see, e.g., Goldman et al., 1971; Mishkin & Pribram, 1955, 1956; Oscar-Berman, 1975; 
Pohl, 1973; but see, e.g., Battig et al., 1960; Rosvold & Delgado, 1956; Zola-Morgan & Squire, 1985). 
 
Single-unit recordings from dPFC cells indicate significant neural populations whose firing is concomitant with 
delay periods. That is, they begin firing when the cue information either appears or disappears, and they 
continue firing during the delay until a response is initiated. Such cells seem to hold cue-related information ―on 
line‖ during the delay (see, e.g., Fuster, 1973; Fuster & Alexander, 1973; Fuster, Bauer, & Jervey, 1985; 
Kikuchi-Yorioka & Sawaguchi, 2000; Kojima & Goldman-Rakic, 1982, 19 84; Kubota & Niki , 197 1; Kubota, 
Tonoike, & Mikami , 1980; E. K. Miller, Erickson, & Desimone, 1996; Niki, 1974a, 1974b, 1974c; Niki & 
Watanabe, 1976; Quintana, Yajeya, & Fuster, 1988; Romo, Brody, Hernández, & Lemus, 1999; Rosenkilde, 
Bauer, & Fuster, 198 1). 
 
Moreover, at least for cells within the principal sulcus region of dPFC in the monkey, circumscribed ―memory 
fields‖ can be seen. Analogous to visual-system neurons with distinct receptive fields, many principal sulcus 
cells respond preferentially to stimuli in specific regions of space. These cells are particularly active during the 
encoding and delay-maintenance of stimuli in their preferred locations (see, e.g., Batuev, Shaefer, & Orlov, 
1985; Funahashi et al., 1989; Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1990; Rainer, Asaad, & Miller, 1998; F. A. 
W. Wilson, O’Scalaidhe, & Goldman-Rakic, 1993). Delay-period specificity is not limited to the spatial 
domain, however. Objects may also elicit selectivity in dPFC cells (Rainer et al., 1998): In a delayed matching-
to-sample task, monkeys responded when a specific sample object, appearing with two distractors, was repeated 
in the same location. The sample stimulus was consistent across trials within a trial block, but it varied between 
blocks. Thus, in a context in which both object and location in-formation was relevant to correct responding, 
object-specific and location-specific maintenance cells were identified. (As we will discuss later, however, more 
dPFC cells were identified as responding generally to both object and location dimensions than as responding 
specifically to only the object or only the location dimension; see also Rao, Rainer, & Miller, 1997.) 
Interestingly, object-specific cells fired above baseline even during the delays between trials, within a block, 
suggesting that the object-specific cells were maintaining the identity of that trial block’s sample stimulus in 
order to help guide attention to the sample among the distractors. 
 
Our arguments about the WM—as opposed to the STM—demands of these delay tasks is further supported by 
an important experiment by Malmo (1942). Monkeys with large dorsolateral lesions performed at chance level 
in the delayed-response task if a light was kept on during a 10-sec delay, as is typical. The lit conditions 
presumably allowed subjects to attend to other objects in the environment. However, if the lights were turned 
off during the delay, thus minimizing distraction from other visual stimuli, the PFC monkeys were virtually 
unimpaired. These findings strongly suggest that the dPFC maintains memory representations in the presence of 
environmental distractions that may switch focus away from the active maintenance of that representation. 
When focus is briefly shifted, interference may make retrieval of recent stimuli or task demands much more 
time-consuming and error prone. 
 
Indeed, Bartus and LaVere (1977) also found that inter-stimulus delays are much less important to dPFC-related 
memory deficits than is the presence of distraction during the delay. Monkeys with dPFC lesions were 
compared with unoperated monkeys. On a traditional delayed-memory task, lesioned monkeys performed at 
chance with a 10-sec delay, but normally with a 0-sec delay, replicating previous findings. Subjects were also 
tested in a combined delayed-memory/delayed matching-to-sample task. Here, the monkeys viewed two stimuli 
for 500 msec, one to the right and one to the left, each consisting of a pattern of three illuminated lights. Eight 
patterns were arbitrarily but consistently defined as targets and eight were defined as distractors. On each trial, 
the monkey was rewarded for pulling a lever on the same side as the target pattern and ignoring the lever on the 
side of the distractor pattern. 
 
When the target and distractor patterns were presented together for 1,000 msec, and until responding was 
permitted, the lesioned and nonlesioned monkeys performed equally well, requiring an average of 60–70 trials 
to reach a 90% accuracy criterion. The groups also performed equivalently when a 500-msec blank interval was 
inserted between the target display and the response. The dPFC-lesioned monkeys were significantly impaired, 
however, in a second condition that presented additional distractors during the delay. Here, the target and 
distractor patterns appeared together for 500 msec, followed by a brief presentation of two distractor patterns. 
Responses were not permitted until after the distractors appeared. In this condition, in which distractor patterns 
intervened between stimulus and response, normal monkeys again took only about 60 trials to reach criterion. 
Monkeys with dPFC lesions, in contrast, took an average of over 220 trials to do so. Consistent with Malmo’s 
(1942) findings, then, monkeys with lesions to the dPFC were particularly impaired in remembering target 
information when attention was drawn away from the target during even a very brief delay. Without the 
maintained activation of target information, and with proactive interference from prior trials impairing LTM 
retrieval, monkeys cannot perform delayed-memory tasks without intact dPFC. 
 
Finally, we note that several brain areas that are anatomically networked with the dPFC also are important to 
delay-task success. For example, lesions to nuclei of the basal ganglia and thalamus, to hippocampal regions, or 
to some parietal and temporal cortex areas produce delay performance deficits; moreover, single-unit recordings 
and imaging data from these structures indicate delay-period activity in a considerable number of cells (see, 
e.g., Alexander & Fuster, 1973; Batuev et al., 1985; Baylis & Rolls, 1987; Friedman & Goldman Rakic, 1988; 
Koch & Fuster, 1989; Shindy et al., 1994; Watanabe & Niki, 1985; Zola-Morgan & Squire, 1985). These 
findings of posterior and subcortical participation in delay-task performance make good sense. First, these 
various structures are neurally interconnected, and second, virtually no cognitive task is performed by a single 
brain region. Complex tasks such as those tapping WM capacity appear to involve integrated circuits that work 
in concert to solve behavioral problems involving immediate memory (see Goldman-Rakic, 1987). 
 
However, we also emphasize that recent evidence suggests that, for cells in posterior areas, firing during the 
delay is significantly disrupted if distractor stimuli are presented prior to the target (Constantinidis & Steinmetz, 
1996; E. K. Miller & Desimone, 1994; E. K. Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1993). Such disruption is not seen in 
delay-responsive dPFC cells (di Pellegrino & Wise, 1993a, 1993b; E. K. Miller et al., 1996). These data 
suggest, again, that dPFC cells are uniquely critical to retaining information across delays when interference 
and distraction are present (Bartus & LaVere, 1977; Malmo, 1942). Without dPFC activity, the presence of a 
salient distractor causes target representations to be lost from active memory, and the buildup of proactive 
interference across trials makes these representations more difficult to retrieve from LTM. Therefore, even 
though posterior and subcortical brain areas are important to some aspects of delay-task performance, the 
dorsolateral PFC appears to be special in its role of maintaining the activation of memory representations in the 
presence of interference, when shifts of attention away from targets may lead to a loss of their rapid 
accessibility. 
 
Human Research 
Memory-span tasks. As far as we know, only one case study and one experiment have tested human patients 
with PFC damage on complex WM-span tests that re-quire subjects to remember words while also reading un-
related sentences (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). Results were mixed. In the case report, a patient with a severe 
head injury to the left frontal lobe was able to attain simple digit span scores of 4 and 5 (with visual and 
auditory stimuli, respectively). However, the patient was unable to recall any of the smallest sets of two words 
in the sentence span task (Van der Linden, Coyette, & Seron, 1992). Thus, the frontal damage appeared to 
impair recall most severely in a WM task. Given that this was a case study, however, we have no premorbid 
assessment or control condition with which to compare these STM and WM scores. A controlled experiment 
comparing lobectomy patients with frontal cortex damage (n = 12) with those with temporal cortex damage (n = 
50) and with healthy controls (n = 17) revealed no significant differences among groups on the sentence span 
task (Frisk & Milner, 1990). How-ever, for the frontal patients, the rank–order correlation between extent of 
damage and various scores from the span task ranged from r = .34 to r = .38, indicating that less frontal damage 
was associated with higher span scores. Although these correlations were not significant (p < .05), perhaps due 
to the small sample size, they are consistent with recent data collected from healthy adult volunteers (Raz, 
Briggs, Marks, & Acker, 1999). In that study, a composite measure of WM span correlated modestly with 
individuals’ dorsolateral PFC volume corrected for height, as measured by MRI (r = .29). WM span scores did 
not correlate significantly with volume of fusiform gyrus (r = . 16), inferior temporal lobe (r = .06), or occipital 
cortex (r = -. 13). 
 
Delayed-memory tasks. Human patients with PFC damage also show clear deficits on delay tasks that are 
similar to those exhibited by brain-lesioned macaques (Baldo & Shimamura, 2000; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, 
& Anderson, 1998; Chorover & Cole, 1966; Dubois et al., 1995; Freedman & Oscar-Berman, 1986; Ptito, 
Crane, Leonard, Amsel, & Caramanos, 1995).4 For example, in computer-presented delayed-response and 
delayed-alternation tasks with 15-sec delays, frontal patients with unilateral stroke damage showed significant 
impairments compared with posterior-damaged and non-brain-damaged controls (Verin et al., 1993). In the 
delayed-response task, no control patients made errors, only 2 of the 10 posterior patients made errors, yet 7 of 
the 10 frontal patients made errors. Ferreira et al. (1998) tested mixed-etiology patients in a computerized 
delayed-response task with 500-msec versus 10-sec delays. Eight patients with unilateral frontal lesions (most 
including dPFC) and 10 patients with unilateral inferior temporal lesions were each compared with patients in 
an age-matched, healthy control group. On each trial, 12 randomly arranged blue squares appeared, and then 2 
to 5 of the squares turned red for 2–3.5 sec. These red squares were the targets for that trial. After the delay, 
during which the screen was black, all 12 squares reappeared. The subjects then touched the target squares in 
any order. All groups performed equivalently on the 500-msec delay trials. Although ceiling effects may have 
limited the sensitivity of the test, only the frontal patients showed a significant decrease in memory on 1 0-sec 
delay trials. Frontal patients appeared to have great difficulties recalling target sets larger than two items on 
long-delay trials, whereas temporal patients were unimpaired across all set sizes. 
 
Brain-imaging studies of healthy humans performing delay tasks have principally employed delayed matching-
to-sample tasks. However, they have provided less clear results than those described above for lesion studies 
(for other reviews of this literature, see Haxby, Petit, Ungerleider, & Courtney, 2000; Jonides et al., 1996; Mc-
Carthy, 1995). On one hand, imaging studies with delayed matching-to-sample tasks using human faces as 
stimuli have shown increasing dPFC activity across increasing delays (e.g., from 1 to 21 sec).5 Structural 
equation modeling suggests that the loci of increased activity occur bilaterally, between dPFC (Brodmann 46) 
and anterior cingulate (Brodmann 24) circuits, and between more ventral PFC (Brodmann 47) and posterior 
areas 21 and 37 (McIntosh, Grady, Haxby, Ungerleider, & Horwitz, 1996; see also Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil, 
& Haxby, 1996, 1997; Grady et al., 1998; Haxby, Ungerleider, Horwitz, Rapoport, & Grady, 1995). 
 
On the other hand, PET studies of delay tasks with object stimuli (primarily novel shapes) or with spatial 
stimuli often show very little prefrontal activation. When PFC activation is seen at all, it is most often centered 
in Broca’s area, more ventral PFC areas, and/or around pre-motor cortex and supplementary motor areas (see, 
e.g., Awh et al., 1996; Dupont et al., 1993; Jonides et al., 1993; Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & 
Passingham, 2000;6 Smith, Jonides, & Koeppe, 1996; Smith et al., 1995). 
 
We would explain such discrepant findings by noting that the delays in most of the ―negative‖ studies were too 
brief to necessitate dPFC involvement. Study–test intervals were typically as short as 3 sec or less. Although the 
nonhuman primate literature suggests prefrontal involvement across very brief delays, humans may be able to 
perform such brief-delay tasks with minimal use of executive attention—and thus of the dPFC—especially with 
verbally codable stimuli (see Engle, Tuholski, et al., 1999). Indeed, in PET and fMRI studies of delayed-
response tasks using relatively long delays, dPFC activation does consistently occur (Baker, Frith, Frackowiak, 
& Dolan, 1996; Barch et al., 1997; D’Esposito, Ballard, Zarahn, & Aguirre, 2000; Fiez et al., 1996; Goldberg, 
Berman, Randolph, Gold, & Weinberger, 1996; Rypma & D’Esposito, 1999; Swartz, Halgren, Fuster, & 
Mandelkern, 1994). Four studies showing significant dPFC activation, even with relatively short delays, have 
used tasks that are more demanding. For example, delayed alternation and delayed response requirements were 
combined into a single task (Gold, Berman, Randolph, Goldberg, & Weinberger, 1996), or subjects had to 
maintain multiple stimuli at once (Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 2000; Rypma, Prabhakaran, 
Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1999; Stern et al., 2000).7 
 
Furthermore, as we noted previously, most delayed-memory experiments with macaques present some kind of 
distractor during the delay, and none of the ―negative‖ human studies drew attention away from the target 
stimuli between study and test. Given that subjects were neither distracted nor required to process new 
information during the delay, these brief-delay tasks were closer to STM tasks than to WM-capacity tasks. That 
is, these tasks may allow insight into the brain areas involved in the short-term storage component of the WM 
system, such as those involving more ventral/ventrolateral PFC areas (see Owen, Evans, & Petrides, 1996; 
Petrides, 1989). They probably do not provide much information about the circuits underlying WM capacity/ 
executive attention. Indeed, delay tasks that require manipulation of the tar-get information during the delay, 
such as alphabetizing a group of random letters, demonstrate increased delay-period dPFC activity relative to 
tasks not requiring such manipulation (D’Esposito, Postle, Ballard, & Lease, 1999; Postle & D’Esposito, 2000). 
Moreover, the dPFC areas that are sensitive to manipulation requirements do not appear to be particularly 
sensitive to changes in memory load, as indexed by delay-period activity across increasing sizes of memory sets 
(Jha & McCarthy, 2000; Postle, Berger, & D’Esposito, 1999; but see Postle & D’Esposito, 2000). 
 
n-Back tasks. Simultaneous storage and manipulation of information is clearly required by the emerging ―gold-
standard‖ task in imaging studies of WM, the n-back task (Kirchner, 1958; Mackworth, 1959). Accordingly, the 
n-back task consistently shows dPFC involvement. For example, in one PET study using the 3- back task, 
subjects responded to each stimulus object in a continuous sequence only if it matched the item seen three items 
ago (Smith et al., 19 96, Experiment 2). In another condition, subjects responded to the stimulus if it appeared in 
a location that was occupied three items ago. Thus, in both conditions subjects had to selectively maintain 
information about prior stimuli as they encoded each new stimulus. Dorsolateral areas 46 and 9 showed 
increased bilateral activation in both object and spatial 3- back conditions compared with control conditions (for 
similar PET results, see Petrides, Alivisatos, Meyer, & Evans, 1993; Schumacher et al., 1996). 
 
Research using f MRI techniques has provided converging evidence of the activation of dPFC areas during n-
back performance. Cohen et al. (1994) presented subjects with a 2-back task with letter stimuli and a 1-sec 
interstimulus interval (ISI). In comparison with a control task in which subjects responded any time they saw 
the letter X, the 2-back task produced significant activation in PFC areas 46, 9, and 10 (and also in more inferior 
areas 45 and 47, and in anterior cingulate). In two experiments, Braver et al. (1997) showed linearly increasing 
activity in dorsolateral areas 9 and 46 as WM load in-creased from a 1-back, to a 2-back, to a 3-back task. 
(Increased activity was also seen in PFC areas 44 and 45.) In their Experiment 2, which utilized whole-brain 
scans, significant memory-related activity was additionally detected in posterior frontal (Brodmann 4 and 6) and 
posterior parietal (Brodmann 40/7) cortices, and in the caudate nucleus of the basal ganglia. Thus, as expected, 
dPFC and regions anatomically networked to it showed significant increases in activation as WM load increased 
(see also Honey, Bullmore, & Sharma, 2000; Jonides et al., 1997; Martinkauppi, Rämä, Aronen, Korvenoja, & 
Carlson, 2000; Nyström et al., 2000; Pfefferbaum et al., 2001; Seidman et al., 1998). Moreover, this dPFC 
activation is maintained at a constant rate throughout ISIs between 10 and 20 sec (Cohen et al., 1997). 
 
Many n-back studies elicit bilateral, and roughly sym-metrical, dPFC activation (e.g., Braver et al., 2001; 
Braver et al., 1997; Cohen et al., 1994; Martinkauppi et al., 2000; Seidman et al., 1998; Smith et al., 1996). 
However, McCarthy and colleagues have found that dPFC activation varies between object and spatial WM 
tasks (Mc-Carthy et al., 1994; McCarthy et al., 1996).8 Here, when subjects monitored a stimulus stream for 
repetitions of objects, both hemispheres showed significant dPFC activation, with higher levels in the left 
hemisphere than in the right (but for the opposite result, see Callicott et al., 1999). When subjects monitored a 
stimulus stream for repetitions of locations, only right-hemisphere dPFC activation was significant. Somewhat 
consistent findings were reported from a multisite, multiscanner study in which a spatial 2-back task produced 
slightly to substantially greater right than left hemisphere activity, depending upon how data were pooled 
(Casey et al., 1998). Likewise, in a paced task resembling the n-back task, in which multiple stimulus locations 
had to be continuously tracked, increasing memory load was associated with greater increases in right than in 
left dPFC activity (Diwadkar, Carpenter, & Just, 2000). 
 
Although the domain generality of dPFC activity in the n-back task remains controversial, recent work has 
suggested that the inconsistent findings of lateralization in spatial versus object tasks may result largely from 
normal individual differences. D’Esposito, Ballard, Aguirre, and Zarahn (1998) examined patterns of 
lateralization in spatial versus object 2-back tasks across individual subjects. Half of the subjects showed either 
bilateral dPFC activation during both tasks or matching unilateral dPFC activation in both tasks, consistent with 
the prior findings of similar lateralization in object and spatial tasks. However, the other half of the subjects 
showed bilateral activation in one of the tasks (most often the verbal task) and unilateral activation in the other, 
which was somewhat more consistent with the McCarthy group’s findings (McCarthy et al., 1994; McCarthy et 
al., 1996). We note, however, that no subjects showed uniquely right hemisphere activation in one task and 
uniquely left hemisphere activation in the other. Similarly, Postle, Stern, Rosen, and Corkin (2000, Experiment 
1) found that exactly half of their subjects showed greater dPFC activation in spatial than in object n-back tasks. 
No evidence was found across their three experiments for systematic differences between spatial and object 
tasks in the anatomical loci of dPFC activity. 
 
Finally, in tasks combining location and identity retention, Jansma, Ramsey, Coppola, and Kahn (2000) in an n-
back task, and Postle and D’Esposito (1999) in a delayed-memory task, found load/delay-specific dorso-lateral 
PFC activity in 83% and in 100% of their subjects, respectively. In the n-back study, three subjects showed left-
lateralized activity, three showed right-lateralized activity, and four showed bilateral activity. In the delayed-
memory study, four of five subjects showed bilateral activity for spatial delays and three of five showed 
bilateral activity for object delays. In both studies, there was much greater variability between subjects within a 
domain (object vs. spatial) than between domains within a subject. Indeed, a recent behavioral study found 
performance on verbal, object, and location n-back tasks to correlate with rs between .50 and .80, indicating 
considerable shared variance among these tasks (Hartley, Speer, Jonides, Reuter-Lorenz, & Smith, 2001).9 It 
appears that further individual-differences work will be important to our future understanding of the laterality of 
WM-related brain activity during n-back and delayed-memory tasks (for more on this controversy, see 
Goldman-Rakic, 2000; E. K. Miller, 2000; Postle & D’Esposito, 2000). 
 
For now, however, our reading of the imaging work discussed thus far is that the preponderance of the evidence 
supports some overlapping neural substrate for spatial and object WM capacity (see also the reviews by 
D’Esposito, Aguirre, et al., 1998; Owen, 1997). As evidenced by delay tasks with brain-injured patients and by 
imaging studies with healthy human subjects, the dorsolateral PFC is significantly involved in memory tasks 
that require subjects to maintain information in memory in the presence of interference, especially if attentional 
focus is temporarily drawn away from target information by distractors or by the processing / manipulation of 
other targets. 
 
Executive Attention Research 
As summarized previously, individual differences in WM capacity among healthy adults reliably predict 
individual differences in rather ―molecular‖ executive-attention tasks such as Stroop, antisaccade, and dichotic 
listening tasks (for reviews, see Conway & Kane, 2001; Engle, 2001; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999). Thus, we 
consider the constructs of WM capacity and executive attention to be largely overlapping, if not isomorphic (see 
also Baddeley, 1996; Engle, 1996). One might expect, then, that the brain structures that support WM capacity 
should be similar or identical to those that support executive-attention capabilities. Faculties of WM capacity 
appear to rely on the dPFC, as was described in the preceding sections, and so this brain region should be 
important to executive attention. We will now review the empirical evidence supporting such a link between 
executive attention and dPFC, specifically with respect to attentional focusing and switching in the presence of 
interference. 
 
Much of the relevant research on the neuroscience of attention was motivated by the work of Mesulam (198 1) 
and Posner and colleagues (e.g., Posner, 1988; Posner & Peterson, 1990). Their theories, and others since, 
argued that attention is not a unitary construct, but rather that it encompasses multiple processes subserved by 
inter-dependent biological substrates. These include posterior parietal cortex, thalamus, anterior cingulate, and 
PFC (for reviews, see Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Parasuraman, 1998; van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). We do 
not attempt to argue here that all dimensions of attention are prefrontal, nor do we argue that all dimensions of 
attention are related to WM capacity. This is clearly not the case. Rather, we suggest only that the aspects of 
executive control that are the focus of this paper—namely, the ability to maintain focus on a representation or 
goal and to block distraction, all in the presence of interference— is heavily reliant on dorsolateral prefrontal 
structures. 
 
The importance of the dPFC to such aspects of executive attention, and the relevant experimental findings 
reviewed below, were anticipated by the research and case reports of Luria and his Soviet colleagues (e.g., 
Luria, 1966; Luria, Karpov, & Yarbuss, 1966; Luria, Pribram, & Homskaya, 1964). These works demonstrated 
that patients with PFC damage had a number of attention-control deficits. They had difficulty maintaining a 
preparatory set during a novel task, particularly if the task demands conflicted with habitual responses (e.g., tap-
ping a finger once when the experimenter tapped twice, and tapping a finger twice when the experimenter 
tapped once). They also failed to disengage attention from previously relevant stimuli and responses (e.g., in 
attempting to draw alternating circles and crosses, they often drew one circle followed by a sequence of crosses 
only). 
 
In the sections that follow, we will discuss in detail the executive-attention deficits that appear to accompany 
dPFC damage. In addition, we will review neuroimaging data suggesting the importance of the dPFC to these 
attention-control functions in normal, healthy subjects. Note, however, that in some of these research domains 
there have been relatively few empirical investigations to date, and so some caution is required. 
 
Dual-Task Interference 
A small but growing body of studies has examined the role of the dPFC in divided attention—that is, in keeping 
multiple task demands active simultaneously or in close alternation, and they have done so using a variety of 
tasks. For example, in an fMRI study, 6 healthy right-handed subjects performed two different tasks, one verbal 
and one spatial, either singly or simultaneously (D’Esposito et al., 1995). Performance of either task alone 
activated only central and posterior cortex areas compared with a resting-state baseline. No dPFC activation was 
evident, even when the spatial task was presented at a faster rate to increase its difficulty. When the two tasks 
were performed simultaneously, however, dPFC areas (9/46) and anterior cingulate were significantly activated 
(with 4 of 6 subjects showing primarily right PFC activation). Note that actual performance on the spatial task 
in the dual-task condition matched that in the fast-rate, single-task condition, indicating that the dPFC activation 
did not merely result from an increase in task difficulty. 
 
Under PET, Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Peterson (199 1) had subjects divide their attention 
among multiple stimulus attributes in order to detect a change in one of the attributes. Right dPFC and anterior 
cingulate areas were significantly activated above a resting-state baseline. Similar findings were reported by 
Johannsen et al. (1997) with elderly adults. Right dPFC areas (but not anterior cingulate) showed increased 
activity when the subjects simultaneously attended to both visual and tactile stimuli, compared with when they 
focused attention to either visual or tactile stimuli. Parietal areas (Brodmann 40) showed less activation under 
divided attention than under focused attention. Finally, Iidaka, Anderson, Kapur, Cabeza, and Craik (2000) 
examined PET activation during paired-associate learning and retrieval. At the same time, subjects performed 
either a simple response-time task (pressing a key whenever they heard a tone) or a choice-response time task 
(pressing one key for high tones and another for low tones). dPFC activity increased bilaterally when either 
encoding or retrieval of the list was paired with the more complex secondary task compared with the simple 
task. In contrast, ventrolateral PFC activity decreased under the demanding dual-task conditions. 
 
Other imaging studies, however, have demonstrated reduced or unchanged dPFC activation under dual-task 
versus single-task conditions. It appears that the essential variable here is whether or not the individual tasks 
themselves rely heavily on dPFC. For example, Goldberg et al. (1998) presented subjects with the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task (WCST) as the primary task, and a verbal shadowing task as the secondary task. The WCST, 
as evidenced by imaging work, consistently activates dPFC bilaterally, along with various posterior brain areas 
(e.g., Weinberger, Berman, & Zec, 1986; for a more detailed discussion of the WCST, see ―Interference in 
shifting attention and set,‖ below). Here, dual-task costs were evident in behavior and brain activity, with 
slower and less accurate WCST performance and with less bilateral dPFC activation under divided- attention 
conditions. Similar results were reported from a memory study in which subjects studied and recalled word lists 
that varied (at three levels) in the degree of active organization required (Fletcher, Shallice, & Dolan, 1998).  
Under PET, ―Level 3‖ lists that required the most organization on the part of the subjects differed from Levels 2 
and 1 in increasing the activation of only dPFC areas 9/46. When these lists were encoded simultaneously with 
a demanding finger-tapping task, only Level 3 lists were significantly impaired relative to an easy finger-
tapping task. Moreover, only Level 3 lists showed a reduction in dPFC activation during demanding tapping 
versus easy tapping. As a final example, when performing two delayed matching-to-sample tasks 
simultaneously (one visual and one auditory), subjects demonstrated no increase in PFC activation compared 
with performing each task individually, despite obvious behavioral effects (Klingberg, 1998). As would be 
expected, however, the individual tasks demonstrated substantial dPFC activation compared with a control 
condition.10 
 
Thus, as a group, the imaging findings reviewed here indicate that, for component tasks making substantial 
demands on dPFC, such as card sorting or delayed memory, dividing attention will lead to deficits in both 
behavior and dPFC activation. In contrast, in tasks that individually make minimal demands on dPFC, such as 
making simple decisions about stimulus attributes, dividing attention among the demands may call dPFC areas 
into action. We see an interesting parallel here to our own individual-differences research with healthy adults. In 
memory tasks that make substantial executive and PFC demands, such as verbal fluency and proactive 
interference tasks (see below for a detailed discussion), subjects of high intelligence and high WM span out-
perform those of low intelligence and low WM span (Kane & Engle, 2000; E. Miller, 1984; Phillips, 1997, 
1999; Rosen & Engle, 1997). When these attention-demanding tasks are combined with secondary tasks, 
however, span and intelligence differences are reduced or eliminated, with only the high-span and high-
intelligence groups being hurt by the secondary task (Kane & Engle, 2000; Kane, Peterman, Bleckley, & Engle, 
2002; Phillips, 1997; Rosen & Engle, 1997). Dividing attention functionally makes low spans out of high spans 
during these already complex tasks, just as it reduces dPFC activity. The findings of increased dPFC activity 
when simple tasks are combined suggest that performance of high- and low-span (and high- and low-
intelligence) subjects should diverge, rather than converge, when a nonfrontal secondary task is added to a 
nonfrontal primary task. An obvious example of this idea is the WM- span task itself, in which the low-
executive STM demand is combined with a low-executive processing demand. 
 
Not only do imaging studies suggest the role of dPFC regions in divided attention, but limited behavioral work 
with patients also points to their importance. In one task that combined divided- and selective-attention 
requirements, unilateral lobectomy patients with damage to dorsolateral PFC, to dorsomedial PFC, and/or to 
anterior cingulate were markedly impaired (Richer et al., 1993). When these frontal patients had to search for 
only one predetermined target amid distractors (e.g., ―:d‖s among ―d:‖s, ―.d‖s, and ―d.‖s), they performed close 
to normally. However, when they had to search for any of several targets (e.g., ―:d‖, ―.d‖, or ―,d‖) amid 
distractors (―d:‖, ―d..‖, ―d ,‖, ―. . d‖, ―:: d‖), and so had to retain a significant amount of information in WM 
during search, they were significantly slower and more error prone than were the control subject groups. 
 
Baddeley, Della Sala, Papagno, and Spinnler (1997) examined the dual-task performance of patients with PFC 
damage of mixed etiology. By a median split (n = 24), half of the patients were characterized as displaying 
marked ―dysexecutive‖ behavior in their lives and in clinical interview, and half were not. The dysexecutive 
patients’ behavior was characterized as having become more inert or more disinhibited after injury, as making a 
clinical interview very difficult to complete, and/or as leading to significant difficulties in living autonomously. 
Compared with the nondysexecutive patients, the dysexecutive patients had significantly more difficulties with 
a dual-task paradigm involving digit span and visuomotor tracking tasks. The nondysexecutive patients showed 
almost no dual-task cost when combining the tasks compared with when they performed them separately, and 
the dysexecutive patients showed a dramatic dual-task cost. The dual-task measure turned out to be a much 
more sensitive measure of dysexecutive behaviors than were several traditional ―frontal tasks.‖ 
 
Interference in Selective Attention, Memory Retrieval, and Switching Attention and Set 
By our view of WM capacity and executive attention, actively maintaining task goals may serve to reduce 
competition from external stimuli, information in long-term memory, and elicited or primed responses. Thus, 
WM capacity may act in the service of selection attention amid distractors, retrieving information from memory 
in the presence of interference, and of flexibly switching task sets in the presence of habitual responses and 
ambiguous stimuli. In the sections that follow, we therefore review the relevant literature linking interference in 
selection, retrieval, and set switching to the dPFC. 
 
Interference in selective attention. Few experiments with monkeys have explicitly related selective-attention 
functions to the dPFC. However, dPFC involvement in resisting distraction was seen in a simple conditional-
response task with irrelevant stimuli (Grueninger & Pribram, 1969). Here, rhesus monkeys with bilateral 
resections of the dPFC viewed a 4 X 4 panel of illuminated squares. The monkeys were rewarded for pressing 
the upper left square if and only if it was simultaneously lit with the bottom right square. Subjects first learned 
the task to criterion with no distractors. These control trials were then interspersed with several distractor 
conditions. On distractor trials, distractor squares brightened or a loud buzzer sounded simultaneously with the 
lighting of the target squares. Monkeys with dPFC lesions were just as fast as control monkeys in the no-
distractor condition. However, in all of the distractor conditions, including the buzzer condition, the dPFC-
operated subjects were significantly slowed. 
 
Although more studies have been done with human subjects, the results have not been consistent. For example, 
in field-dependence tasks, in which subjects must ignore some environmental cues and attend to others, patients 
with broad-spread frontal lobe damage are only sometimes impaired relative to patients with posterior cortical 
damage. Frontal patients appear to be impaired only when they must overcome the distracting effect of their 
own body orientation, but not when they must simply ignore irrelevant visual stimuli (Battersby, Krieger, 
Pollack, & Bender, 1953; Teuber, Battersby, & Bender, 1951; Teuber & Mishkin, 1954; Teuber & Weinstein, 
1956; but see Yacosynski & Davies, 1945). Moreover, in the Eriksen and Eriksen (1 974) flanker task, in which 
to-be-identified target letters are flanked by distractor letters, patients with heterogeneous PFC damage showed 
no more interference from the distractors than did nor-mal controls (Lee, Wild, Hollnagel, & Grafman, 1999; 
Rafal et al., 1996). These findings may appear to be troubling from the perspective of our framework, but the 
field-dependence results are also difficult to interpret. The subjects all had very large lesions due to battle 
wounds or tumors, and damage was rarely confined to either the anterior or the posterior cortex. However, these 
results, along with the flanker task data, do tentatively suggest that, relative to posterior lesions, frontal lobe 
lesions in humans may only disrupt selective attention when the distractor stimuli are very highly salient, and/or 
provoke a prepotent response. As in the human individual- differences work, WM-related effects are most 
clearly seen in attentional tasks when a habitual response must be overcome for accurate responding. 
 
In the Stroop (1935) task, the distractor stimulus provides a truly powerful competitor for the target, given that 
subjects must name the color in which a conflicting color word is printed. According to our view, prefrontal 
patients should show marked deficits in the Stroop task relative to healthy controls and posterior-lesioned 
patients. They sometimes do (e.g., Richer et al., 1993). However, the reliability of dPFC-specific deficits may 
depend upon specific task parameters. For example, Vendrell et al. (1995) compared patients with damage of 
mixed etiology in various prefrontal areas (e.g., dorsolateral, medial, orbital, anterior cingulate) to age-matched 
control patients on a discrete-trial computerized version of the Stroop task. Control and Stroop trials were 
randomly intermixed, and response times and accuracy were measured for each stimulus. Patients with right 
dorsolateral damage (n = 2), right anterior cingulate damage (n = 3), or both (n = 10) showed exaggerated 
Stroop effects in error rates (as did low-WM-span subjects in our own work; see Kane & Engle, in press). 
Concordant findings come from imaging studies with healthy adults in discrete-trial Stroop procedures. Here, 
prefrontal and anterior cingulate areas were more active than they were on control trials in which subjects 
named the colors of nonlinguistic stimuli (Banich et al., 2000; Bench et al., 1993; Pardo, Pardo, Janer, & 
Raichle, 1990; Taylor, Kornblum, Lauber, Minoshima, & Koeppe, 1997; Zysset, Müller, Lohman, & von 
Cramon, 2001). 
 
Involvement of dPFC areas is less consistent, however, in tests using standardized neuropsychological Stroop 
assessments that measure total response times over a long series of items presented on cards. On one hand, 
Perret (1974) found that patients with circumscribed PFC lesions demonstrated larger Stroop-RT effects than 
did control patients (see also Walker, Husain, Hodgson, Harrison, & Kennard, 1998). On the other hand, several 
experiments and case studies have reported no dPFC-specific Stroop deficits (Ahola, Vilkki, & Servo, 1996; 
Butters, Kaszniak, Glisky, Eslinger, & Schacter, 1994; Corcoran & Upton, 1993; Shallice & Burgess, 199 1 a; 
Stuss, Floden, Alexander, Levine, & Katz, 2001; Vilkki, Holst, Ohman, Servo, & Heiskanen, 1992). We note 
that healthy subjects’ performance on standard neuropsychological administrations of the Stroop test may be 
uncorrelated with their performance on discrete-trial procedures (Kindt, Bierman, & Brosschot, 1996). We also 
note that these standardized, blocked Stroop procedures may show inconsistent effects because they minimize 
the WM demands of the task. 
 
In discrete-trial versions, Stroop and control trials appear unpredictably, and they are often interleaved with 
congruent trials in which the colors and words actually match (e.g., RED displayed in red). Thus, in discrete-
trial versions that include some nonconflicting, congruent stimuli, subjects should have more difficulty keeping 
the unusual task requirements active and accessible in WM (e.g., Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; De 
Jong, Berendsen, & Cools, 1999). Although the explicit task instructions and goals are the same when 
congruent trials are intermixed with incongruent trials, the implicit procedures that subjects follow may be quite 
different. When congruent trials are included in the mix, word information is unpredictably congruent or 
incongruent with responses. Thus, actively maintaining the ignore-the-word demands in WM should be more 
necessary (if not more difficult), and so lapses in goal maintenance should be more frequent. 
 
Recall that Kane and Engle (in press) found that the relation between Stroop interference and WM capacity in 
healthy adults is complicated by the presence or absence of congruent trials in the design. In particular, with 
high proportions of congruent trials, individuals of lower WM capacity committed many more errors, by 
reading the word instead of naming the color, than did individuals of high-WM capacity. Thus, individuals of 
low WM were more likely than those of high WM to neglect the goal of the task, ignore the word, when 
actively maintaining the goal was made difficult by the experimental context. Such findings suggest that active 
goal maintenance in the presence of interference from LTM or habit, which is the essence of WM capacity, 
drives individual differences in the ability to block or inhibit distraction, and so may be critical to finding dPFC-
related deficits in Stroop task performance. 
 
Indeed, a recent ERP study with healthy adults found that errors in the Stroop task predictably followed a slow 
wave originating in dPFC and/or polar PFC. That is, these slow waves, which began 400–800 msec before the 
stimulus was presented, were more likely to precede trials on which subjects erred than to precede those on 
which subjects were accurate (West & Alain, 2000b). In our view, the timing and location of this wave pattern 
suggests that it reflected a transient loss of goal-state in-formation that had previously been maintained in dPFC, 
and with the loss of this goal-state information came the likelihood of error. As further evidence of the validity 
of this idea, West and Alain (2000b) found that the slow wave was specifically tied to errors in a Stroop task 
with many congruent trials. It was not particularly associated with error trials in a Stroop task with few 
congruent trials. Thus, just as in our individual-differences study, increasing the difficulty of maintaining goal 
information was critical to making the Stroop measure sensitive to dPFC- and WM-related contributions to 
interference susceptibility and control. 
 
These conclusions are further bolstered by f MRI data obtained during a mixed-block Stroop task in which the 
instructions to read the word or name the color were presented 11 sec before each stimulus appeared 
(MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). Half of the trials were word-reading trials and half were color-
naming trials; within each trial type, half of the stimuli were incongruent and half were congruent. Over the 1 1 
-sec delay, dPFC activity steadily increased on color-naming trials only. No increase was seen on the more 
automatic word-reading trials. Moreover, the correlation between delay-period dPFC activity and Stroop 
interference in color naming was substantial and negative (r = —.63). These data indicate that dPFC acts to 
reduce Stroop interference by maintaining the name-the-color and/or ignore-the-word task demands in an active 
state.11 
 
ERP studies with more simple stimuli also confirm that damage to the dPFC can impair selective-attention 
capabilities (for reviews, see Knight, 1991; Knight & Grabowecky, 1995; Knight, Staines, Swick, & Chao, 
1999). For example, certain components of auditory- and somatosensory-evoked waveforms are greater in 
magnitude for frontal-lesioned patients than for healthy controls or posterior-lesioned patients (Knight, Scabini, 
& Woods, 1989; Yamaguchi & Knight, 1990). Such findings suggest that intact PFC areas normally inhibit, or 
―gate,‖ the amplitude of these potentials from other cortical and subcortical areas (Skinner & Yingling, 1977; 
Yingling & Skinner, 1977). Furthermore, in dichotic-listening tasks that present subjects with target and 
distractor stimuli to different ears, patients with right-PFC damage show decreased target detection rates from 
left channels. This behavioral deficit is concomitant with an absence of the Nd component of the ERP 
waveform (Knight, Hillyard, Woods, & Neville, 1981), a component that normally corresponds to auditory 
target detection under focused-attention conditions (see Knight, 199 1). Moreover, the presence of a distractor 
stimulus in the ―unattended‖ channel on trial n reduces the subsequent Nd to a target channel stimulus on trial n 
+ 1. This occurs with both right- and left-hemisphere dPFC damage (Knight et al., 1981; D. L. Woods & 
Knight, 1986). Therefore, patients with dPFC damage appear unable to maintain activation of target stimuli 
and/or to block distractor stimuli from gaining access to WM, and so they have greater difficulty detecting 
targets. 
 
A particularly powerful demonstration of the gating function of the dPFC in a memory context was provided by 
an ERP study by Chao and Knight (1998). Their study also made clear the link between the attentional and 
immediate memory functions required by the delayed-memory tasks that we discussed earlier (e.g., Bartus & 
LaVere, 1977; Malmo, 1942). Ten patients with unilateral dPFC lesions and 10 healthy age-matched controls 
were tested in an auditory delayed matching-to-sample test with a 5,000-msec delay. The sample and test 
stimuli consisted of real-world sounds such as coughing, dogs barking, piano notes, and dishwasher noise. In 
addition, half of the trials included several auditory distractor ―tone pips‖ (4000 Hz) between the offset of the 
sample sound and the onset of the test sound. The PFC patients and the controls showed similar error rates on 
no-distractor trials, but the PFC patients showed significantly more errors than did the controls on distractor 
trials. Moreover, in comparison with the controls, the dPFC patients showed increased cortical responding to the 
distractor tones and decreased cortical responding to the target stimuli. Damage to dPFC disrupted the blocking 
of irrelevant distractors, thus impairing the ability to maintain memory for target stimuli across a delay. Or, the 
failure to actively maintain target representations allowed for disruptions by distractor stimuli. Just as is 
evidenced in delay tasks with nonhuman primates, then, the dPFC appears to be critical to selectively 
maintaining target information across filled intervals. This is especially true when attentional focus may be 
drawn away from the target by distraction, and interference from prior events impairs retrieval of the target 
information from LTM. 
 
Interference in memory retrieval. With respect to interference effects on memory, proactive interference tasks 
require subjects to recall recently presented items while disregarding previously studied items. As more and 
more lists are presented, there is greater competition from prior lists, and this is reflected in the tendency for 
greater intrusions and fewer correctly recalled items on the subsequent lists. We have found that low-WM-span 
subjects are more vulnerable to proactive interference than are high-span subjects, and, furthermore, that di-
viding the attention of high spans increases their interference effects to the level of those of low spans (Kane & 
Engle, 2000). 
 
Luria (1971) stressed the utility of such interference tests in assessing brain-injured patients, and in fact, sub-
sequent research with dPFC-lesioned subjects supports a connection between the dPFC and interference 
resistance in memory. Case reports first indicated that stroke, aneurysm repair, or traumatic damage to various 
PFC areas produced marked susceptibility to proactive interference. When these patients attempted to recall a 
short word list following as few as one or two associatively related lists, recall dropped by 50% to 90% from 
List 1 levels. Healthy control subjects showed recall decreases of only 15% to 30% with the same lists (Coslett, 
Bowers, Verfaellie, & Heilman, 1991; Parkin, Leng, & Stanhope, 1988; Zatorre & McEntee, 1983; but see 
Simkins-Bullock, Brown, Greiffenstein, Malik, & McGillicuddy, 1994). Volpe and Hirst (1983) also found that 
prefrontal patients showed more intrusions of prior-list words into their recall of subsequent lists (14% of 
responses) than did healthy controls (1% of responses). 
 
In experimental work with larger groups of brain-lesioned subjects, frontal patients have proven highly 
susceptible to proactive interference, regardless of lesion laterality (Freedman & Cermak, 1986; Jetter, Poser, 
Freeman, & Markowitsch, 1986; Shimamura, Jurica, Mangels, Gershberg, & Knight, 1995; Van der Linden, 
Bruyer, Roland, & Schils, 1993; but see Janowsky, Shimamura, Kritchevsky, & Squire, 1989). Even when these 
frontal patients were matched on List 1 recall to patients with nonfrontal lesions (or to healthy controls), the 
frontal patients had more difficulty recalling the later word lists. Interference-buildup tasks typically produce 
highly variable data and require large samples to detect group interactions (see, e.g., Wickens, 1970). Thus, 
these findings of significant frontal deficits with modest-sized patient groups are particularly noteworthy. 
 
The few imaging studies with healthy subjects further support the idea that the dPFC is integral to combatting 
proactive interference. As has been indicated by ERP, PET, and brain-SPECT data, dorsolateral and anterior 
PFC areas are activated when subjects attempt to recall stimuli under high-interference conditions. However, 
these areas are not active under low-interference conditions (Dolan & Fletcher, 1997; Uhl et al., 1990; Uhl, 
Podreka, & Deecke, 1994). Furthermore, this interference-related prefrontal activity is actually stronger when 
subjects are unsuccessful in recalling than when they are successful (Uhl et al., 1990). Prefrontal activity may 
therefore represent the effort and executive attention involved in attempting to select among (and/or inhibit) 
highly activated response candidates (for contributions of ventrolateral PFC to interference resistance, see 
D’Esposito, Postle, Jonides, & Smith, 1999; Jonides, Marshuetz, Smith, Reuter-Lorenz, & Koeppe, 2000; 
Jonides, Smith, Marshuetz, & Koeppe, 1998). 
 
Retrieval-interference effects may also be inferred from verbal fluency tasks, in which subjects generate as 
many exemplars as they can from a given category, such as animals or letters beginning with S, within some 
time limit. Recall that low-WM-span and low-intelligence individuals show impaired fluency relative to high-
WM-span and high-intelligence individuals (see, e.g., Phillips, 1997; Rosen & Engle, 1997). We suggest that, 
particularly across long recall periods, fluency may be enhanced by selectively directing attention away from, or 
inhibiting, the high-probability words that were recalled earlier in the session. After a subject has exhausted the 
first words that easily come to mind, executive attention should be necessary to maintain active search and 
avoid repeating the recall of previously recalled, and therefore highly activated, exemplars (see Moscovitch, 
1994; Per-ret, 1974; Rosen & Engle, 1997). Indeed, the length of the recall period may be critical to 
understanding how PFC structures affect fluency. 
 
One- and 2-min fluency tests that allow for responding primarily on automatically activated, high-probability 
exemplars show only small differences, if any, among patients with left frontal, right frontal, nonfrontal, or dif-
fuse lesions (Ahola et al., 1996; Benton, 1968; Corcoran & Upton, 1993; Joanette & Goulet, 1986; Miceli, 
Caltagirone, Gainotti, Masullo, & Silveri, 1981; Newcombe, 1969; Parkin, Bindschaedler, Harsent, & Metzler, 
1996; Shallice & Burgess, 1991a; Upton & Corcoran, 1995; Vilkki et al., 1992; Walker et al., 1998; but see E. 
Miller, 1984; Ramier & Hecaen, 1970). Often, though, patients with frontal damage do perform more poorly 
than healthy control subjects on these brief recall tasks (Baldo & Shimamura, 1998; Butters et al., 1994; 
Janowsky, Shimamura, Kritchevsky, & Squire, 1989; Laiacona et al., 1989; Owen, Downes, Sahakian, Polkey, 
& Robbins, 1990; Paus et al., 199 1; Troyer, Moscovitch, Winocur, Alexander, & Stuss, 1998; Tucha, Smely, & 
Lange, 1999). 
 
Fewer studies have been done with longer recall periods. However, frontal patients, particularly those with left-
hemisphere damage, consistently perform significantly worse than do nonfrontal patients across 4- or 5-min 
recall periods (Guitton, Buchtel, & Douglas, 1985; Jones-Gotman & Milner, 1977; Milner, 1964; Pendleton, 
Heaton, Lehman, & Hulihan, 1982; Perret, 1974; but see Bolter, Long, & Wagner, 1983). These long-duration 
fluency tasks should make considerable demands on selective attention and effortful memory search, as less 
dominant exemplars must be retrieved amid increasing interference from the already recalled, dominant 
exemplars. 
 
Fluency results should be interpreted with some caution, for, as Reitan and Wolfson (1994) indicate, few studies 
screen subjects for dysphasic symptoms, and so dysphasic disturbances may contribute to the left-hemisphere 
deficits seen in the literature. However, 133Xe-inhalation, PET, and f MRI imaging data from healthy right-
handed subjects corroborate the neuropsychological findings. When recall periods exceed 2 min, or when 
multiple recall periods are required with the same cues, both of which should increase potential for interference, 
both left and right dPFC areas are activated over baseline (Cuenod et al., 1995; Frith, Friston, Liddle, & 
Frackowiak, 1991; Parks et al., 1988; but see Warkentin, Nilsson, Risberg, & Karlson, 1989, for left PFC 
activation only).12 Thus, on balance, the data from neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies suggest that 
the dPFC is instrumental in fluency tasks that, we argue, require executive attention and memory-search 
processes, primarily due to the presence of output interference.13 
 
Interference in shifting attention and set. Set-shifting tasks represent a further class of interference task 
wherein prepotent response tendencies must be overcome in order for the subject to act according to goals or 
intentions. Here, executive attention may be required to allow rapid access to task-relevant memory 
representations (or action productions, or goals) while shifts of attentional focus are made. That is, keeping 
task-relevant information active in memory while focus is switched away and back should put a premium on 
executive attention, Gf, and dPFC. In addition, goal states that drive subject-initiated shifts of attention may 
often conflict with environmental cues or prior habit. For example, a stressed parent behind the wheel of a car 
may intend to shift focus away from a screaming child in the back seat and toward the oncoming traffic on the 
road. In such cases, optimal performance will depend on the parent’s actively maintaining the goal state in WM 
and preventing its decay to baseline in the presence of powerful distraction. Thus, these shifts of focus should 
put a premium on executive attention, fluid ability, and PFC. 
 
One might expect relevant evidence here from the testing of brain-injured patients on the WCST (Berg, 1948; 
Grant & Berg, 1948; Heaton, 1981). The WCST is a complex problem-solving and set-switching task adapted 
from concept-formation tasks used with nonhuman primates (e.g., Zable & Harlow, 1946) and human 
psychiatric patients (e.g., Weigl, 1941). Subjects in these early tasks learned to discriminate reinforced from 
nonreinforced stimuli on the basis of some rule (e.g., the left object is always rewarded regardless of identity). 
They then had to reverse the discrimination after reaching some learning criterion (e.g., the right object is now 
rewarded). Macaques and other primates with full bilateral frontal ablations demonstrated marked difficulty in 
reversing previously learned discriminations in comparison with posterior-lesioned and control monkeys (H. F. 
Harlow & Dagnon, 1943; H. F. Harlow & Settlage, 1948). These frontal deficits were especially pronounced as 
succeeding discriminations and reversals were tested (Settlage, Zable, & Harlow, 1948). 
 
Clinical lore and early research (e.g., Milner, 1963) supported the use of the WCST as a diagnostic tool for 
assessing PFC damage. However, more recent data now provide mixed support for an association between 
WCST performance and dPFC structures (for reviews, see Mountain & Snow, 1993; Reitan & Wolfson, 1994). 
For example, relative to patients with posterior damage, patients with PFC damage are sometimes unimpaired 
on the WCST (see, e.g., Anderson, Damasio, Jones, & Tranel, 1991; Corcoran & Upton, 1993; Grafman, Jonas, 
& Salazar, 1990) and are sometimes impaired (see, e.g., Drewe, 1974; Milner, 1963; Nelson, 1976). This lack of 
specificity may not be surprising, given the obvious complexity of the WCST. There are many ways to pass (or 
fail) this test, and so one might expect multiple processes and brain areas to be involved. Indeed, Dunbar and 
Sussman (1995) presented a patient with damage to left temporoparietal cortex and impairment in articulatory 
rehearsal who obtained zero categories and committed 94 perseverative errors on the WCST. Likewise, when 
Dunbar and Sussman used a secondary task to prevent healthy adults from using articulatory rehearsal during 
the WCST, category attainment dropped and perseverative errors increased substantially relative to baseline 
WCST conditions. 
 
Nonexecutive processes notwithstanding, a more prominent and specific role for the PFC in such a set-
switching task might be anticipated given the present theoretical framework. That is, WM capacity and PFC 
circuits should be important to preventing perseveration, or interference from a prior task set. Indeed, in a 
latent-variable, structural-equation modeling study with healthy undergraduates, Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, 
Witzki, and Howerter (2000) found that WCST performance was predicted by a latent variable derived from 
three simple set-switching tasks (path coefficient = .3 8; for more on such tasks, see below). Such findings 
suggest that in normal subjects, individual differences in WCST performance are determined, at least in part, by 
ability to switch task set. As further behavioral evidence of a connection between the WCST and the PFC 
functions of concern in this review, Lehto (1996) found that among healthy adolescents, a composite measure of 
WM-span tasks correlated significantly with various WCST measures, such as categories achieved (r = .34), 
trials to completion (r = —.45), and perseverative errors (r = —.35). 
 
Moreover, in a recent neuropsychological study that improved upon the subject-selection criteria of many prior 
studies, patients with focal lesions to dPFC and to superior medial frontal cortex demonstrated substantial 
WCST deficits in comparison with patients with non-frontal lesions and healthy controls (Stuss et al., 2000). In 
a subsequent version of the test, subjects were first told all the possible categories in the test, and in the final 
version of the test subjects were explicitly told when to switch categories. The dPFC and medial–frontal 
patients were significantly impaired in both of these WCST modifications. For example, even in the final 
version, the dPFC and medial groups averaged between 9 and 17 perseverative errors in 64 trials, whereas the 
nonfrontal groups averaged only between 1 and 3 such errors. 
 
Neuroimaging studies, particularly those by Weinberger, Berman, and colleagues, have also indicated a 
prominent role for dPFC in the WCST (Berman et al., 1995; Berman, Zec, & Weinberger, 1986; Esposito, 
Kirkby, Van Horn, Ellmore, & Berman, 1999; Goldberg et al., 1998; Weinberger et al., 1986). Subjects were 
scanned while performing the WCST and while performing a computerized control task, in which test cards 
were to be sorted according to a consistent and concrete rule. That is, in the control task, the to-be-sorted test 
cards each displayed a number from 1 to 4, and the four reference cards each displayed a number from 1 to 4. 
Consistently across studies, the WCST evoked significant increases in bilateral blood flow to dorsolateral 
regions of the prefrontal cortex in comparison with the control task. In addition, broad networks of medial 
frontal and posterior brain areas were also activated, but somewhat less consistently across studies (see also 
Nagahama et al., 1996; Nagahama et al., 1999; Nagahama et al., 1998).14 
 
Set-shifting tasks that are similar to, but less complex than, the WCST also produce deficits that are specific to 
dPFC damage, at least for certain kinds of shifts (see, e.g., Cicerone, Lazar, & Shapiro, 1983; Delis, Squire, 
Bihrle, & Massman, 1992). That is, patients with damage to PFC are as able as healthy controls and patients 
with posterior lesions to develop an attentional set in responding, and subsequently to apply that set to new 
stimuli. For example, PFC patients can learn to respond according to shape with squares and triangles, and then 
shift to respond according to shape with circles and rectangles. Thus, ―intradimensional‖ set shifting does not 
appear to rely on PFC. However, patients with PFC lesions are significantly impaired when they are required to 
shift set to an entirely new dimension, such as color (Owen et al., 1993; Owen, Roberts, Polkey, Sahakian, & 
Robbins, 1991). These ―extradimensional‖ set shifts are particularly difficult for frontal patients when the 
previously reinforced dimension becomes nonreinforced and the reinforced dimension is entirely new (e.g., 
respond to shape and ignore a superimposed line, and then switch to responding to color and ignoring shape; 
Owen et al., 1993). Moreover, extradimensional set shifting appears to rely on dPFC structures in particular. 
Studies of brain-lesioned marmosets (Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 1996a, 1996b, 1997) and imaging studies with 
humans (Rogers, Andrews, Grasby, Brooks, & Robbins, 2000) have indicated that areas 9/46 (and their 
nonhuman analogues) are active during, and critical to, successful extradimensional shifting.15 Other kinds of 
shifts appear to rely more on or-bitofrontal and medial frontal areas. 
 
Thus, on balance, recent research with the WCST and its analogues indicates a strong link between shifting 
attentional sets and the dPFC. Although the database is considerably smaller, evidence for dPFC involvement in 
overcoming a previously established task set has also come from less conceptually driven tasks. These tasks 
tend to require switching attention among spatial locations, but most importantly, they require switching focus 
in opposition to interference from habit or from a powerful cue. 
 
For example, in the antisaccade task, subjects see an abrupt-onset signal in one spatial location, and must direct 
attention and eyes away from this cue to the opposite side of the screen (for a review, see Everling & Fischer, 
1998). We found that successful performance on this task is linked with WM capacity, given that the goal to 
respond in opposition to habit must be actively maintained in the presence of a powerful elicitor of the habit 
(Kane et al., 2001). Antisaccade performance is likewise disrupted when WM is occupied by an attention-
demanding secondary task (R. J. Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994). As one might expect, then, patients with 
dPFC damage are also impaired in the antisaccade task relative to normal controls, patients with Parkinson’s 
disease, and patients with damage to posterior frontal and nonfrontal cortex (Fukushima, Fukushima, Miyasaka, 
& Yamashita, 1994; Guitton et al., 1985; Pierrot-Deseilligny, Rivaud, Gaymard, & Agid, 1991). However, 
dPFC damage does not affect performance in a prosaccade condition in which the location of the cue always 
corresponds to the location of the upcoming target (similar to the case of our WM-capacity findings). PET 
imaging has also indicated that antisaccade trials increase dPFC activation relative to prosaccade trials, along 
with increases in some parietal, temporal, and midbrain areas (Sweeney et al., 1996). Relative to a fixation 
condition, prosaccade trials provoke no increase in dPFC activity. Thus, dPFC damage impairs performance, 
and dPFC areas are active, only when the cue always appears in a location that attracted focus away from the 
upcoming target. Such contexts demand that responding be in accordance with activated task goals, not 
environmental prompting. 
 
In a particularly dramatic illustration of failed goal maintenance in the antisaccade task, Walker et al. (1998) 
presented the case study of a 62-year-old patient with stroke damage to right lateral PFC (primarily 
ventrolateral, but encroaching on dorsolateral areas). The patient was tested on four different occasions, 
between 12 and 60 weeks postinsult, on several variations of the prosaccade and antisaccade tasks. The patient 
made saccade errors on 100% of the antisaccade trials in every session, regardless of target hemifield, even 
though he understood the task and could articulate the direction of the appropriate response for each trial. 
Parallel findings come from the visual analogue of the dichotic-listening task (hereafter, the Duncan task), in 
which subjects monitor one of two visual stimulus streams, on either the left or the right, for targets. On some 
trials subjects unpredictably see an abstract cue (a ―+‖ or ―2‖) that signals them to immediately switch their 
attention to the other stimulus stream (see, e.g., Duncan et al., 1996). Thus, a habitual response must be 
prevented, and a new task set must replace it. Moreover, because the cue is abstract, subjects must accurately 
maintain its meaning, or the production to rapidly retrieve its meaning from LTM, in order to respond 
accurately. Using this task, Duncan et al. (1996) found that, like healthy subjects of low fluid intelligence, 
patients with frontal lobe damage were more impaired in switching attention away from one stimulus location to 
another than were posterior-lesioned patients and healthy controls. These frontal patients actually showed no 
difficulty in initially attending to targets on either the left or the right side of fixation. However, they failed as a 
group to shift attention to the other side when they were cued by the abstract signal to do so. Ten of 19 normal 
controls switched attention successfully on every trial block, and only 3 failed to switch on any block. Similarly, 
3 of 8 posterior-damaged patients switched attention successfully on every block, and only 1 failed to switch on 
any block. In contrast, only 1 of 10 frontal patients switched attention successfully on every block, and a full 
seven patients failed to switch on any block. Statistically, the posterior patients performed identically to the 
normal controls, whereas the frontal patients were significantly impaired relative to both other groups. Some 
caution is advised in interpreting these data, however, because only 3 of the 10 frontal patients had exclusively 
frontal dam-age, with the remaining 7 having widespread extrafrontal damage.16 
 
Finally, set-shifting deficits in frontal patients were also seen in an analogue of the Stroop task. Dunbar and 
Sussman (1995) studied patients with frontal damage due to closed-head injury (but they had probably sustained 
extra-frontal damage as well). One of their experiments presented congruent, neutral, and incongruent trials in 
pure blocks of a picture–word Stroop task. Here, the patients demonstrated interference comparable to that 
found in published norms. However, another experiment presented a mixed block of picture-naming or word-
reading trials that were individually precued by a tone. Thus, on the basis of the tone, which was, as in the 
Duncan task, an abstract task cue, the patients had to switch continually and unpredictably between task sets. 
Here, the patients showed dramatic error rates on incongruent trials (between 40% and 50% errors) in both 
picture naming and word reading. 
 
Cognitive psychologists, outside the neuroscience do-main, demonstrate increasing interest in set shifting, or 
―task switching,‖ as a means of exploring the executive control of behavior (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 
1994; Gopher, Armony, & Greenshpan, 2000; Los, 1999; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Meiran, 1996). Following 
Jersild (1927), their experiments identified switching ―costs‖ by comparing conditions in which simple task 
demands repeat with those in which they change across trials. For example, subjects may see a letter and a 
number paired on each trial, and on some trials they must categorize the letter and on others the number (see, 
e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995). When two consecutive trials require different kinds of responses (e.g., 
letter/number), response times and error rates are higher than when two such trials require the same kind of 
response (e.g., number/number). This very task was presented to 12 patients with focal PFC damage and 14 
control subjects matched for age and verbal intelligence (Rogers et al., 1998). PFC-related deficits were limited 
to those subjects with left hemisphere damage and to conditions in which task set was cued by an abstract 
signal. That is, in conditions presenting a concrete word cue for each trial, such as the word LETTER, above the 
stimuli (e.g., LETTER: 4G —~ NUMBER: 6A), frontal patients showed switch costs as small as those of 
controls. However, in conditions presenting an abstract cue for each trial, such as a red background for letter 
trials and a green background for number trials, left PFC patients showed costs that were three to four times 
larger than those for right PFC patients and controls. This abstract cuing effect is most interesting because tasks 
switched predictably after every two trials, making the explicit cues redundant. 
 
Unfortunately, the limited fMRI work that has been done with such switching tasks has produced equivocal 
results. On one hand, in a task in which response mappings switched or repeated from trial to trial, response-
switching trials produced greater activation in bilateral PFC (areas 9, 6, 44, 45) than did response-repeat trials 
(Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000). On the other hand, in a letter/number task similar 
to that used by Rogers et al. (1998) with PFC patients, no prefrontal areas were more active during task-
switching trials than during task-repeat trials, despite large switch costs in the behavioral data (Kimberg, 
Aguirre, & D’Esposito, 2000). Here, tasks switches were regular and predictable, just as in Rogers et al. (1998), 
and the provided task cues were seemingly as abstract as those used by Rogers et al. (1998; they were cued by 
the screen location of the stimuli). It is unclear to us how the lack of PFC activation here is to be accounted for. 
In conclusion, the interference data from attention-switching tasks are something of a mixed bag with respect to 
dPFC involvement. On the negative side, the ―gold-standard‖ neuropsychological test reflecting failures to 
switch, or perseveration—the WCST—has been argued to be no more selective for PFC damage than for non-
PFC damage. Moreover, of the two imaging studies examining task-switching paradigms from cognitive 
psychology, one found no switch-related PFC activity. However, on the positive side, recent brain-lesion and 
neuroimaging data from the WCST and WCST-like tasks offer fairly compelling evidence that dorsolateral PFC 
is active during, if not critical to, successful switches of set. Moreover, as evidenced by antisaccade and Duncan 
tasks, dPFC areas support attentional switches in space that are made in opposition to interference from habit 
and in concordance with an abstract cue. Finally, there is at least some preliminary evidence from task-
switching paradigms that PFC damage impairs switching set in response to abstract cues. 
 
General Intelligence Research 
As we have already mentioned, clinical and experimental reports indicate that PFC injury may have little effect 
on intelligence as defined by broad psychometric test batteries (e.g., Ackerly, 1937; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; 
Hebb, 1939, 1945; Hebb & Penfield, 1940; Shallice & Burgess, 1991a; Warrington, James, & Maciejewski, 
1986). According to Duncan (1995), however, this paradox may be resolved by considering more carefully what 
IQ batteries such as the WAIS–R actually measure. Gf may contribute some variance to each of the various 
subtests in the battery, but it certainly plays a greater role in some than in others. Whereas nonverbal, figural 
reasoning tests such as Raven’s Progressive Matrices or the Cattell Culture Fair have very high Gf loadings, 
WAIS–R sub-tests on vocabulary and information do not. The latter tests may more accurately reflect general 
crystallized intelligence (Gc) or Gf at the time of learning but not necessarily at the time of testing. Averaging 
across high-Gf and low-Gf subtests in IQ batteries may thus dilute the real effect that PFC lesions have on Gf. 
 
Duncan, Burgess, and Emslie (1995) tested three patients with frontal lobe lesions of mixed etiology. One had 
bilateral damage from an open head wound, one had unilateral damage due to tumor resection, and one had 
unilateral damage due to a white-matter infarction. These three frontal patients were matched to healthy controls 
for age (range, 29–56 years) and for their overall WAIS or WAIS–R scores, with scores ranging from 126 to 
130. All subjects then took the Cattell Culture Fair test as a measure of Gf. The ―intelligence‖ of all the frontal 
patients was dramatically lower—22–38 points—as indicated by their Cattell scores compared with their own 
WAIS scores. In contrast, the controls all showed equivalent or higher scores on the Cattell test than on the 
WAIS. Moreover, the frontal patients’ Culture Fair IQs were three standard deviations below those of their 
WAIS-matched controls. A group of patients with parietal damage, and lower mean WAIS scores than the 
frontal patients or controls, demonstrated no discrepancy between their WAIS and Cattell scores. Although 
based on few subjects, the Duncan et al. (1995) findings suggest the useful research strategy of matching 
subject groups on their conventional IQ scores (or, even better, on Gc measures) and then testing for PFC-
related deficits that are specific to Gf-loaded tasks. 
 
Waltz et al. (1999) took a different but equally interesting approach. They tested six patients with focal frontal 
damage and six patients with focal temporal damage on different categories of problems adapted from Raven’s 
test. All categories presented matrices with one piece missing. In the ―Level 0‖ category, the missing piece was 
identical to all the presented pieces. In the ―Level 1‖ category, the missing piece represented a single feature 
change along the horizontal or the vertical. For example, the top row showed two white squares, the bottom row 
showed one black square, and so the missing piece should have been another black square. In the ―Level 2‖ 
category, the missing piece represented the integration of joint feature changes across the horizontal and the 
vertical. For example, the top row showed a white square and a white triangle, the bottom row showed one 
black square, and so the missing piece should have been a black triangle. PFC patients, temporal patients, and 
healthy controls scored equally on Levels 0 and 1 problems (all between 80% and 100% correct). However, on 
Level 2 problems, PFC patients scored below chance, at approximately 10% correct, whereas temporal patients 
and controls performed equivalently, at approximately 90% correct. Thus, when relations among stimuli 
demanded integration—perhaps accomplished through WM maintenance—PFC patients were markedly 
impaired in a Gf-loaded task of induction. Indeed, a computational model of performance on such matrix-
reasoning tasks indicates that integration of multiple stimulus dimensions relies on WM capacity (Carpenter, 
Just, & Shell, 1990). 
 
The Duncan et al. (1995) and Waltz et al. (1999) findings are consistent with the few imaging studies that have 
been conducted to examine the neural substrates of nonverbal, fluid reasoning in healthy adults. Early studies 
measured regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) during the performance of Raven’s matrices test (Risberg & 
Ingvar, 1973; Risberg, Maximilian, & Prohovnik, 1977). Al-though these rCBF techniques had rather poor 
spatial resolution, they indicated that performance of Raven’s test caused blood flow increases in frontal, 
parietal, and occipital cortex as compared with a resting condition. More recently, an fMRI study examined 
cortical activation patterns during the performance of different subtypes of Raven’s problems (Prabhakaran, 
Smith, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997). Some problems required only visuo-spatial analysis, and others 
additionally required non-spatial, abstract/analytical reasoning (see Carpenter et al., 1990). Relative to a no-
delay, matching-to-sample base-line, spatial reasoning activated right dorsolateral areas (Brodmann 9, 46) along 
with other right hemisphere regions such as anterior cingulate (32), parietal areas (7, 40), and temporal areas 
(37). Analytical reasoning versus baseline, however, elicited broader prefrontal activation bilaterally in 
dorsolateral areas (9/10, 45 , 46), as well as bilaterally in other PFC areas (6, 44), parietal areas (7, 39, 40), 
temporal areas (37, 21, 19), and occipital areas (18 , 19 , 37). These findings indicate dPFC involvement in all 
kinds of Raven’s items (along with PFC-networked regions posteriorly), but with greater bilateral dorsolateral 
involvement when abstract, fluid reasoning is necessary for item solution. 
 
Similar findings under PET were reported by Esposito et al. (1999) and Duncan et al. (2000). Esposito et al. 
found bilateral dPFC activity (areas 9/46) during Raven’s problems compared with a no-delay, matching-to-
sample baseline, along with activity in anterior cingulate and some parietal, temporal, and occipital areas. 
Duncan et al. (2000) tested subjects on figural and verbal tests with high Gf loadings versus low Gf loadings 
(based on behavioral pilot testing). The figural tests were based on the Cattell test, and verbal tests were based 
on the Letter Sets Test (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976). In comparison with the low-Gf tasks, the 
high-Gf tasks activated dPFC area 46, the figural task eliciting bilateral activation and the verbal task activating 
only left dPFC. (The figural task also demonstrated activation in anterior cingulate and in parietal and occipital 
areas.) The bilateral dPFC activation found during figural reasoning is consistent with the studies reviewed 
above. The more lateralized activation evidenced by the verbal task is intriguing and merits further 
investigation. 
 
The evidence discussed in this section is clearly limited by the small number of studies conducted, and by the 
small samples in each. However, we are optimistic that further patient and imaging work with matrix-reasoning 
tests, such as the Cattell test and Raven’s test, will confirm a prominent role for the dPFC in novel reasoning 
that loads highly onto a psychometric Gf factor. Indeed, the limited neuropsychological and neuroimaging 
research on other forms of g-loaded analytical reasoning, such as deductive reasoning, provides converging 
evidence for an important role for WM and dPFC. For example, patients with focal PFC damage performed 
worse than those with focal anterior temporal damage on deductive reasoning tasks that required integrating 
information across statements (Waltz et al., 1999). When propositions were chained, such as Dave is taller than 
Gary; Gary is taller than Bart; Is Dave taller than Bart?, patient groups and controls performed equivalently 
(all group Ms > 86% correct). However, when propositions were scrambled and so required integration, such as 
Mona is taller than Kim; Stef is taller than Mona; Is Stef taller than Kim?, PFC patients performed at chance 
(M = 20% correct), whereas temporal patients and controls performed equivalently (Ms = 87% and 86%, 
respectively). Thus, PFC damage severely limited patients’ ability to make transitive inferences when two 
relations had to be simultaneously maintained and integrated for solution. 
 
Imaging studies using PET and f MRI also suggest dPFC involvement in deductive, syllogistic reasoning (e.g., 
All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal.), also a highly Gf-loaded task (Car-roll, 
1993; Snow, Kyllonen, & Marshalek, 1984). Left dPFC areas, along with left temporal and anterior cingulate 
areas, are rather consistently active over baseline during syllogistic reasoning (Goel, Gold, Kapur, & Houle, 
1997), even when the syllogisms involve spatial relations (e.g., Officers are standing next to generals; privates 
are standing behind generals; Goel, Gold, Kapur, & Houle, 1998). Moreover, right dPFC regions appear to be 
uniquely called upon when the contents of the syllogisms conflict with known facts (e.g., All pets are poodles; 
all poodles are vicious), and between the presentations of propositions to be integrated when they are free of 
real-world content (e.g., All B are K; all K are X; Goel, Buchel, Frith, & Dolan, 2000). Whereas left PFC 
appears important for general reasoning (and integrative?) processes here, right PFC appears specialized for 
blocking the effect of prior knowledge and maintaining abstract information. 
 
As with the study of prototypical Gf tests involving inductive reasoning such as Raven’s and Cattell tests, then, 
a small body of work on deductive reasoning indicates that dPFC regions are involved in, and may be critical to, 
formal deduction. This is particularly true when propositions or arguments must be integrated in order to solve 
the problem, suggesting that the dPFC contribution here may be in active memory maintenance (for related 
imaging findings from a mathematical reasoning test, see Prabhakaran, Rypma, & Gabrieli, 2001). 
 
Working Memory Functions and the Prefrontal Cortex: Conclusions and Criticisms 
In our review of research on the dPFC and its WM-capacity/executive-attention functions, we have examined 
empirical work with varied methodologies and subject populations, and we are encouraged by the tremendous 
breadth and consistency of the evidence reviewed here. Clearly, more work is needed to understand some of the 
behaviors we have emphasized—for example, the role of the dPFC in set switching, and the role of specific 
dPFC areas in maintaining object versus spatial information and in different components of reasoning. 
However, some consistent patterns are certainly observable across diverse subject populations and tasks. The 
data are particularly clear regarding WM capacity. Damage to dPFC areas selectively reduces performance to 
chance levels on memory tasks in which interference is high and some source of distraction challenges the 
effective maintenance of the target information. Furthermore, dPFC areas, in conjunction with the posterior 
areas to which they are networked, are highly active during the performance of these WM-capacity tasks. 
Perhaps most importantly from our perspective, these dPFC cells, unlike the memory-relevant cells in posterior 
brain areas, persist in firing across memory delays even when distracting events occur before responding is 
permitted. 
 
By generally linking WM/executive-attention processes to the PFC, however, we do not preclude the 
involvement of PFC structures in other cognitive, or noncognitive, functions (see D’Esposito, Ballard, et al., 
1998). The PFC is a very large, anatomically complex area of the primate brain, and so it is likely to be 
involved in additional aspects of information processing, motor performance, motivation, and/or emotional 
regulation. Indeed, just within the cognitive domain, patients with PFC damage have difficulty learning new 
associations, discriminating recent events from distant ones, and remembering the sources of learned 
information, among other tasks (e.g., Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989; Petrides, 1985, 1990; Petrides & 
Milner, 1982; Shimamura, Janowsky, & Squire, 1990). These memory and timing functions may be influenced 
by WM and attention-control processes, but they also may not be. For many of these behaviors, current models 
are too underspecified to clearly implicate executive attention involvement (but see Kimberg & Farah, 1993; 
Zakay & Block, 1997). 
 
Because WM-capacity/executive-attention functions appear to map onto dPFC (and networked) structures, we 
propose that normal individual differences in WM capacity are mediated by individual differences in dPFC 
functioning. Of course, we recognize that the dPFC is not uniquely important to WM capacity or executive 
control. The dPFC clearly supports WM functions but cannot embody them by itself. To restate this important 
point, the dPFC is a necessary structure in executive-attention processes, but it is not a sufficient structure. As 
we have emphasized in our own work (see Engle, 2001; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Engle, Tuholski, et al., 
1999), even simple cognitive tasks involve multiple processes. It is therefore likely that these various processes 
map onto multiple functional mechanisms, which in turn map onto multiple biological structures. 
 
However, with such caution in mind, we want to emphasize that PFC cells differ from memory-sensitive cells 
outside of the PFC, in that only the PFC cells maintain their delay-period activity in the presence of a distractor 
(di Pellegrino & Wise, 1993 a, 1993b; E. K. Miller et al., 1996). Similarly, patients with dPFC damage show 
exaggerated brain potentials in auditory cortex to distractor tones presented during memory delays, suggesting 
that intact dPFC is critical to blocking distraction in the service of memory maintenance (Chao & Knight, 1998; 
see also Bartus & LaVere, 1977; Malmo, 1942). Together, these findings certainly suggest that the dPFC does 
have a unique function with respect to WM/executive-attention capabilities. More work is obviously needed, 
but we would argue that this unique function is to sustain the activation of memory representations even when 
attentional focus is drawn elsewhere due to distraction. This unique function will be particularly important in 
contexts in which LTM retrieval is made difficult due to interference from competing events or habit. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Arguments for a strong relationship, or even an isomorphism, among WM capacity, executive attention, and 
fluid intelligence (see Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Engle, Tuholski, et al., 1999) are strengthened by the 
evidence that they also share a neurological substrate. Experimental work with brain-damaged primates (both 
human and nonhuman), as well as imaging research with healthy humans, indicates that the PFC—and perhaps 
the dorsolateral area in particular—is necessary for effective WM capacity and aspects of executive attention. 
Monkeys and human patients with lesions to the dPFC exhibit marked impairments in WM tasks and in many 
indices of focusing, dividing, and shifting attention. This should be particularly true, in our view, insofar as 
these tasks require that information be maintained in memory in the presence of interference. Damage to 
posterior and subcortical brain areas to which the dPFC is anatomically linked also impairs WM-
capacity/attention-control capabilities. Single-unit recording and brain-imaging techniques further suggest that 
when healthy monkeys and humans engage in behaviors requiring WM capacity/ executive attention, they 
selectively activate dPFC and dPFC-linked brain regions. Finally, limited evidence from human studies 
suggests a corresponding reliance of psychometric Gf on the dPFC. 
 
But how general are these WM-capacity/executive-attention capabilities? Do they really reflect a common 
construct, or are there multiple WM ―capacities‖ associated with different stimulus modalities or processing do-
mains? Of course, we do not suggest that all components of the WM system or all components of ―attention‖ 
are domain-free. Clearly, the STM components, or ―slave systems,‖ of the WM system may be dissociated by 
the stimuli and representations on which they operate (see Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Logie, 1999). 
We suggest here that an executive core of the WM system, which we label ―WM capacity,‖ reflects a general 
capability to control attention to maintain a limited amount of information in an active state, particularly in the 
presence of interference. Moreover, this domain-free capability reflects the shared variance among WM-
capacity tests and tests of higher order cognition. 
 
There is significant behavioral evidence for our position, reviewed in detail elsewhere (Conway & Kane, 2001; 
Engle, 2001, 2002; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999). Briefly, we note here that WM-capacity measures, 
requiring a variety of processing skills and presenting a variety of stimulus types, correlate substantially with 
fluid ability tasks across verbal, mathematical, and spatial domains (see, e.g., Crawford & Stankov, 1983; 
Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Engle et al., 1992; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Larson & Saccuzzo, 1989; Law, 
Morrin, & Pellegrino, 1995; Stankov & Crawford, 1993; Turner & Engle, 1989). They also predict performance 
in a variety of simple attentional tasks that make explicit demands neither on memory retrieval nor on one 
particular domain of processing (Bleckley, 2001; Conway et al., 2001; Conway, Tuholski, Shisler, & Engle, 
1999; Kane et al., 2001; Kane & Engle, in press; Tuholski, Engle, & Baylis, 2001). 
 
Furthermore, in neuropsychological terms, dPFC injury or deactivation may impair recall equivalently on 
object, spatial, haptic, and cross-modal delayed-memory tasks, suggesting generality across stimulus domains 
(e.g., Bauer & Fuster, 1976; Fuster & Bauer, 1974; Quintana & Fuster, 1993; Verin et al., 1993). Moreover, 
PET results suggest equivalent dPFC activation in n-back tasks using visual versus auditory stimuli 
(Schumacher et al., 1996), and single-cell recordings indicate dPFC cells tuned to rule-dependent combinations 
of stimulus modalities (Fuster, Bodner, & Kroger, 2000; White & Wise, 1999). Finally, several imaging studies 
show similar bilateral dPFC activation patterns during both object and spatial WM task performance (e.g., 
Braver et al., 1997; Cohen et al., 1994; D’Esposito, Ballard, et al., 1998; Smith et al., 1996), and this conclusion 
is supported by a recent meta-analysis (Owen, 1997; see also D’Esposito, Aguirre, et al., 1998). 
 
However, some behavioral work does support the idea of multiple, domain-specific WM-capacity systems (e.g., 
Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Daneman & Tardif, 1987; Jurden, 1995; Shah & Miyake, 1996).17 Moreover, with 
respect to neurology, the lateral PFC consists of several distinct subregions with different specialties: for 
example, the principal sulcus and inferior convexity regions in the macaque. These dorsolateral and 
ventrolateral subregions (i.e., areas 9/46 and 12, respectively) are anatomically networked to different posterior 
regions. Principal sulcus neurons are primarily linked to posterior parietal cortex, and inferior convexity 
neurons are linked to inferior temporal cortex. These two posterior areas are specialized for processing spatial 
and object information, respectively (e.g., Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983; Pandya & Barnes, 1987).  
 
Accordingly, delay tasks with spatial stimuli may rely more on principal sulcus neurons in the dPFC, and delay 
tasks with object stimuli may rely more on inferior convexity cells (see, e.g., Mishkin & Manning, 1978; 
Passingham, 1975; Rosenkilde, 1979; F. A. W. Wison et al., 1993; but see also Boussaoud & Wise, 1993), and 
on more dorsal areas as well (Petrides, 1995). Moreover, in imaging studies, humans sometimes show different 
lateralization patterns in PFC activation during spatial versus object memory tasks (Casey et al., 1998; Courtney 
et al., 1998; D’Esposito, Ballard, et al., 1998; McCarthy et al., 1994; McCarthy et al., 1996). Here, then, 
separate anatomical structures seem to subserve working memories that involve different stimulus domains (but 
see D’Esposito, Aguirre, et al., 1998; D’Esposito, Postle, Ballard, & Lease, 1999; Owen, 1997). 
 
Despite these inconsistencies, we believe that WM capacity/executive attention/Gf reflects an entirely domain-
free process or mechanism. At the same time, however, every task also involves the use of some domain-
specific stimuli, processing, and skill, and so every measure of WM capacity/executive attention/Gf reflects 
both domain-free and domain-specific components. No individual test or small battery of tests will exclusively 
tap the executive component of WM capacity. For example, contradictory imaging findings with respect to 
dPFC laterality for spatial and object n-back tasks may reflect individual differences across the small samples of 
subjects in each study (D’Esposito, Ballard, et al., 1998; Postle, Stern, et al., 2000). The individual differences 
in these studies may represent the WM-capacity/executive-attention construct, or instead (or even also) may 
represent idiosyncratic strategies or skills adopted by subjects. 
 
We suggest that a hierarchical view of the WM system is most appropriate, by analogy to the intelligence 
literature (e.g., Carroll, 1993, 1996; Kyllonen, 1993, 1996; Snow et al., 1984; see Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 
1999). A domain-free central-executive component (―WM capacity‖), like the second-order Gf factor of 
intelligence, works in concert with domain-specific storage and processing components, such as the first-order, 
domain-specific factors of intelligence. 
 
Indeed, we view the neuroanatomic evidence as supporting a hierarchical view of WM. The specific factors 
correspond primarily to the domain or modality of to-be-stored information, and therefore to the action of more 
posterior brain regions. The general factor transcends any specific domain or modality of processing, and 
therefore corresponds to the action of dPFC. As noted above, different subregions of the lateral PFC are 
generally networked to different posterior systems, and these separable pathways are suggestive of distinct WM 
systems. How-ever, neural connections between these lateral PFC areas may allow them to coordinate their 
activity (Barbas & Pandya, 199 1; Pandya & Barnes, 19 87). 
 
Moreover, a minority of neurons in each of these PFC subregions responds to the domain or modality that is 
typically reserved for the other subregion. That is, some principal sulcus neurons respond preferably to object, 
as opposed to spatial, information, and some inferior convexity neurons respond to spatial, as opposed to object, 
information (see, e.g., Boussaoud & Wise, 1993; Funahashi et al., 1989, 1990; Kubota et al., 1980; Rosenkilde 
et al., 1981; F. A. W. Wilson et al., 1993; but see Niki, 1974b). Even within each specialized subregion, then, 
cross-domain activity is measurable. This suggests that lateral subregions of PFC have domain-specific firing 
preferences, or tuning curves, but they still contribute to WM performance in other nonpreferred domains or 
modalities (see Erickson, 1974, for parallel arguments in the neurobiology of coordinative perceptual coding, 
and see E. K. Miller, 2000, for evidence of similar tuning within the ―what‖ and ―where‖ visual pathways). 
 
Even a single neuron may fire across delays in both spatial- and object-based discriminations within the very 
same task. Rao et al. (1997) created an ingenious delayed matching-to- sample task requiring monkeys to retain 
both object and spatial information across delays. The subject first viewed a sample object illustration in a 
neutral location, and then, after a blank delay, saw two test illustrations (each appearing in one of four possible 
test locations), one of which matched the sample. After another blank delay, the subject had to make an eye 
movement to the location where the matching sample had previously appeared. Thus, in making a delayed 
spatial response, object information also had to be maintained across delays. Seven percent of delay-sensitive 
cells fired only during the first, ―object/what‖ delay, and 41 % were uniquely tuned for the second, 
―location/where‖ delay. However, a majority (52%) of delay neurons fired during both object- and location-
based delays, and these ―what-and-where‖ cells were distributed equally between dorsolateral and ventrolateral 
PFC areas. In similar studies, Rainer et al. (1998) found that 25% of dPFC delay cells were tuned to both object 
and location information, and White and Wise (1999) demonstrated that delay-period cells in dorsolateral and 
ventrolateral PFC were equally likely to be activated by cues for spatial or conditional (nonspatial) target-
detection rules. Moreover, in the White and Wise study, individual cells in both dorsal and ventral areas 
changed preference for conditional versus spatial rules across different blocks of the task. 
 
The generality of WM capacity is strongly supported by the human individual-differences research showing that 
WM-span measures predict performance in relatively low-level attention tasks bearing no surface similarity to 
the span tasks themselves, or to other ―memory‖ tasks (for reviews, see Conway & Kane, 2001; Engle, 2001, 
2002; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999). Unlike WM-span tasks, these attention tasks, such as antisaccade and 
Stroop, require no complex linguistic/arithmetic processing and no retention of stimulus lists. What they do 
require is that a goal-state be actively maintained in order to control behavior despite strong interference from 
habit and environmental events. They also appear to re-quire intact dPFC functioning. Thus, our findings that 
low spans perform worse than do high spans on antisaccade tasks, Stroop tasks, dichotic-listening tasks, verbal-
fluency tasks, proactive-interference tasks, and Gf-loaded reasoning tasks strongly resemble the 
neuropsychological findings discussed at length in this review. Healthy individuals with low WM capacities, 
although obviously not as impaired as patients with dPFC damage, do show pat-terns of cognitive performance 
similar to those of dPFC patients. Moreover, healthy high-span subjects engaged in executive-attention tasks 
under a memory load come to resemble both low spans and dPFC patients in their performance (Bleckley, 2001; 
Kane & Engle, 2000; Rosen & Engle, 1997). 
 
A hierarchical organization of WM capabilities seems the best way to account for the apparent generality and 
specificity in behavioral and neuroanatomical indices of WM capacity/executive attention. A general, domain-
free factor certainly accounts for too much performance variance to be ignored. There are simply too many 
strong correlations among diverse WM-capacity tasks and diverse higher order tasks to deny that some general 
mechanism is involved. Yet, with respect to WM-capacity and higher order tasks, there typically remains some 
significant variance to be accounted for after the general-factor variance is removed (see, e.g., Daneman & 
Merikle, 1996; Shah & Miyake, 1996). Similarly, the dPFC appears to be critical to executive-attention 
capabilities across a variety of tasks and stimulus domains, and yet other posterior brain areas are variously and 
variably important to some of these tasks and stimuli, as well. 
 
According to our framework, then, individual differences in WM capacity should best predict other capabilities 
when the WM-measure and the target-ability task both demand executive attention—that is, when neither task is 
too demanding in terms of a specialized skill in a particular domain. The correlations between WM-capacity 
and ability tasks will be highest when both tasks reflect the general WM-capacity factor (―Gwm‖) and neither is 
mediated too strongly by a specific lower level factor such as Baddeley’s phonological loop or visuospatial 
sketchpad, or by other, more strategic mechanisms. Likewise, bilateral patterns of dPFC activation will be most 
likely during memory tasks that make the highest demands on executive attention regardless of the task domain. 
More differentiated activation patterns, and more variability in the participation of posterior brain areas, will be 
likely to appear during the performance of memory tasks that make particular demands on specific skills. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
By definition, subjects in complex WM-capacity tasks must do more than just passively store information. 
These tasks make considerable demands on executive attention, we argue, by requiring that subjects maintain 
some in-formation in an active state, and this is particularly critical under conditions of interference. The 
presence of interference puts a premium on this active maintenance of information, because without 
interference it is quite easy to retrieve inactive information from LTM. Not surprisingly, then, other cognitive 
tasks that demand executive attention for focusing or switching in the face of interference are also well 
predicted by individual differences in WM capacity. Moreover, performance on these executive-attention tasks 
is severely disrupted by imposing a simultaneous WM load. 
 
But what does this WM capacity/executive attention construct ultimately reflect? We propose that the common 
factor among tasks that are sensitive to individual differences in WM capacity, tasks that are impacted by a 
secondary load, tasks that load highly onto a Gf factor, and tasks that selectively require dPFC involvement is 
the degree to which the tasks require executive attention. More specifically, the capability to maintain a memory 
representation in an active state despite distractions, and in interference-rich contexts, is precisely the aspect of 
executive attention that is critical to predicting general success across higher order cognitive domains, and that 
is particularly reliant on cells of the dPFC. 
 
REFERENCES 
Ackerly, S. (1937). Instinctive, emotional and mental changes following prefrontal lobe extirpation. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 92, 717-729. 
Ahola, K., Vilkki, J., & Servo, A. (1996). Frontal tests do not detect frontal infarctions after ruptured 
intracranial aneurysm. Brain & Cognition, 31, 1-16. 
Alexander, G. E., & Fuster, J. M. (1973). Effects of cooling pre-frontal cortex on cell firing in the nucleus 
medialis dorsalis. Brain Research, 61, 93-105. 
Allport, D. A., Styles, E. A., & Hsieh, S. (1994). Shifting attentional set: Exploring the dynamic control of 
tasks. In C. Umiltà & M. Moscovitch (Eds.), Attention and performance XV: Conscious and nonconscious 
information processing (pp. 421-452). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Anderson, S. W., Damasio, H., Jones, R. D., & Tranel, D. (1991). Wisconsin Card Sorting Test performance as 
a measure of frontal lobe damage. Journal of Clinical & Experimental Neuropsychology, 13, 909-922. 
Arthur, W., Jr., Barrett, G. V., & Doverspike, D. (1990). Validation of an information-processing-based test 
battery for the prediction of handling accidents among petroleum-product transport drivers. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 75, 621-628. 
Awh, E., Jonides, J., Smith, E. E., Schumacher, E. H., Koeppe, R. A., & Katz, S. (1996). Dissociation of storage 
and rehearsal in verbal working memory: Evidence from positron emission tomography. Psychological Science, 
7, 25-31. 
Baddeley, A. D. (1996). Exploring the central executive. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49A, 
5-28. 
Baddeley, A. D., Della Sala, S., Papagno, C., & Spinnler, H. (1997). Dual-task performance in dysexecutive and 
nondysexecutive patients with a frontal lesion. Neuropsychology, 11, 187-194. 
Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. In G. A. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and 
motivation (Vol. 8, pp. 47-89). New York: Academic Press. 
Baddeley, A. D., & Logie, R. (1999). Working memory: The multiple component model. In A. Miyake & P. 
Shah (Eds.), Models of working memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance and executive control (pp. 28-61). 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Baker, S. C., Frith, C. D., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Dolan, R. J. (1996). Active representation of shape and spatial 
location in man. Cerebral Cortex, 6, 612-619. 
Baldo, J. V., & Shimamura, A. P. (1998). Letter and category fluency in patients with frontal lobe lesions. 
Neuropsychology, 12, 259-267. 
Baldo, J. V., & Shimamura, A. P. (2000). Spatial and color working memory in patients with lateral prefrontal 
cortex lesions. Psycho-biology, 28,156-167. 
Banich, M. T., Milham, M. P., Atchley, R. A., Cohen, N. J., Webb, A., Wszalek, T., Kramer, A. F., Liang, Z. P., 
Wright, A., Shenker, J., 
& Magin, R. (2000). fMRI studies of Stroop tasks reveal unique roles of anterior and posterior brain systems in 
attentional selection. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12, 988-1000. 
Barbas, H., & Mesulam, M. M. (1981). Organization of afferent input to subdivisions of area 8 in the rhesus 
monkey. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 200, 407-431. 
Barbas, H., & Mesulam, M. M. (1985). Cortical afferent input to the principalis region of the rhesus monkey. 
Neuroscience, 15, 619-637. 
Barbas, H., & Pandya, D. N. (1991). Patterns of connections of the prefrontal cortex in the rhesus monkey 
associated with cortical architecture. In H. S. Levin, H. M. Eisenberg, & A. L. Benton (Eds.), Frontal lobe 
function and dysfunction (pp. 35-58). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Barch, D. M., Braver, T. S., Nyström, L. E., Forman, S. D., Noll, D. C., & Cohen, J. D. (1997). Dissociating 
working memory from task difficulty in human prefrontal cortex. Neuropsychologia, 35, 1373-1380. 
Bartus, R. T., & LaVere, T. E. (1977). Frontal decortication in rhesus monkeys: A test of the interference 
hypothesis. Brain Research, 119, 233-248. 
Battersby, W. S., Krieger, H. P., Pollack, M., & Bender, M. B. (1953). Figure-ground discrimination and the 
―abstract attitude‖ in patients with cerebral lesions. Archives of Neurology & Psychiatry, 70, 703-712. 
Battig, K., Rosvold, H. E., & Mishkin, M. (1960). Comparison of the effects of frontal and caudate lesions on 
delayed response and alternation in monkeys. Journal of Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 53, 400-
404. 
Batuev A. S., Shaefer, V. I., & Orlov, A. A. (1985). Comparative characteristics of unit activity in the prefrontal 
and parietal areas during delayed performance in monkeys. Behavioural Brain Research, 16,57-70. 
Bauer, R. H., & Fuster, J. M. (1976). Delayed-matching and delayed-response deficit from cooling dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex in monkeys. Journal of Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 90, 293- 302. 
Baylis, G. C., & Rolls, E. T. (1987). Responses of neurons in the inferior temporal cortex in short term and 
serial recognition memory tasks. Experimental Brain Research, 65, 614-622. 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Anderson, S. W. (1998). Dissociation of working memory from 
decision making within the human prefrontal cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 18, 428-437. 
Bench, C. J., Frith, C. D., Grasby, P. M., Friston, K. J., Paulesu, E., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Dolan, R. J. (1993). 
Investigations of the functional anatomy of attention using the Stroop test. Neuropsychologia, 31, 907-922. 
Benedict, R. H. B., Lockwood, A. H., Shucard, J. L., Shucard, D. W., Wack, D., & Murphy, B. W. (1998). 
Functional neuroimaging of attention in the auditory modality. NeuroReport, 9, 121-126. 
Benton, A. L. (1968). Differential behavioral effects in frontal lobe disease. Neuropsychologia, 6, 53-60. 
Berg, E. A. (1948). A simple objective technique for measuring flexibility in thinking. Journal of General 
Psychology, 39, 15-22. 
Berman, K. F., Ostrem, J. L., Randolph, C., Gold, J., Goldberg, T. E., Coppola, R., Carson, R. E., Herscovitch, 
P., & Weinberger, D. R. (1995). Physiological activation of a cortical network during performance of the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test: A positron emission tomography study. Neuropsychologia, 33, 1027-1046. 
Berman, K. F., Zec, R. F., & Weinberger, D. R. (1986). Physiological dysfunction of dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex in schizophrenia: II. Role of neuroleptic treatment, attention, and mental effort. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 43, 126-135. 
Bleckley, M. K. (2001). Individual differences in visual attention and working memory capacity: Further 
distinctions between where and what. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Georgia Institute of Technology. 
Bolter, J. F., Long, C. J., & Wagner, M. (1983). The utility of the Thurstone Word Fluency Test in identifying 
cortical damage. Clinical Neuropsychology, 5, 77 -82. 
Boone, K. B. (1999). Neuropsychological assessment of executive functions: Impact of age, education, gender, 
intellectual level, and vascular status on executive test scores. In B. L. Miller & J. L. Cummings (Eds.), The 
human frontal lobes: Functions and disorders (pp. 247- 260). New York: Guilford. 
Borkowski, J. G. (1965). Interference effects in short-term memory as a function of level of intelligence. 
American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 70, 458-465. 
Boussaoud, D., & Wise, S. P. (1993). Primate frontal cortex: Neuronal activity following attentional versus 
intentional cues. Experimental Brain Research, 95, 15 -27. 
Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Kelley, W. M., Buckner, R. L., Cohen, N. J., Miezin, F. M., Snyder, A. Z., 
Ollinger, J. M., Akbudak, E., Conturo, T. E., & Petersen, S. E. (2001). Direct comparison of pre-frontal cortex 
regions engaged by working and long-term memory tasks. NeuroImage, 14, 48-59. 
Braver, T. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2000). On the control of control: The role of dopamine in regulating prefrontal 
function and working memory. In S. Monsell & J. Driver (Eds.), Attention and performance XVIII: Control of 
cognitive processes (pp. 713-737). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Braver, T. S., Cohen, J. D., Nyström, L. E., Jonides, J., Smith, E. E., & Noll, D. C. (1997). A parametric study 
of prefrontal cortex involvement in human working memory. NeuroImage, 5, 49-62. 
Brodmann, K. (1925). Vergleichende Lokalisationslehre der Grosshirn-rinde. Leipzig, Germany: Barth. 
Butters, M. A., Kaszniak, A. W., Glisky, E. L., Eslinger, P. J., & Schacter, D. L. (1994). Recency discrimination 
deficits in frontal lobe patients. Neuropsychology, 8, 343-353. 
Callicott, J. H., Mattay, V. S., Bertolino, A., Finn, K., Coppola, R., Frank, J. A., Goldberg, T. E., & Weinberger, 
D. R. (1999). Physiological characteristics of capacity constraints in working memory as revealed by functional 
MRI. Cerebral Cortex, 9, 20-26. 
Carpenter, P. A., Just, M. A., & Shell, P. (1990). What one intelligence test measures: A theoretical account of 
the processing in the Raven Progressive Matrices test. Psychological Review, 97, 404-431. 
Carroll, J. B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities: A survey of factor-analytic studies. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Carroll, J. B. (1996). A three-striatum theory of intelligence: Spearman’s contribution. In I. Dennis & P. 
Tapsfield (Eds.), Human abilities: Their nature and measurement (pp. 1- 17). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Casey, B. J., Cohen, J. D., O’Craven, K., Davidson, R. J., Irwin, W., Nelson, C. A., Noll, D. C., Hu, X., Lowe, 
M. J., Rosen, B. R., Truwitt, C. L., & Turski, P. A. (1998). Reproducibility of fMRI results across four 
institutions using a spatial working memory task. NeuroImage, 8,249-261. 
Chao, L. L., & Knight, R. T. (1998). Contribution of human prefrontal cortex to delay performance. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 167-177. 
Chorover, S. L., & Cole, M. (1966). Delayed alternation performance in patients with cerebral lesions. 
Neuropsychologia, 4, 1-7. 
Chow, T. W., & Cummings, J. L. (1999). Frontal-subcortical circuits. In B. L. Miller & J. L. Cummings (Eds.), 
The human frontal lobes: Functions and disorders (pp. 3-26). New York: Guilford. 
Cicerone, K. D., Lazar, R. M., & Shapiro, W. R. (1983). Effects of frontal lobe lesions on hypothesis sampling 
during concept formation. Neuropsychologia, 21, 513-524. 
Cohen, J. D., Braver, T. S., & O’Reilly, R. C. (1996). A computational approach to prefrontal cortex, cognitive 
control and schizophrenia: Recent developments and current challenges. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London: Series B, 351, 1515-1527. 
Cohen, J. D., Braver, T. S., & O’Reilly, R. C. (1998). A computational approach to prefrontal cortex, cognitive 
control and schizophrenia: Recent developments and current challenges. In A. C. Roberts, T. W. Robbins, & L. 
Weiskrantz (Eds.), The prefrontal cortex: Executive and cognitive functions (pp. 195-220). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Cohen, J. D., Dunbar, K., & McClelland, J. L. (1990). On the control of automatic processes: A parallel 
distributed processing account of the Stroop effect. Psychological Review, 97, 332-361. 
Cohen, J. D., Forman, S. D., Braver, T. S., Casey, B. J., Servan-Schreiber, D., & Noll, D. C. (1994). Activation 
of the prefrontal cortex in a nonspatial working memory task with functional MRI. Human Brain Mapping, 1, 
293-304. 
Cohen, J. D., Perlstein, W. M., Braver, T. S., Nyström, L. E., Noll, D. C., Jonides, J., & Smith, E. E. (1997). 
Temporal dynamics of brain activation during a working memory task. Nature, 386, 604- 608. 
Cohen, J. D., & Servan-Schreiber, D. (1992). Context, cortex, and dopamine: A connectionist approach to 
behavior and biology in schizophrenia. Psychological Review, 99, 45-77. 
Constantinidis, C., & Steinmetz, M. A. (1996). Neuronal activity in posterior parietal area 7a during the delay 
periods of a spatial memory task. Journal of Neurophysiology, 76,1352-1355. 
Conway, A. R. A., Cowan, N., & Bunting, M. F. (2001). The cocktail party phenomenon revisited: The 
importance of working memory capacity. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8, 331-335. 
Conway, A. R. A., Cowan, N., Bunting, M. F., Therriault, D., & Minkoff, S. (2002). A latent variable analysis 
of working memory capacity, short term memory capacity, processing speed, and general fluid intelligence. 
Intelligence, 30, 163-183. 
Conway, A. R. A., & Engle, R. W. (1994). Working memory and retrieval: A resource-dependent inhibition 
model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 123, 354-373. 
Conway, A. R. A., & Engle, R. W. (1996). Individual differences in working memory capacity: More evidence 
for a general capacity theory. Memory, 4, 577-590. 
Conway, A. R. A., & Kane, M. J. (2001). Capacity, control and conflict: An individual differences perspective 
on attentional capture. In C. Folk & B. Gibson (Eds.), Attraction, distraction and action: Multiple perspectives 
on attention capture (pp. 349-372). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Conway, A. R. A., Tuholski, S. W., Shisler, R. J., & Engle, R. W. (1999). The effect of memory load on 
negative priming: An individual differences investigation. Memory & Cognition, 27, 1042-1050. 
Corbetta, M., Miezin, F. M., Dobmeyer, S., Shulman, G. L., & Peterson, S. E. (1991). Selective and divided 
attention during visual discriminations of shape, color, and speed: Functional anatomy by positron emission 
tomography. Journal of Neuroscience, 11, 2383-2402. 
Corcoran, R., & Upton, D. (1993). A role for the hippocampus in card sorting? Cortex, 29, 293-304. 
Coslett, H. B., Bowers, D., Verfaellie, M., & Heilman, K. M. (1991). Frontal verbal amnesia: Phonological 
amnesia. Archives of Neurology, 48, 949-955. 
Courtney, S. M., Petit, L., Maisog, J. M., Ungerleider, L. G., & Haxby, J. V. (1998). An area specialized for 
spatial working memory in human frontal cortex. Science, 279, 1347-135 1. 
Courtney, S. M., Ungerleider, L. G., Keil, K., & Haxby, J. V. (1996). Object and spatial working memory 
activate separate neural systems in human cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 6, 39-49. 
Courtney, S. M., Ungerleider, L. G., Keil, K., & Haxby, J. V. (1997). Transient and sustained activity in a 
distributed neural system for human working memory. Nature, 386, 608-611. 
Cowan, N. (1995). Attention and memory: An integrated framework. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cowan, N. (1999). An embedded-process model of working memory. In A. Miyake & P. Shah (Eds.), Models of 
working memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance and executive control (pp. 62-10 1). New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Crawford, J. D., & Stankov L. (1983). Fluid and crystallized intelligence and primacy/recency components of 
short-term memory. Intelligence, 7, 227-252. 
Cuenod, C. A., Bookheimer, S. Y., Hertz-Pannier, L., Zeffiro, T. A., Theodore, W. H., & Le Bihan, D. (1995). 
Functional MRI during word generation, using conventional equipment: A potential tool for language 
localization in the clinical environment. Neurology, 45, 1821-1827. 
Damasio, H. C. (1991). Neuroanatomy of frontal lobe in vivo: A comment on methodology. In H. S. Levin, H. 
M. Eisenberg, & A. L. Benton (Eds.), Frontal lobe function and dysfunction (pp. 92-12 1). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
D’Amato, M. R., & O’Neill, W. (1971). Effect of delay-interval illumination on matching behavior in the 
capuchin monkey. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 15, 327-333. 
Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). Individual differences in working memory and reading. Journal of 
Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 19, 450-466. 
Daneman, M., & Merikle, P. M. (1996). Working memory and language comprehension: A meta-analysis. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Re-view, 3, 422-433. 
Daneman, M., & Tardif, T. (1987). Working memory and reading skill reexamined. In M. Coltheart (Ed.), 
Attention and performance XII: The psychology of reading (pp. 491-508). Hove, U.K.: Erlbaum. 
Dehaene, S. , & Changeux, J. P. (1989). A simple model of prefrontal cortex function in delayed-response tasks. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuro-science, 1, 244-261. 
De Jong, R. D., Berendsen, E., & Cools, R. (1999). Goal neglect and inhibitory limitations: Dissociable causes 
of interference effects in conflict situations. Acta Psychologica, 101, 379-394. 
Delis, D. C., Squire, L. R., Bihrle, A., & Massman, P. (1992). Componential analysis of problem-solving 
ability: Performance of patients with frontal lobe damage and amnesic patients on a new sorting test. 
Neuropsychologia, 30, 683-697. 
Dempster, F. N. (199 1). Inhibitory processes: A neglected dimension in intelligence. Intelligence, 15, 157-173. 
Dempster, F. N. (1992). The rise and fall of the inhibitory mechanism: Toward a unified theory of cognitive 
development and aging. Developmental Review, 12, 45-75. 
Dempster, F. N., & Corkill, A. J. (1999). Individual differences in susceptibility to interference and general 
cognitive ability. Acta Psychologica, 101, 395-416. 
Desimone, R., & Duncan, J. (1995). Neural mechanisms of selective visual attention. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 18, 193-222. 
D’Esposito, M., Aguirre, G. K., Zarahn, E. K., Ballard, D., Shin, R. K., & Lease, J. (1998). Functional MRI 
studies of spatial and non-spatial working memory. Cognitive Brain Research, 7, 1-13. 
D’Esposito, M., Ballard, D., Aguirre, G. K., & Zarahn, E. (1998). Human prefrontal cortex is not specific for 
working memory: A functional MRI study. NeuroImage, 8, 274-282. 
D’Esposito, M., Ballard, D., Zarahn, E., & Aguirre, G. K. (2000). The role of prefrontal cortex in sensory 
memory and motor preparation: An event-related fMRI study. NeuroImage, 11, 400-408. 
D’Esposito, M., Detre, J. A., Alsop, D. C., Shin, R. K., Atlas, S., & Grossman, M. (1995). The neural basis of 
the central executive system of working memory. Nature, 378, 279-281. 
D’Esposito, M., Postle, B. R., Ballard, D., & Lease, J. (1999). Maintenance versus manipulation of information 
held in working memory: An event-related fMRI study. Brain & Cognition, 41, 66-86. 
D’Esposito, M., Postle, B. R., Jonides, J., & Smith, E. E. (1999). The neural substrate and temporal dynamics of 
interference effects in working memory as revealed by event-related functional MRI. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 96, 7514-7519. 
Diamond, A. (1990). Developmental time course in human infants and infant monkeys, and the neural bases of, 
inhibitory control of reaching. In A. Diamond (Ed.), The development and neural bases of higher cognitive 
functions (Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 608, pp. 637-676). New York: New York 
Academy of Sciences. 
Diamond, A. (19 9 1). Frontal lobe involvement in cognitive changes during the first year of life. In K. R. 
Gibson & A. C. Peterson (Eds.), Brain maturation and cognitive development: Comparative and cross-cultural 
perspectives (pp. 127-180). New York: de Gruyter. 
Dias, R., Robbins, T. W., & Roberts, A. C. (1996a). Dissociation in pre-frontal cortex of affective and 
attentional shifts. Nature, 380, 69-72. 
Dias, R., Robbins, T. W., & Roberts, A. C. (1996b). Primate analogue of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test: 
Effects of excitotoxic lesions of the prefrontal cortex in the marmoset. Behavioral Neuroscience, 110, 872-886. 
Dias, R., Robbins, T. W., & Roberts, A. C. (1997). Dissociable forms of inhibitory control within prefrontal 
cortex with an analog of the Wisconsin Card Sort Test: Restriction to novel situations and independence from 
―on-line‖ processing. Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 9285-9297. 
di Pellegrino, G., & Wise, S. P. (1 993a). Effects of attention on visuo-motor activity in the premotor and 
prefrontal cortex of a primate. Somatosensory & Motor Research, 10, 245-262. 
di Pellegrino, G., & Wise, S. P. (1993b). Visuospatial versus visuo-motor activity in the premotor and prefrontal 
cortex of a primate. Journal of Neuroscience, 13, 1227-1243. 
Diwadkar, V. A., Carpenter, P. A., & Just, M. A. (2000). Collaborative activity between parietal and dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex in dynamic spatial working memory revealed by f MRI. NeuroImage, 12,85-99. 
Dolan, R. J., & Fletcher, P. C. (1997). Dissociating prefrontal and hippocampal function in episodic memory 
encoding. Nature, 388, 582-585. 
Dove, A., Pollmann, S., Schubert, T., Wiggins, C. J., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2000). Prefrontal cortex activation 
in task switching: An event-related f MRI study. Cognitive Brain Research, 9, 103-109. 
Drewe, E. A. (1974). The effect of type and area of brain lesion on Wisconsin Card Sorting Test performance. 
Cortex, 10, 159-170. 
Dubois, B., Levy, R., Verin, M., Teixeira, C., Agid, Y., & Pillon, B. (1995). Experimental approach to 
prefrontal functions in humans. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 769, 41-60. 
Dunbar, K., & Sussman, D. (1995). Toward a cognitive account of frontal lobe function: Simulating frontal lobe 
deficits in normal subjects. In J. Grafman, K. J. Holyoak, & F. Butler (Eds.), Structure and functions of the 
human prefrontal cortex (Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 769, pp. 289-304). New York: 
New York Academy of Sciences. 
Duncan, J. (1990). Goal weighting and the choice of behavior in a complex world. Ergonomics, 33, 1265-1279. 
Duncan, J. (1993). Selection of input and goal in the control of behavior. In A. Baddeley & L. Weiskrantz 
(Eds.), Attention: Selection, awareness, and control. A tribute to Donald Broadbent (pp. 53-71). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press. 
Duncan, J. (1995). Attention, intelligence, and the frontal lobes. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive 
neurosciences (pp. 721-733). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Duncan, J., Burgess, P., & Emslie, H. (1995). Fluid intelligence after frontal lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia, 
33, 261-268. 
Duncan, J., Emslie, H., Williams, P., Johnson, R., & Freer, C. (1996). Intelligence and the frontal lobe: The 
organization of goal-directed behavior. Cognitive Psychology, 30, 257-303. 
Duncan, J., Johnson, R., Swales, M., & Freer, C. (1997). Frontal lobe deficits after head injury: Unity and 
diversity of function. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 14, 713-741. 
Duncan, J., Seitz, R. J., Kolodny, J., Bor, D., Herzog, H., Ahmed, A., Newell, F. N., & Emslie, H. (2000). A 
neural basis for general intelligence. Science, 289, 457-460. 
Dupont P., Orban, G. A., Vogels, R., Bormans, G., Nuyts, J., Schiepers, C., De Roo, M., & Mortelmans, L. 
(1993). Different perceptual tasks performed with the same visual stimulus attribute activate different regions of 
the human brain: A positron emission tomography study. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
90,10927-10931. 
Ekstrom, R. B., French, J. W., Harman, M. H., & Dermen, D. (1976). Manual for kit of factor-referenced 
cognitive tests. Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service. 
Elfgren, C. I., & Risberg , J. (1998). Lateralized frontal blood flow increases during fluency tasks: Influence of 
cognitive strategy. Neuropsychologia, 36, 505-512. 
Engle, R. W. (1996). Working memory and retrieval: An inhibition-resource approach. In J. T. E. Richardson, 
R. W. Engle, L. Hasher, R. H. Logie, E. R. Stoltzfus, & R. T. Zacks (Eds.), Working memory and human 
cognition (pp. 89-119). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Engle, R. W. (2001). What is working memory capacity? In H. L. Roediger III, J. S. Nairne, I. Neath, & A. M. 
Surprenant (Eds.), The nature of remembering: Essays in honor of Robert G. Crowder (pp. 297-314). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Engle, R. W. (2002). Working memory capacity as executive attention. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 11, 19-23. 
Engle, R. W., Cantor, J., & Carullo, J. J. (1992). Individual differences in working memory and comprehension: 
A test of four hypotheses. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 18, 972-992. 
Engle, R. W., Kane, M. J., & Tuholski, S. W. (1999). Individual differences in working memory capacity and 
what they tell us about controlled attention, general fluid intelligence and functions of the prefrontal cortex. In 
A. Miyake & P. Shah (Eds.), Models of working memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance and executive 
control (pp. 102-134). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Engle, R. W., Nations, J. K., & Cantor, J. (1990). Is ―working memory capacity‖ just another name for word 
knowledge? Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 799-804. 
Engle, R. W., & Oransky, N. (1999). The evolution from short-term to working memory: Multi-store to 
dynamic models of temporary storage. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The concept of cognition (pp. 515- 555). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. A. (1999). Working memory, short-term 
memory and general fluid intelligence: A latent variable approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 128,309-331. 
Erickson, R. P. (1974). Parallel ―population‖ neural coding in feature extraction. In F. O. Schmitt & F. G. 
Worden (Eds.), The neuro-sciences: Third study program (pp. 155-169). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Eriksen, B. A., & Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon the identification of a target letter in a 
nonsearch task. Perception & Psychophysics, 16,143-149. 
Eslinger, P. J., & Damasio, A. R. (1985). Severe disturbance of higher cognition after bilateral frontal lobe 
ablation: Patient EVR. Neurology, 35,1731-1741. 
Esposito, G., Kirkby, B. S., Van Horn, J. D., Ellmore, T. M., & Berman, K. F. (1999). Context-dependent, 
neural system-specific neurophysiological concomitants of ageing: Mapping PET correlates during cognitive 
activation. Brain, 122, 963-979. 
Everling, S., & Fischer, B. (1998). The antisaccade: A review of basic research and clinical findings. 
Neuropsychologia, 36, 885-899. 
Ferreira, C. T., Verin, M., Pillon, B., Levy, R., Dubois, B., & Agid, Y. (1998). Spatio-temporal working 
memory and frontal lesions in man. Cortex, 34, 83-98. 
Ferrier, D. (1886). The functions of the brain (2nd ed.). London: Smith, Elder. 
Fiez, J. A., Raife, E. A., Balota, D. A., Schwarz, J. P., Raichle, M. E., & Peterson, S. E. (1996). A positron 
emission tomography study of the short-term maintenance of verbal information. Journal of Neuroscience, 16, 
808-822. 
Fletcher, P. C., Shallice, T., & Dolan, R. J. (1998). The functional roles of prefrontal cortex in episodic 
memory. Brain, 121, 1239- 1248. 
Freedman, M., & Cermak, L. S. (1986). Semantic encoding deficits in frontal lobe disease and amnesia. Brain 
& Cognition, 5, 108-114. 
Freedman, M., & Oscar-Berman, M. (1986). Bilateral frontal lobe disease and selective delayed response 
deficits in humans. Behavioral Neuroscience, 100, 337-342. 
Friedman, H. R., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1988). Activation of the hippocampus and dentate gyrus by working 
memory: A 2-deoxyglucose study of behaving rhesus monkeys. Journal of Neuroscience, 8, 46 93 - 4706. 
Frisk, V., & Milner, B. (1990). The relationship of working memory to the immediate recall of stories following 
unilateral temporal or frontal lobectomy. Neuropsychologia, 28,121-135. 
Frith, C. D., Friston, K. J., Liddle, P. F., & Frackowiak, R. S. J. (1991). A PET study of word finding. 
Neuropsychologia, 29, 1137- 1148. 
Fukushima, J., Fukushima, K., Miyasaka, K., & Yamashita, I. (1994). Voluntary control of saccadic eye 
movement in patients with frontal cortical lesions and Parkinsonian patients in comparison with that in 
schizophrenics. Biological Psychiatry, 36, 21-30. 
Funahashi, S., Bruce, C. J., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1989). Mnemonic coding of visual space in the monkey’s 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 61, 331-349. 
Funahashi, S., Bruce, C. J., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1990). Visuo-spatial coding in primate prefrontal neurons 
revealed by oculomotor paradigms. Journal of Neurophysiology, 63, 814-83 1. 
Funahashi, S., Bruce, C. J., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1993). Dorso- 
lateral prefrontal lesions and oculomotor delayed-response performance: Evidence for mnemonic ―scotomas.‖ 
Journal of Neuroscience, 13, 1479-1497. 
Funahashi, S., & Kubota, K. (1994). Working memory and prefrontal cortex. Neuroscience Research, 21, 1 -11. 
Fuster, , J. M. (1973). Unit activity in prefrontal cortex during delayed-response performance: Neuronal 
correlates of transient memory. Journal of Neurophysiology, 36, 61-78. 
Fuster, J. M. (1980). The prefrontal cortex. New York: Raven. Fuster, J. M. (1988). The prefrontal cortex: 
Anatomy, physiology, and neuropsychology of the frontal lobe. New York: Raven. 
Fuster, J. M. (1989). The prefrontal cortex (2nd ed.). New York: Raven. 
Fuster, J. M. (1996, July). Emerging solutions to the problem of the frontal lobe. Paper presented at the James S. 
McDonnell Foundation Summer Institute in Cognitive Neuroscience, Hanover, NH. 
Fuster, J. M., & Alexander, G. E. (1973). Firing changes in cells of the nucleus medialis dorsalis associated with 
delayed response behavior. Brain Research, 61, 79-91. 
Fuster, J. M., & Bauer, R. H. (1974). Visual short-term memory deficit from hypothermia of frontal cortex. 
Brain Research, 81, 393-400. 
Fuster, J. M., Bauer, R. H., & Jervey, J. P. (1985). Functional interactions between inferotemporal and 
prefrontal cortex in a cognitive task. Brain Research, 330, 299-307. 
Fuster, J. M., Bodner, M., & Kroger, J. (2000). Cross-modal and cross-temporal association in neurons of 
frontal cortex. Nature, 405, 347-351. 
Goel, V., Buchel, C., Frith, C., & Dolan, R. J. (2000). Dissociation of mechanisms underlying syllogistic 
reasoning. NeuroImage, 12, 504-514. 
Goel, V., Gold, B., Kapur, S., & Houle, S. (1997). The seats of reason? An imaging study of deductive and 
inductive reasoning. NeuroReport, 8,1305-1310. 
Goel, V., Gold, B., Kapur, S., & Houle, S. (1998). Neuroanatomical correlates of human reasoning. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 293-302. 
Gold, J. M., Berman, K. F., Randolph, C., Goldberg, T. E., & Weinberger, D. R. (1996). PET validation of a 
novel prefrontal task: Delayed response alternation. Neuropsychology, 10, 3- 10. 
Goldberg, T. E., Berman, K. F., Fleming, K., Ostrem, J., Van Horn, J. D., Esposito, G., Mattay, V. S., Gold, J. 
M., & Weinberger, D. R. (1998). Uncoupling cognitive workload and prefrontal cortical physiology: A PET 
rCBF study. NeuroImage, 7, 296-303. 
Goldberg, T. E., Berman, K. F., Randolph, C., Gold, J. M., & Weinberger, D. R. (1996). Isolating the 
mnemonic component in spatial delayed response: A controlled PET 15O-labeled water regional cerebral blood 
flow study in normal humans. NeuroImage, 3, 69-78. 
Goldman, P. S. , & Rosvold, H. E. (1970). Localization of function within the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of 
the rhesus monkey. Experimental Neurology, 27, 291-304. 
Goldman, P. S., Rosvold, H. E., Vest, B., & Galkin, T. W. (1971). Analysis of the delayed-alternation deficit 
produced by dorsolateral prefrontal lesions in the rhesus monkey. Journal of Comparative & Physiological 
Psychology, 77, 212-220. 
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1987). Circuitry of primate prefrontal cortex and regulation of behavior by 
representational memory. In F. Plum (Ed.), Handbook of physiology: The nervous system (Vol. 5, pp. 373- 417). 
Bethesda, MD: American Physiological Society. 
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1995). Cellular basis of working memory. Neuron, 14, 477-485. 
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (2000). Localization of function all over again. NeuroImage, 11, 451-457. 
Goldstein, K. (1936). The significance of the frontal lobes for mental performance. Journal of Neurology & 
Psychopathology, 17, 27-40. Goldstein, K. (1944). The mental changes due to frontal lobe damage. Journal of 
Psychology, 17,187-208. 
Gopher, D., Armony, L., & Greenshpan, Y. (2000). Switching tasks and attention policies. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 129, 308-339. 
Grady, C. L., McIntosh, A. R., Bookstein, F., Horwitz, B., Rapoport, S. I., & Haxby, J. V. (1998). Age-related 
changes in regional cerebral blood flow during working memory for faces. NeuroImage, 8, 409-425. 
Grafman, J., Jonas, B., & Salazar, A. (1990). Wisconsin Card Sorting Test performance based on location and 
size of neuroanatomical lesion in Vietnam veterans with penetrating head injury. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 71, 
1120-1122. 
Grant, A. D., & Berg, E. A. (1948). A behavioral analysis of degree of reinforcement and ease of shifting to 
new responses in a Weigl-type card-sorting problem. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 38, 404-411. 
Grueninger, W. E., & Pribram, K. H. (1969). Effects of spatial and nonspatial distractors on performance 
latency of monkeys with frontal lesions. Journal of Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 68, 203-209. 
Guitton, D., Buchtel, H. A., & Douglas, R. M. (1985). Frontal lobe lesions in man cause difficulties in 
suppressing reflexive glances and in generating goal-directed saccades. Experimental Brain Research, 58, 455-
472. 
Halstead, W. C. (1947). Brain and intelligence: A quantitative study of the frontal lobes. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Harlow, H. F., & Dagnon, J. (1943). Problem solution by monkeys following bilateral removal of the prefrontal 
areas: I. The discrimination and discrimination-reversal problems. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32, 
351-356. 
Harlow, H. F., Davis, R. T., Settlage, P. H., & Meyer, D. R. (1952). Analysis of frontal and posterior 
association syndromes in brain-damaged monkeys. Journal of Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 45, 
419-429. 
Harlow, H. F., & Settlage, P. H. (1948). Effect of extirpation of frontal areas upon learning performance of 
monkeys. Research Publications for Research in Nervous & Mental Disease, 27, 446-459. 
Harlow, J. M. (1848). Passage of an iron bar through the head. Publications of the Massachusetts Medical 
Society, 2, 327-347. 
Harper, D. N., & White, K. G. (1997). Retroactive interference and rate of forgetting in delayed matching-to-
sample performance. Animal Learning & Behavior, 25, 158-164. 
Hartley, A. A., Speer, N. K., Jonides, J., Reuter-Lorenz, P. A., & Smith, E. E. (2001). Is the dissociability of 
working memory systems for name identity, visual-object identity, and spatial location maintained in old age? 
Neuropsychology, 15, 3-17. 
Haxby, J. V., Petit, L., Ungerleider, L. G., & Courtney, S. M. (2000). Distinguishing the functional roles of 
multiple regions in distributed neural systems for visual working memory. NeuroImage, 11, 98-110. 
Haxby, J. V., Ungerleider, L. G., Horwitz, B., Rapoport, S. I., & Grady, C. L. (1995). Hemispheric differences 
in neural systems for face working memory: A PET rCBF study. Human Brain Mapping, 3,68-82. 
Heaton, R. (1981). A manual for the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment 
Resources. 
Hebb, D. O. (1939). Intelligence in man after large removals of cerebral tissue: Report of four left frontal lobe 
cases. Journal of General Psychology, 21, 73-87. 
Hebb, D. O. (1945). Man’s frontal lobes: A critical review. Archives of Neurology & Psychiatry, 54, 10-24. 
Hebb, D. O., & Penfield, W. (1940). Human behavior after extensive bilateral removal from the frontal lobes. 
Archives of Neurology & Psychiatry, 44, 421-438. 
Honey, G. D., Bullmore, E. T., & Sharma, T. (2000). Prolonged reaction time to a verbal working memory task 
predicts increased power of posterior parietal cortical activation. NeuroImage, 12, 495- 503. 
Iidaka, T., Anderson, N. D., Kapur, S., Cabeza, R., & Craik, F. I. M. (2000). The effect of divided attention on 
encoding and retrieval in episodic memory revealed by Positron Emission Tomography. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 12, 267-280. 
Institute for Personality and Ability Testing (1973). Measuring intelligence with culture fair tests. Champaign, 
IL: Author. 
Jacobsen, C. F. (1935). Functions of the frontal association area in primates. Archives of Neurology & 
Psychiatry, 33, 558-569. 
Jacobsen, C. F. (1936). Studies of cerebral function in primates: I. The functions of the frontal association area 
in monkeys. Comparative Psychology Monographs, 13,1-68. 
Janowsky, J. S., Shimamura, A. P., Kritchevsky, M., & Squire, L. R. (1989). Cognitive impairment following 
frontal lobe damage and its relevance to human amnesia. Behavioral Neuroscience, 103, 548-560. 
Janowsky, J. S., Shimamura, A. P., & Squire, L. R. (1989). Source memory impairment in patients with frontal 
lobe lesions. Neuro-psychologia, 27, 1043-1056. 
Jansma, J. M., Ramsey, N. F., Coppola, R., & Kahn, R. S. (2000). Specific versus nonspecific brain activity in a 
parametric n-back task. NeuroImage, 12, 688-697. 
Jersild, A. T. (1927). Mental set and shift. Archives of Psychology [Whole No. 89]. 
Jetter, W., Poser, U., Freeman, R. B., Jr., & Markowitsch, H. J. (1986). A verbal long term memory deficit in 
frontal lobe damaged patients. Cortex, 22, 229-242. 
Jha, A. P., & McCarthy, G. (2000). The influence of memory load upon delay-interval activity in a working-
memory task: An event-related functional MRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12(Suppl.), 90-105. 
Joanette, Y., & Goulet, P. (1986). Criterion-specific reduction of verbal fluency in right brain -damaged right-
handers. Neuropsychologia, 24, 875-879. 
Johannsen, P., Jakobsen, J., Bruhn, P., Hansen, S. B., Gee, A., Stødkilde-Jørgensen, H., & Gjedde, A. (1997). 
Cortical sites of sustained and divided attention in normal elderly humans. Neuro-Image, 6,145-155. 
Jones-Gotman, M., & Milner, B. (1977). Design fluency: The invention of nonsense drawings after focal 
cortical lesions. Neuro-psychologia, 15, 653-674. 
Jonides, J., Marshuetz, C., Smith, E. E., Reuter-Lorenz, P. A., & Koeppe, R. A. (2000). Age differences in 
behavior and PET activation reveal differences in interference resolution in verbal working memory. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 12, 188-196. 
Jonides, J., Reuter-Lorenz, P. A., Smith, E. E., Awh, E., Barnes, L. L., Drain, M., Glass, J., Lauber, E. J., 
Patalano, A. L., & Schumacher, E. H. (1996). Verbal and spatial working memory in humans. Psychology of 
Learning & Motivation, 35, 43-88. 
Jonides, J., Schumacher, E. H., Smith, E. E., Lauber, E. J., Awh, E., Minoshima, S., & Koeppe, R. A. (1997). 
Verbal working memory load affects regional brain activation as measured by PET. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 9, 462-475. 
Jonides, J., Smith, E. E., Koeppe, R. A., Awh, E., Minoshima, S., & Mintun, M. A. (1993). Spatial working 
memory in humans as revealed by PET. Nature, 363, 623-625. 
Jonides, J., Smith, E. E., Marshuetz, C., & Koeppe, R. A. (1998). Inhibition in verbal-working memory revealed 
by brain activation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 95, 8410-8413. 
Jurden, F. H. (1995). Individual differences in working memory and complex cognition. Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 87,93-102. 
Kahneman, D., Ben-Ishai, R., & Lotan, M. (1973). Relation of a test of attention to road accidents. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 58, 113-115. 
Kail, R., & Hall, L. K. (200 1). Distinguishing short-term memory from working memory. Memory & 
Cognition, 29,1-9. 
Kane, M. J., Bleckley, M. K., Conway, A. R. A., & Engle, R. W. (2001). A controlled-attention view of 
working-memory capacity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130, 169-183. 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2000). Working memory capacity, pro-active interference, and divided attention: 
Limits on long-term memory retrieval. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 
26, 333-358. 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (in press). Working-memory capacity and the control of attention: The 
contributions of goal neglect, response competition, and task set to Stroop interference. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General. 
Kane, M. J., Peterman, M., Bleckley, M. K., & Engle, R. W. (2002). The attentional and intellectual demands 
of verbal and figural fluency: A dual-task approach. Unpublished manuscript. 
Kane, M. J., Sanchez, A., & Engle, R. W. (1999, November). Working memory capacity, intelligence, and goal 
neglect in the Stroop task. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Psychonomic Society, Los Angeles. 
Kikuchi-Yorioka, Y., & Sawaguchi, T. (2000). Parallel visuospatial and audiospatial working memory 
processes in the monkey dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 1075-1076. 
Kimberg, D. Y., Aguirre, G. K., & D’Esposito, M. (2000). Modulation of task-related neural activity in task-
switching: An fMRI study. Cognitive Brain Research, 10, 189-196. 
Kimberg, D. Y., D’Esposito, M., & Farah, J. (1997). Effects of bromocriptine on human subjects depend on 
working memory capacity. Cognitive Neuroscience, 8, 3581-3585. 
Kimberg, D. Y., & Farah, M. J. (1993). A unified account of cognitive impairments following frontal lobe 
damage: The role of working memory in complex, organized behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 4, 411-428. 
Kindt, M., Bierman, D., & Brosschot, J. F. (1996). Stroop versus Stroop: Comparison of a card format and a 
single-trial format of the standard color-word Stroop task and the emotional Stroop task. Personality & 
Individual Differences, 21, 653-661. 
Kirchner, W. K. (1958). Age differences in short-term retention of rapidly changing information. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 55, 352-358. 
Klein, K., & Fiss, W. H. (1999). The reliability and stability of the Turner and Engle working memory task. 
Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 31, 429-432. 
Klingberg, T. (1998). Concurrent performance of two working memory tasks: Potential mechanisms of 
interference. Cerebral Cortex, 8, 593-601. 
Knight, R. T. (1991). Evoked potential studies of attention capacity in human frontal lobe lesions. In H. S. 
Levin, H. M. Eisenberg, & A. L. Benton (Eds.), Frontal lobe function and dysfunction (pp. 139-153). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Knight, R. T., & Grabowecky, M. (1995). Escape from linear time: Prefrontal cortex and conscious experience. 
In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences (pp. 1357-137 1). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Knight, R. T., Hillyard, S. A., Woods, D. L., & Neville, S. J. (198 1). The effects of frontal cortex lesions on 
event-related potentials during auditory selective attention. Electroencephalography & Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 52, 571-582. 
Knight, R. T., Scabini, D., & Woods, D. L. (1989). Prefrontal cortex gating of auditory transmission in humans. 
Brain Research, 504, 338- 342. 
Knight, R. T., Staines, W. R., Swick, D., & Chao, L. L. (1999). Pre-frontal cortex regulates inhibition and 
excitation in distributed neural networks. Acta Psychologica, 101, 159-178. 
Koch, K. W., & Fuster, J. M. (1989). Unit activity in monkey parietal cortex related to haptic perception and 
temporary memory. Experimental Brain Research, 76, 292-306. 
Kojima, S., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1982). Delay-related activity of prefrontal neurons in rhesus monkeys 
performing delayed response. Brain Research, 248, 43 -49. 
Kojima, S., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1984). Functional analysis of spatially discriminative neurons in 
prefrontal cortex of rhesus monkey. Brain Research, 291, 229-240. 
Kubota, K., & Niki, H. (197 1). Prefrontal cortical unit activity and delayed alternation performance in 
monkeys. Journal of Neurophysiology, 34, 337-347. 
Kubota, K., Tonoike, M., & Mikami, A. (1980). Neuronal activity in the monkey dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
during a discrimination task with delay. Brain Research, 183, 29-42. 
Kyllonen, P. C. (1993). Aptitude testing inspired by information processing: A test of the four-sources model. 
Journal of General Psychology, 120,375-405. 
Kyllonen, P. C. (1996). Is working memory capacity Spearman’s g? In I. Dennis & P. Tapsfield (Eds.), Human 
abilities: Their nature and measurement (pp. 49-75). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Kyllonen, P. C., & Christal, R. E. (1990). Reasoning ability is (little more than) working-memory capacity?! 
Intelligence, 14, 389-433. 
Laiacona, M., De Santis, A., Barbaratto, R., Basso, A., Spagnoli, D., & Capitani, E. (1989). Neuropsychological 
follow-up of patients operated for aneurysms of anterior communicating artery. Cortex, 25, 261-273. 
Larson, G. E., & Perry, Z. A. (1999). Visual capture and human error. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 13, 227-
236. 
Larson, G. E., & Saccuzzo, D. P. (1989). Cognitive correlates of general intelligence: Toward a process theory 
of g. Intelligence, 13, 5-3 1. 
Law, D. J., Morrin, K. A., & Pellegrino, J. W. (1995). Training effects and working memory contributions to 
skill acquisition in a complex coordination task. Learning & Individual Differences, 7, 207- 234. 
Lee, S. L., Wild, K., Hollnagel, C., & Grafman, J. (1999). Selective visual attention in patients with frontal lobe 
lesions or Parkinson’s disease. Neuropsychologia, 37, 595-604. 
Lehto, J. (1996). Are executive function tests dependent on working memory capacity? Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 49A, 29-50. 
Lezak, M. D. (1983). Neuropsychological assessment. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Los, S. A. (1999). Identifying stimuli of different perceptual categories in pure and mixed blocks of trials: 
Evidence for stimulus-driven switch costs. Acta Psychologica, 103, 173-205. 
Luciana, M., Depue, R. A., Arbisi, P., & Leon, A. (1992). Facilitation of working memory in humans by a D2 
dopamine receptor agonist. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 4, 58-68. 
Luria, A. R. (1966). Higher cortical functions in man. New York: Basic Books. 
Luria, A. R. (1971). Memory disturbances in local brain lesions. Neuropsychologia, 9, 367-375. 
Luria, A. R., Karpov, B. A., & Yarbuss, A. L. (1966). Disturbances of active visual perception with lesions of 
the frontal lobes. Cortex, 2, 202-212. 
Luria, A. R., Pribram, K. H., & Homskaya, E. D. (1964). An experimental analysis of the behavioral 
disturbance produced by a left frontal arachnoidal endothelioma (meningioma). Neuropsychologia, 2,257-280. 
MacDonald, A. W., Cohen, J. D., Stenger, V. A., & Carter, C. S. (2000). Dissociating the role of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex in cognitive control. Science, 288, 1835-1838. 
Mackworth, J. F. (1959). Paced memorizing in a continuous task. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 206-
211. 
MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: An integrative review. Psychological 
Bulletin, 109, 163-203. 
MacLeod, C. M., & MacDonald, P. A. (2000). Interdimensional interference in the Stroop effect: Uncovering 
the cognitive and neural anatomy of attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 383-391. 
Malmo, R. B. (1942). Interference factors in delayed response in monkeys after removal of frontal lobes. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 5, 295-308. 
Martinkauppi, S. , Rämä, P., Aronen, H. J., Korvenoja, A., & Carlson, S. (2000). Working memory of auditory 
localization. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 889-898. 
Mayr, U., & Keele, S. W. (2000). Changing internal constraints on action: The role of backward inhibition. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129, 4-26. 
McCarthy, G. (1995). Functional neuroimaging of memory. The Neuroscientist, 1, 155-163. 
McCarthy, G., Blamire, A. M., Puce, A., Nobre, A. C., Bloch, G., Hyder, F., Goldman-Rakic, P. S., & Shulman, 
R. G. (1994). Functional magnetic resonance imaging of human prefrontal cortex activation during a spatial 
working memory task. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 91, 8690-8694. 
McCarthy, G., Puce, A., Constable, R. T., Krystal, J. H., Gore, J. C., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1996). Activation 
of human prefrontal cortex during spatial and nonspatial working memory tasks measured by functional MRI. 
Cerebral Cortex, 6, 600-611. 
McIntosh, A. R., Grady, C. L., Haxby, J. V., Ungerleider, L. G., & Horwitz, B. (1996). Changes in limbic and 
prefrontal functional interactions in a working memory task for faces. Cerebral Cortex, 6, 57 1 - 584. 
McKenna, F. P., Duncan, J., & Brown, I. D. (1986). Cognitive abilities and safety on the road: A reexamination 
of individual differences in dichotic listening and search for embedded figures. Ergonomics, 29, 649-663. 
Meiran, N. (1996). Reconfiguration of processing mode prior to task performance. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 22,1423-1442. 
Mesulam, M. M. (1981). A cortical network for directed attention and unilateral neglect. Annals of Neurology, 
10, 309-325. 
Metz, J. T., Yasillo, N. J., & Cooper, M. (1987). Relationship between cognitive functioning and cerebral 
metabolism. Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow & Metabolism, 7(Suppl. 1), S305. 
Miceli, G., Caltagirone, C., Gainotti, G., Masullo, C., & Silveri, M. C. (198 1). Neuropsychological correlates 
of localized cerebral lesions in non-aphasic brain-damaged patients. Journal of Clinical Neuropsychology, 3, 53 
-63. 
Miller, E. (1984). Verbal fluency as a function of a measure of verbal intelligence and in relation to different 
types of cerebral pathology. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 23, 53-57. 
Miller, E. K. (2000). The prefrontal cortex: No simple matter. Neuro-Image, 11, 447-450. 
Miller, E. K., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An integrative theory of pre-frontal cortex function. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 24,167-202. Miller, E. K., & Desimone, R. (1994). Parallel neuronal mechanisms for short-term 
memory. Science, 263, 520-522. 
Miller, E. K., Erickson, C. A., & Desimone, R. (1996). Neural mechanisms of visual working memory in 
prefrontal cortex of the macaque. Journal of Neuroscience, 16, 5154-5167. 
Miller, E. K., Li, L., & Desimone, R. (1993). Activity of neurons in anterior inferior temporal cortex during a 
short-term memory task. Journal of Neuroscience, 13, 1460-1478. 
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing 
information. Psychological Review, 63, 81-97. 
Milner, B. (1963). Effects of different brain lesions on card sorting. Archives of Neurology, 9, 90-100. 
Milner, B. (1964). Some effects of frontal lobectomy in man. In J. M. Warren & K. Akert (Eds.), The frontal 
granular cortex and behavior (pp. 313-334). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Mishkin, M., & Manning, F. J. (1978). Non-spatial memory after selective prefrontal lesions in monkeys. Brain 
Research, 143, 313-323. 
Mishkin, M., & Pribram, K. H. (1955). Analysis of the effects of frontal lesions in monkey: I. Variations of 
delayed alternation. Journal of Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 48, 492-495. 
Mishkin, M., & Pribram, K. H. (1956). Analysis of the effects of frontal lesions in monkey: II. Variations of 
delayed response. Journal of Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 49, 36-45. 
Mishkin, M., Ungerleider, L. G., & Macko, K. A. (1983). Object vision and spatial vision: Two cortical 
pathways. Trends in Neurosciences, 6, 414-417. 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., & Howerter, A. (2000). The unity and diversity of 
executive functions and their contributions to complex ―frontal lobe‖ tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive 
Psychology. 
Moscovitch, M. (1994). Cognitive resources and dual-task interference effects at retrieval in normal people: The 
role of the frontal lobes and medial temporal cortex. Neuropsychology, 8, 524-534. 
Mountain, M. A., & Snow, W. G. (1993). Wisconsin Card Sorting Test as a measure of frontal pathology: A 
review. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 7, 108-118. 
Nagahama, Y., Fukuyama, H., Yamauchi, H., Matsuzaki, S., Konishi, J., Shibasaki, H., & Kimura, J. (1996). 
Cerebral activation during performance of a card sorting test. Brain, 119, 1667-1675. 
Nagahama, Y., Okada, T., Katsumi, Y., Hayashi, T., Yamauchi, H., Sawamoto, N., Toma, K., Nakamura, K., 
Hanakawa, T., Konishi, J., Fuyukama, H., & Shibasaki, H. (1999). Transient neural activity in the medial 
superior frontal gyrus and precuneus time locked with attention shift between object features. NeuroImage, 10, 
193-199. 
Nagahama, Y., Sadato, N., Yamauchi, H., Katsumi, Y., Hayashi, T., Fukuyama, H., Kimura, J., Shibasaki, H., 
& Yonekura, Y. (1998). Neural activity during attention shifts between object features. Neuro-Report, 9, 2633-
2638. 
Nauta, W. J. H. (1964). Some efferent connections of the prefrontal cortex in the monkey. In J. M. Warren & K. 
Akert (Eds.), The frontal granular cortex and behavior (pp. 397-407). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Nauta, W. J. H. (1972). Neural associations of the frontal cortex. Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis, 32, 125-
140. 
Nelson, H. E. (1976). A modified card sorting test sensitive to frontal lobe defects. Cortex, 12, 313-324. 
Newcombe, F. (1969). Missile wounds of the brain: A study of psychological deficits. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Niki, H. (1974a). Differential activity of prefrontal units during right and left delayed response. Brain Research, 
70, 346-349. 
Niki, H. (1 974b). Prefrontal unit activity during delayed alternation in the monkey: I. Relation to the direction 
of response. Brain Research, 68,185-196. 
Niki, H. (1 974c). Prefrontal unit activity during delayed alternation in the monkey: II. Relation to absolute 
versus relative direction of response. Brain Research, 68, 197-204. 
Niki, H., & Watanabe, M. (1976). Prefrontal unit activity and delayed response: Relation to cue location versus 
direction of response. Brain Research, 105, 79-88. 
Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of behavior. In R. J. 
Davidson, G. E. Schwartz, & D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation: Advances in research and 
theory (Vol. 4, pp. 1-18). New York: Plenum. 
Nyström, L. E., Braver, T. S., Sabb, F. W., Delgado, M. R., Noll, D. C., & Cohen, J. D. (2000). Working 
memory for letters, shapes, and localizations: fMRI evidence against stimulus-based regional organization in 
human prefrontal cortex. NeuroImage, 11, 424-446. 
O’Reilly, R. C., Braver, T. S., & Cohen, J. D. (1997, July). A biologically-based computational model of 
working memory. Paper presented at the Models of Working Memory Symposium, Boulder, CO. 
O’Reilly, R. C., Braver, T. S., & Cohen, J. D. (1999). A biologically-based computational model of working 
memory. In A. Miyake & P. Shah (Eds.), Models of working memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance and 
executive control (pp. 375-411). New York: Cam-bridge University Press. 
Oscar-Berman, M. (1975). The effects of dorsolateral-frontal and ventrolateral-frontal lesions on spatial 
discrimination learning and delayed response in two modalities. Neuropsychologia, 13, 237-246. 
Owen, A. M. (1997). The functional organization of working memory processes within human lateral frontal 
cortex: The contribution of functional neuroimaging. European Journal of Neuroscience, 9, 1329-1339. 
Owen, A. M., Downes, J. J., Sahakian, B. J., Polkey, C. E., & Rob-bins, T. W. (1990). Planning and spatial 
working memory following frontal lobe lesions in man. Neuropsychologia, 28,1021-1034. 
Owen, A. M., Evans, A. C., & Petrides, M. (1996). Evidence for a two-stage model of spatial working memory 
processing within the lateral frontal cortex: A positron emission tomography study. Cerebral Cortex, 6, 31-38. 
Owen, A. M., Roberts, A. C., Hodges, J. R., Summers, B. A., Polkey, C. E., & Robbins, T. W. (1993). 
Contrasting mechanisms of impaired attentional set-shifting in patients with frontal lobe damage or Parkinson’s 
disease. Brain, 116, 1159-1175. 
Owen, A. M., Roberts, A. C., Polkey, C. E., Sahakian, B. J., & Rob-bins, T. W. (1991). Extra-dimensional 
versus intra-dimensional set shifting performance following frontal lobe excisions, temporal lobe excisions or 
amygdalo-hippocampectomy in man. Neuropsychologia, 29, 993-1006. 
Pandya, D. N., & Barnes, D. L. (1987). Architecture and connections of the frontal lobe. In E. Perecman (Ed.), 
The frontal lobes revisited (pp. 41-72). New York: IRBN Press. 
Pandya, D. N., & Yeterian, E. H. (1990). Prefrontal cortex in relation to other cortical areas in rhesus monkey: 
Architecture and connections. Progress in Brain Research, 85, 63 -93. 
Pandya, D. N., & Yeterian, E. H. (1999). Comparison of prefrontal architecture and connections. In A. C. 
Roberts, T. W. Robbins, & L. Weiskrantz (Eds.), The prefrontal cortex: Executive and cognitive functions (pp. 
51 -66). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Parasuraman, R. (1998). The attentive brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Pardo, J. V., Pardo, P. J., Janer, K. W., & Raichle, M. E. (1990). The anterior cingulate cortex mediates 
processing selection in the Stroop attentional conflict paradigm. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 87, 256-259. 
Parkin, A. J., Bindschaedler, C., Harsent, L., & Metzler, C. (1996). Pathological false alarm rates following 
damage to the left frontal cortex. Brain & Cognition, 32, 14-27. 
Parkin, A. J., Leng, N. R. C., & Stanhope, N. (1988). Memory impairment following ruptured aneurysm of the 
anterior communicating artery. Brain & Cognition, 7, 231-243. 
Parks, R. W., Loewenstein, D. A., Dodrill, K. L., Barker, W. W., Yoshii, F., Chang, J. Y., Emran, A., Apicella, 
A., Sheramata, W. A., & Duara, R. (1988). Cerebral metabolic effects of a verbal fluency test: A PET scan 
study. Journal of Clinical & Experimental Neuropsychology, 10, 565-575. 
Passingham, R. E. (1975). Delayed matching after selective prefrontal lesions in monkeys. Brain Research, 92, 
89-102. 
Pati, P., & Dash, A. S. (1990). Interrelationships between incidental memory, non-verbal intelligence and 
Stroop scores. Psycho-Lingua, 20,27-31. 
Paus, T., Kalina, M., Patockova, L., Angerova, Y., Cerny, R., Mecir, P., Bauer, J., & Krabec, P. (1991). Medial 
vs lateral frontal lobe lesions and differential impairment of central-gaze fixation maintenance in man. Brain, 
114, 2051-2067. 
Pavlov, I. P. (1941). Conditioned reflexes and psychiatry (Vol. 2; W. H. Gantt, Trans.). New York: International 
Publishers. 
Pendleton, M. G., Heaton, R. K., Lehman, R. A., & Hulihan, D. (1982). Diagnostic utility of the Thurstone 
Word Fluency Test in neuro-psychological evaluations. Journal of Clinical Neuropsychology, 4, 307-317. 
Pennington, B. F. (1994). The working memory function of the pre-frontal cortices. In M. M. Haith, J. B. 
Bensen, R. J. Roberts, & B. F. Pennington (Eds.), The development of future-oriented processes. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Perret E. (1974). The left frontal lobe of man and the suppression of habitual responses in verbal categorical 
behavior. Neuropsychologia, 12, 323-330. 
Petrides, M. (1985). Deficits on conditional associative-learning tasks after frontal- and temporal-lobe lesions in 
man. Neuropsychologia, 23,601-614. 
Petrides, M. (1989). Frontal lobes and memory. In F. Boller & J. Grafman (Eds.), Handbook of 
neuropsychology (Vol. 3, pp. 75 -90). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Petrides, M. (1990). Nonspatial conditional learning impaired in patients with unilateral frontal but not 
unilateral temporal lobe excisions. Neuropsychologia, 28,137-149. 
Petrides, M. (1995). Impairments in non-spatial self-ordered and externally ordered working memory tasks after 
lesions of the mid-dorsal part of the lateral frontal cortex in the monkey. Journal of Neuroscience, 15, 359-375. 
Petrides, M., Alivisatos, B., Meyer, E., & Evans, A. C. (1993). Functional activation of the human frontal cortex 
during the performance of verbal working memory tasks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 90, 
878-882. 
Petrides, M., & Milner, B. (1982). Deficits on subject-ordered tasks after frontal- and temporal-lobe lesions in 
man. Neuropsychologia, 20, 249-262. 
Petrides, M., & Pandya, D. N. (1994). Comparative architectonic analysis of the human and macaque frontal 
cortex. In F. Boller & J. Grafman (Eds.), Handbook of neuropsychology(Vol. 9, pp. 17-58). Amsterdam: 
Elsevier. 
Pfefferbaum, A., Desmond, J. E., Galloway, C., Menon, V., Glover, G. H., & Sullivan, E. V. (2001). 
Reorganization of frontal systems used by alcoholics for spatial working memory: An f MRI study. 
NeuroImage, 14, 7-20. 
Phillips, L. H. (1997). Do ―frontal tests‖ measure executive function? Issues of assessment and evidence from 
fluency tests. In P. Rabbitt (Ed.), Methodology of frontal and executive function (pp. 191-213). Hove, U.K.: 
Psychology Press. 
Phillips, L. H. (1999). Age and individual differences in letter fluency. Developmental Neuropsychology, 15, 
249-267. 
Pierrot-Deseilligny, C., Rivaud, S., Gaymard, B., & Agid, Y. (1991). Cortical control of reflexive visually-
guided saccades. Brain, 114,1473-1485. 
Pohl, W. (1973). Dissociation of spatial discrimination deficits following frontal and parietal lesions in 
monkeys. Journal of Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 82, 227-239. 
Pollmann, S. (2001). Switching between dimensions, locations, and responses: The role of left frontopolar 
cortex. NeuroImage, 14, S 118- S124. 
Posner, M. I. (1988). Structures and functions of selective attention. In T. Boll & B. Bryant (Eds.), Clinical 
neuropsychology and brain function: Research, measurement, and practice. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
Posner, M. I., & Peterson, S. E. (1990). The attention system of the human brain. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 13, 25-42. 
Posner, M. I., & Raichle, M. E. (1994). Images of mind. New York: Freeman. 
Postle, B. R., Berger, J. S., & D’Esposito, M. (1999). Functional neuro-anatomical double dissociation of 
mnemonic and executive control processes contributing to working memory performance. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 96,12959-12964. 
Postle, B. R., Berger, J. S., Taich, A. M., & D’Esposito, M. (2000). Activity in human frontal cortex associated 
with spatial working memory and saccadic behavior. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12(Suppl.), 2-14. 
Postle, B. R., & D’Esposito, M. (1999). ―What‖–then–―where‖ in visual working memory: An event-related 
fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 11, 585-597. 
Postle, B. R., & D’Esposito, M. (2000). Evaluating models of the topographical organization of working 
memory function in frontal cortex with event-related fMRI. Psychobiology, 28, 13 2-145. 
Postle, B. R., Stern, C. E., Rosen, B. R., & Corkin, S. (2000). An fMRI investigation of cortical contributions to 
spatial and nonspatial visual working memory. NeuroImage, 11, 409-423. 
Prabhakaran, V., Narayanan, K., Zhao, Z., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2000). Integration of diverse information in 
working memory within the frontal lobe. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 85-90. 
Prabhakaran, V., Rypma, B., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2001). Neural substrates of mathematical reasoning: A 
functional magnetic resonance imaging study of neocortical activation during performance of the Necessary 
Arithmetic Operations Test. Neuropsychology, 15,115-127. 
Prabhakaran, V., Smith, J. A. L., Desmond, J. E., Glover, G. H., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1997). Neural substrates 
of fluid reasoning: An fMRI study of neocortical activation during performance of the Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices Test. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 33,43-63. 
Pribram, K. H., & Mishkin, M. (1956). Analysis of the effects of frontal lesions in monkey: III. Object 
alternation. Journal of Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 49, 41-45. 
Ptito, A., Crane, J., Leonard, G., Amsel, R., & Caramanos, Z. (1995). Visual-spatial localization by patients 
with frontal-lobe lesions invading or sparing area 46. NeuroReport, 6, 1781-1784. 
Quintana, J., & Fuster, J. M. (1993). Spatial and temporal factors in the role of prefrontal and parietal cortex in 
visuomotor integration. Cerebral Cortex, 3, 122-132. 
Quintana, J., Yajeya, J., & Fuster, J. M. (1988). Prefrontal representation of stimulus attributes during delay 
tasks: I. Unit activity in cross-temporal integration of sensory and sensory-motor information. Brain Research, 
474, 211-222. 
Rafal, R., Gershberg, F., Egly, R., Ivry, R., Kingstone, A., & Ro, T. (1996). Response channel activation and 
the lateral prefrontal cortex. Neuropsychologia, 34,1197-1202. 
Ragland, J. D., Gur, R. C., Glahn, D. C., Censits, D. M., Smith, R. J., Lazarev, M. G., Alavi, A., & Gur, R. E. 
(1998). Frontotemporal cerebral blood flow change during executive and declarative memory tasks with 
schizophrenia: A positron emission tomography study. Neuropsychology, 12, 399-413. 
Raichle, M. E. (1994). Images of the mind: Studies with modern imaging techniques. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 45, 333-356. Rainer, G., Asaad, W. F., & Miller, E. K. (1998). Selective representation of relevant 
information by neurons in the primate prefrontal cortex. Nature, 393, 577-579. 
Ramier, A. M., & Hecaen, H. (1970). Role respectif des atteintes frontales et de la lateralisation lesionnelle dans 
les deficits de la ―fluence verbal‖ [Respective role of frontal injuries and lesion lateralization in ―verbal 
fluency‖ deficits]. Revue Neurologique, 123, 2-22. 
Rao, S. C., Rainer, G., & Miller, E. K. (1997). Integration of what and where in the primate prefrontal cortex. 
Science, 276, 821-824. 
Raz, N., Briggs, S. D., Marks, W., & Acker, J. D. (1999). Age-related deficits in generation and manipulation of 
mental images: II. The role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Psychology & Aging, 14, 43 6-444. 
Reitan, R. M., & Wolfson, D. (1994). A selective and critical review of neuropsychological deficits and the 
frontal lobes. Neuropsychology Review, 4, 161-197. 
Richer, F., Decary, A., Lapierre, M. F., Rouleau, I., Bouvier, G., & Saint-Hilaire, J. M. (1993). Target detection 
deficits in frontal lobectomy. Brain & Cognition, 21, 203-211. 
Risberg, J., & Ingvar, D. H. (1973). Patterns of activation in the grey matter of the dominant hemisphere during 
memorizing and reasoning. Brain, 96, 737-756. 
Risberg, J., Maximilian, A. V., & Prohovnik, I. (1977). Changes of cortical activity patterns during habituation 
to a reasoning test. Neuropsychologia, 15, 793-798. 
Roberts, A. C., Robbins, T. W., & Weiskrantz, L. (1998). The pre-frontal cortex: Executive and cognitive 
functions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Roberts, R. J., Jr., Hager, L. D., & Heron, C. (1994). Prefrontal cognitive processes: Working memory and 
inhibition in the antisaccade task. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 123, 374-393. 
Roberts, R. J., Jr., & Pennington, B. F. (1996). An interactive framework for examining prefrontal cognitive 
processes. Developmental Neuropsychology, 12,105-126. 
Rogers, R. D., Andrews, T. C., Grasby, P. M., Brooks, D. J., & Rob-bins, T. W. (2000). Contrasting cortical and 
subcortical activations produced by attentional-set shifting and reversal learning in humans. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 12, 142-162. 
Rogers, R. D., & Monsell, S. (1995). The cost of a predictable switch between simple cognitive tasks. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 124, 207-231. 
Rogers, R. D., Sahakian, B. J., Hodges, J. R., Polkey, C. E., Ken-nard, C., & Robbins, T. W. (1998). 
Dissociating executive mechanisms of task control following frontal lobe damage and Parkinson’s disease. 
Brain, 121, 815-842. 
Romo, R., Brody, C. D., Hernández, A., & Lemus, L. (1999). Neuronal correlates of parametric working 
memory in the prefrontal cortex. Nature, 399, 470-473. 
Rosen, V. M., & Engle, R. W. (1997). The role of working memory capacity in retrieval. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 126,211-227. 
Rosen, V. M., & Engle, R. W. (1998). Working memory capacity and suppression. Journal of Memory & 
Language, 39, 418-436. 
Rosenkilde, C. E. (1979). Functional heterogeneity of the prefrontal cortex in the monkey: A review. 
Behavioral & Neural Biology, 25, 301-345. 
Rosenkilde, C. E., Bauer, R. H., & Fuster, J. M. (1981). Single cell activity in ventral prefrontal cortex of 
behaving monkeys. Brain Research, 209, 375-394. 
Rosvold, H. E., & Delgado, J. M. R. (1956). The effect on delayed alternation test performance of stimulating 
or destroying electrically structures within the frontal lobes of the monkey’s brain. Journal of Comparative & 
Physiological Psychology, 49, 365-372. 
Rowe, J. B., Toni, I., Josephs, O., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Passingham, R. E. (2000). The prefrontal cortex: 
Response selection or maintenance within working memory? Science, 288, 1656-1660. 
Rylander, G. (1939). Personality changes after operations on the frontal lobes. Copenhagen: Munksgaard. 
Rypma, B., & D’Esposito, M. (1999). The roles of prefrontal brain regions in components of working memory: 
Effects of memory load and individual differences. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96, 6558-
6563. 
Rypma, B., Prabhakaran, V., Desmond, J. E., Glover, G. H., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1999). Load-dependent roles 
of frontal brain regions in the maintenance of working memory. NeuroImage, 9, 216- 226. 
Salmon, D. P., & D’ Amato, M. R. (198 1). Note on delay-interval illumination effects on retention in monkeys 
(Cebus apella). Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 36, 381-385. 
Sarter, M., Bernston, G. G., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1996). Brain imaging and cognitive neuroscience: Toward 
strong inference in attributing function to structure. American Psychologist, 51, 13-21. 
Schumacher, E. H., Lauber, E., Awh, E., Jonides, J., Smith, E. E., & Koeppe, R. A. (1996). PET evidence for an 
a modal verbal working memory system. NeuroImage, 3, 79-88. 
Seidman, L. J., Breiter, H. C., Goodman, J. M., Goldstein, J. M., Woodruff, P. W. R., O’Craven, K., Savoy, R., 
Tsuang, M. T., & Rosen, B. R. (1998). A functional magnetic resonance imaging study of auditory vigilance 
with low and high information processing demands. Neuropsychology, 12, 505-518. 
Sergent J. (1994). Brain-imaging studies of cognitive functions. Trends in Neurosciences, 17, 221-227. 
Settlage, P., Zable, M., & Harlow, H. F. (1948). Problem solution by monkeys following bilateral removal of 
the prefrontal areas: VI. Performance on tests requiring contradictory reactions to similar and to identical 
stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 38, 50-65. 
Shah, P., & Miyake, A. (1996). The separability of working memory resources for spatial thinking and language 
processing: An individual differences approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 125, 4-27. 
Shallice, T. (1988). From neuropsychology to mental structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shallice, T., & Burgess, P. W. (1991 a). Deficits in strategy application following frontal lobe damage in man. 
Brain, 114, 727-741. 
Shallice, T., & Burgess, P. W. (1991b). Higher-order cognitive impairments and frontal lobe lesions in man. In 
H. S. Levin, H. M. Eisenberg, & A. L. Benton (Eds.), Frontal lobe function and dysfunction (pp. 125-138). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Shimamura, A. P. (2000). The role of the prefrontal cortex in dynamic filtering. Psychobiology, 28, 207-218. 
Shimamura, A. P., Janowsky, J. S., & Squire, L. R. (1990). Memory for the temporal order of events in patients 
with frontal lobe lesions and amnesic patients. Neuropsychologia, 28, 803-813. 
Shimamura, A. P., Jurica, P. J., Mangels, J. A., Gershberg, F. B., & Knight, R. T. (1995). Susceptibility to 
memory interference effects following frontal lobe damage: Findings from tests of paired-associate learning. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 7, 144-152. 
Shindy, W. W., Posley, K. A., & Fuster, J. M. (1994). Reversible deficit in haptic delay tasks from cooling 
prefrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 4, 443-450. 
Simkins-Bullock, J., Brown, G. G., Greiffenstein, M., Malik, G. M., & McGillicuddy, J. (1994). 
Neuropsychological correlates of short-term memory distractor tasks among patients with surgical repair of 
anterior communicating artery aneurysms. Neuropsychology, 8, 246-254. 
Skinner, J. E., & Yingling, C. D. (1977). Central gating mechanisms that regulate event-related potentials and 
behavior. Progress in Clinical Neurophysiology, 1, 30-69. 
Smith, E. E., & Jonides, J. (1997). Working memory: A view from neuro-imaging. Cognitive Psychology, 33, 5-
42. 
Smith, E. E., Jonides, J., & Koeppe, R. A. (1996). Dissociating verbal and spatial working memory using PET. 
Cerebral Cortex, 6, 11-20. 
Smith, E. E., Jonides, J., Koeppe, R. A., Awh, E., Schumacher, E. H., & Minoshima, S. (1995). Spatial versus 
object working memory: PET investigations. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 7, 337-356. 
Snow, R. E., Kyllonen, P. C., & Marshalek, B. (1984). The topography of ability and learning correlations. In 
R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (Vol. 2, pp. 47- 103). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Stamm, J. S. (1961). Electrical stimulation of frontal cortex in monkeys during learning of an alternation task. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 24, 414-426. 
Stamm, J. S., & Rosen, S. C. (1973). The locus and crucial time of implication of prefrontal cortex in the 
delayed response task. In K. H. Pribram & A. R. Luria (Eds.), Psychophysiology of the frontal lobes (pp. 139-
153). New York: Academic Press. 
Stankov L., & Crawford, J. D. (1993). Ingredients of complexity in fluid intelligence. Learning & Individual 
Differences, 5, 73-111. 
Stern, C. E., Owen, A. M., Tracey, I., Look, R. B., Rosen, B. R., & Petrides, M. (2000). Activity in ventrolateral 
and mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during nonspatial visual working memory processing: Evidence from 
functional magnetic resonance imaging. Neuro-Image, 11, 392-399. 
Stroop J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18, 
643-662. 
Stuss, D. T., & Benson, D. F. (1984). Neuropsychological studies of the frontal lobes. Psychological Bulletin, 
95, 3-28. 
Stuss, D. T., Floden, D., Alexander, M. P., Levine, B., & Katz, D. (2001). Stroop performance in focal lesion 
patients: Dissociation of processes and frontal lobe lesion location. Neuropsychologia, 39, 771-786. 
Stuss, D. T., Levine, B., Alexander, M. P., Hong, J., Palumbo, C., Hamer, L., Murphy, K. J., & Izukawa, D. 
(2000). Wisconsin Card Sorting Test performance in patients with focal frontal and posterior brain damage: 
Effects of lesion location and test structure on separable cognitive processes. Neuropsychologia, 38, 388-402. 
Stuss, D. T., Shallice, T., Alexander, M. P., & Picton, T. W. (1995). A multidisciplinary approach to anterior 
attentional functions. In J. Grafman, K. J. Holyoak, & F. Boller (Eds.), Structure and functions of the human 
prefrontal cortex. (Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 769, pp. 191-211). New York: New 
York Academy of Sciences. 
Süß, H.-M., Oberauer, K., Wittman, W. W., Wilhelm, O., & Schulze, R. (2002). Working-memory capacity 
explains reasoning ability and a little bit more. Intelligence, 30, 261-288. 
Swartz, B. E., Halgren, E., Fuster, J. M., & Mandelkern, M. (1994). An 18FDG-PET study of cortical activation 
during a short-term visual memory task in humans. NeuroReport, 5, 925-928. 
Sweeney, J. A., Mintun, M. A., Kwee, S., Wiseman, M. B., Brown, D. L., Rosenberg, D. R., & Carl, J. R. 
(1996). Positron emission tomography study of voluntary saccadic eye movements and spatial working 
memory. Journal of Neurophysiology, 75, 454-468. 
Taylor, S. F., Kornblum, S., Lauber, E. J., Minoshima, S., & Koeppe, R. A. (1997). Isolation of specific 
interference processing in the Stroop task: PET activation studies. NeuroImage, 6, 81-92. 
Teuber, H. L., Battersby, W. S., & Bender, M. B. (1951). Performance of complex visual tasks after cerebral 
lesions. Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease, 114, 413-429. 
Teuber, H. L., & Mishkin, M. (1954). Judgment of visual and postural vertical after brain injury. Journal of 
Psychology, 38,161-175. 
Teuber, H. L., & Weinstein, S. (1956). Ability to discover hidden figures after cerebral lesions. Archives of 
Neurology & Psychiatry, 76, 369-379. 
Troyer, A. K., Moscovitch, M., Winocur, G., Alexander, M. P., & Stuss, D. (1998). Clustering and switching on 
verbal fluency: The effects of focal frontal- and temporal-lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia, 36, 499-504. 
Tucha, O., Smely, C., & Lange, K. W. (1999). Verbal and figural fluency in patients with mass lesions of the 
left or right frontal lobes. Journal of Clinical & Experimental Neuropsychology, 21, 229-236. 
Tuholski, S. W., Engle, R. W., & Baylis, G. C. (2001). Individual differences in working memory capacity and 
enumeration. Memory & Cognition, 29, 484-492. 
Turner, M. L., & Engle, R. W. (1989). Is working memory capacity task dependent? Journal of Memory & 
Language, 28, 127-154. 
Uhl, F., Franzen, P., Serles, W., Lange, W., Lindinger, G., & Deecke, L. (1990). Anterior frontal cortex and the 
effect of proactive interference in paired associate learning: A DC potential study. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 2, 373-382. 
Uhl, F., Podreka, I., & Deecke, L. (1994). Anterior frontal cortex and the effect of proactive interference in 
word pair learning—Results of Brain-SPECT. Neuropsychologia, 32, 241-247. 
Upton, D., & Corcoran, R. (1995). The role of the right temporal lobe in card sorting: A case study. Cortex, 31, 
405-409. 
Valentine, E. R. (1975). Performance on two reasoning tasks in relation to intelligence, divergence and 
interference proneness. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 45,198-205. 
Van der Linden, M., Bruyer, R., Roland, J., & Schils, J. P. (1993). Proactive interference in patients with 
amnesia resulting from anterior communicating artery aneurysm. Journal of Clinical & Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 15, 525-536. 
Van der Linden, M., Coyette, , F., & Seron, X. (1992). Selective impairment of the ―central executive‖ 
component of working memory: A single case study. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 9, 301-326. 
van Zomeren, A. H., & Brouwer, W. H. (1994). Clinical neuropsychology of attention. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Vendrell, P., Junque, C., Pujol, J., Jurado, M. A., Molet, J., & Grafman, J. (1995). The role of prefrontal regions 
in the Stroop task. Neuropsychologia, 33, 341-362. 
Verin, M., Partiot, A., Pillon, B., Malapani, C., Agid, Y., & Dubois, B. (1993). Delayed response tasks and 
prefrontal lesions in man—Evidence for self generated patterns of behaviour with poor environmental 
modulation. Neuropsychologia, 31, 1379-1396. 
Vilkki, J., Holst, P., Ohman, J., Servo, A., & Heiskanen, O. (1992). Cognitive test performances related to early 
and late computed tomography findings after closed-head injury. Journal of Clinical & Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 14, 518-532. 
Volpe, B. T., & Hirst, W. (1983). Amnesia following the rupture and repair of an anterior communicating artery 
aneurysm. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, & Psychiatry, 46, 704-709. 
Walker, R., Husain, M., Hodgson, T. L., Harrison, J., & Kennard, C. (1998). Saccadic eye movements and 
working memory deficits following damage to human prefrontal cortex. Neuropsychologia, 36, 1141-1159. 
Waltz, J. A., Knowlton, B. J., Holyoak, K. J., Boone, K. B., Mishkin, F. S., de Menezes Santos, M., Thomas, C. 
R., & Miller, B. L. (1999). A system for relational reasoning in human prefrontal cortex. Psychological Science, 
10, 119-125. 
Warkentin, S., Nilsson, A., Risberg, J., & Karlson, S. (1989). Absence of frontal lobe activation in 
schizophrenia. Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow & Metabolism, 9(Suppl. 1), S3 54. 
Warrington, E. K., James, M., & Maciejewski, C. (1986). The WAIS as a lateralizing and localizing diagnostic 
instrument: A study of 656 patients with unilateral cerebral lesions. Neuropsychologia, 24, 223-239. 
Watanabe, T., & Niki, H. (1985). Hippocampal unit activity and delayed response in the monkey. Brain 
Research, 325, 241-254. 
Weigl, E. (1941). On the psychology of so-called processes of abstraction. Journal of Abnormal & Social 
Psychology, 36, 3-33. 
Weinberger, D. R., Berman, K. F., & Zec, R. F. (1986). Physiologic dysfunction of dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex in schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry, 43,114-124. 
West, R. L. (1996). An application of prefrontal cortex function theory to cognitive aging. Psychological 
Bulletin, 120, 272-292. 
West, R. [L.], & Alain, C. (1999). Event-related neural activity associated with the Stroop task. Cognitive Brain 
Research, 8, 157-174. 
West, R. [L.], & Alain, C. (2000a). Effects of task context and fluctuations of attention on neural activity 
supporting performance of the Stroop task. Brain Research, 873, 102-111. 
West, R. [L.], & Alain, C. (2000b). Evidence for the transient nature of a neural system supporting goal-directed 
action. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 748-752. 
White, I. M., & Wise, S. P. (1999). Rule dependent neuronal activity in 
the prefrontal cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 126, 315-335. Wickens, D. (1970). Encoding categories of 
words: An empirical approach to memory. Psychological Review, 77, 1-15. 
Wilson, F. A.W., O’Scalaidhe, S. P., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1993). Dissociation of object and spatial 
processing domains in primate pre-frontal cortex. Science, 260, 1955-1958. 
Wilson, W. A., Jr. (1962). Alternation in normal and frontal monkeys as a function of response and outcome of 
the previous trial. Journal of Comparative & Physiological Psychology, 55, 701-704. 
Wise, S. P., Murray, E. A., & Gerfen, C. R. (1996). The frontal cortex-basal ganglia system in primates. Critical 
Reviews in Neurobiology, 10, 317-356. 
Woodrow, H. (1916). The faculty of attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1, 285-318. 
Woods, D. L., & Knight, R. T. (1986). Electrophysiological evidence of increased distractibility after 
dorsolateral prefrontal lesions. Neurology, 36, 212-216. 
Woods, R. P. (1996). Modeling for intergroup comparisons of imaging data. NeuroImage, 4, S84-S94. 
Worsham, R. W., & D’Amato, M. R. (1973). Ambient light, white noise, and monkey vocalization as sources of 
interference in visual short-term memory of monkeys. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 99, 99-105. 
Yacosynski, G. K., & Davies, L. (1945). An experimental study of the frontal lobes in man. Psychosomatic 
Medicine, 7, 97-107. 
Yamaguchi, S., & Knight, R. T. (1990). Gating of somatosensory in-puts by human prefrontal cortex. Brain 
Research, 521, 281-288. 
Yingling, C. D., & Skinner, J. E. (1977). Gating of thalamic input to cerebral cortex by nucleus reticularis 
thalami. In J. E. Desmedt (Ed.), Progress in clinical neurophysiology (Vol. 1, pp. 70-96). Basel: Karger. 
Zable, M., & Harlow, H. F. (1946). The performance of rhesus monkeys on series of object-quality and 
positional discriminations and discrimination reversals. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 39,13-23. 
Zakay, D., & Block, R. A. (1997). Temporal cognition. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 6, 12-16. 
Zatorre, R. J., & McEntee, W. J. (1983). Semantic encoding deficits in a case of traumatic amnesia. Brain & 
Cognition, 2, 331-345. 
Zola-Morgan, S., & Squire, L. R. (1985). Medial temporal lesions in monkeys impair memory on a variety of 
tasks sensitive to human amnesia. Behavioral Neuroscience, 99, 22-34. 
Zysset, S., Müller, K., Lohman, G., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2001). Color–word matching Stroop task: Separating 
interference and response conflict. NeuroImage, 13, 29-36. 
 
NOTES 
1. For example, Engle, Tuholski, et al. (1999) found correlations among individual WM-span tasks ranging 
between .32 and .51 (M = .43), and correlations between the STM and WM-span tasks ranging between . 31 
and.43 (M =.35). 
 
2. See Kane etal. (2001) for a brief discussion of two recent failures to find a relation between WM measures 
and antisaccade performance (Larson & Perry, 1999; R. J. Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994). 
 
3. We recognize that such a caveat may render some claims about PFC functioning unfalsifiable, at least on the 
basis of data from brain - injured patients. However, because we do not present a formal theory here, we are less 
concerned with testability than with raising potentially important interpretational issues. 
 
4. In several of Baldo and Shimamura’s (2000) experimental conditions, patients with PFC damage were 
impaired relative to healthy controls even on no-delay versions of the tasks, and so it is difficult to infer 
memory maintenance disturbances here. 
 
5. In a recent delayed matching-to-sample study using faces as stimuli and delays of 15 and 24 sec, substantial 
delay-period dPFC activity was found, but in both delay conditions the activation peaked 9 to 12 sec into the 
delay (dropping to quite low levels by the 21 st second in the 24-sec delay condition; Jha & McCarthy, 2000). 
 
6. In a spatial matching-to-sample task with a 9.5–18.5-sec delay, Rowe et al. (2000) reported delay-period 
activity in PFC Brodmann area 8 and Petrides and Pandya’s (1994) area 9/46, but no delay activity in 
Brodmann area 46 proper. 
 
7. Sweeney et al. (1996) also showed significant dPFC activation during a delayed-memory task with a short 
delay. Although their task was not obviously ―complex‖ in terms of memory requirements, it did differ from 
most other human imaging work in that it required a delayed eye-movement response to the peripheral location 
that had previously contained the target stimulus. 
 
8. Courtney, Petit, Maisog, Ungerleider, and Haxby (1998) reported a more posterior dorsal PFC region, just 
anterior to frontal eye field (FEF) on the superior frontal sulcus, to be bilaterally active during memory delays, 
but particularly during spatial delays. The relative position of this region compared with FEF was consistent 
with the area in monkey cortex that may be especially active during spatial delayed-memory tasks (F. A.W. 
Wilson et al., 1993). However, others have failed to replicate this result (Postle, Berger, Taich, & D’Esposito, 
2000). 
 
9. Because Hartley et al. (2001) did not report correlation coefficients, we estimated them from the factor 
loadings of each n-back task onto the latent variable comprised of the three n-back tasks (loadings for verbal, 
object, and location tasks were .97,.68, and .82, respectively). 
 
10. Benedict et al. (1998) also demonstrated no difference in PFC activation under PET between focused- and 
divided-attention conditions during a continuous performance task. However, it is not clear from their report to 
what extent the focused-attention condition recruited dPFC-areas in comparison with a control condition. 
Because the focused-attention condition required ignoring potent distraction, we would expect that it evoked 
substantial dPFC activity, and so the lack of difference between divided- and focused-attention conditions 
seems to fit with our interpretation of the findings from other demanding tasks. 
 
11. This study also addressed the role of the anterior cingulate in Stroop interference. Although many imaging 
studies have indicated anterior cingulate activation in Stroop tasks (e.g., Bench et al., 1993; Pardo et al., 1990; 
for a review, see MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000), here there was no anterior-cingulate-delay activity related to 
task instructions. Instead, anterior cingulate was activated at the time of stimulus presentation, particularly for 
incongruent stimuli. In contrast to correlations between dPFC activity and performance, however, anterior 
cingulate activity at stimulus presentation was positively correlated with interference (r = .38). Thus, the more 
interference subjects showed, the more anterior cingulate activity they showed. These findings indicate that 
anterior cingulate may not play a role in combatting Stroop interference, but rather that it may merely signal or 
recognize that conflict is present (see also West & Alain, 1999, 2000a). 
 
12. Elfgren and Risberg (1998) found only left hemisphere dPFC blood flow increases in a letter-fluency task 
in which subjects generated as many words as possible starting with each of eight different letters, for 1 min 
each. However, they found bilateral dPFC increases in a figural fluency task in which subjects generated as 
many unique, unnameable designs as possible in an 8-min period. 
 
13. We note a recent finding that verbal fluency tasks did not differentially correlate with seemingly 
―executive‖ compared with seemingly ―nonexecutive‖ tasks in a population of traumatic brain injury patients 
(Duncan et al., 1997). However, the degree to which active maintenance and interference contributed to 
performance of the ―executive‖ or ―nonexecutive‖ tasks employed is not obvious to us. 
 
14. Metz, Yasillo, and Cooper (1987) found that performance of a computerized WCST produced no more 
frontal activation in PET than did performance of a computerized matching-to-sample ―control‖ task. However, 
their written report is too brief to allow a critical analysis of their methods and data. Note, however, that the 
matching-to-sample ―control‖ task that they used has been shown to rely on the PFC in humans and macaques 
(Goldman-Rakic, 1987; McIntosh et al., 1996; Verin et al., 1993). Thus, the lack of significant PFC activation 
differences between this ―control‖ task and the WCST is not too surprising. 
 
Ragland et al. (1998) used PET to test activation patterns in the WCST in comparison with a resting-state 
baseline. They found that healthy adults matched to schizophrenia patients on various variables showed 
significant WCST-linked activation only in inferior PFC areas and not in dorsolateral areas. However, 
dorsolateral, dorsomedial, and superior PFC activation was linked with some aspects of superior performance: 
The number of categories attained was correlated with dorso-lateral PFC activity at r = .48, with dorsomedial 
activity at r =.50, and with superior frontal activity at r = .69 
 
15. But see Pollmann (2001) for evidence that frontopolar cortex is critically activated during 
extradimensional set-switching. 
 
16. Duncan et al. (1997) failed to replicate these results in a study of patients with damage due to traumatic 
brain injury. Here, patterns of goal neglect were no more highly correlated with extent of frontal lobe damage 
by MRI (r = .25) than with parietal damage (r = .25) or with temporal damage (r = .36). However, most patients 
in this study had rather diffuse damage, and so inferences regarding focal lesion effects here must be drawn 
very tentatively. 
 
17. We have technical concerns with some of this work. First, Jurden’s (1995) contention that verbal and 
nonverbal working memory factors are separable depends largely on a reanalysis of Kyllonen and Christal’s 
(1990, Experiment 1) data; however, Jurden’s Table 3 (p. 99) shows that he transposed Kyllonen and Christal’s 
data incorrectly. This may simply reflect typographical errors in the table, but it instead might indicate that the 
reanalyses were conducted on the wrong data. Second, in Daneman and Tardif (1987), ceiling effects in their 
spatial-task data probably limited the possibility that this task would correlate with verbal measures (see Engle 
et al., 1992). Finally, in Shah and Miyake’s (1996) study of verbal versus spatial WM (Experiment 1), subjects’ 
VSAT and QSAT scores were correlated at an unusually low r =.28. Perhaps with a wider range of ability (their 
undergraduate subjects were recruited from Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Pittsburgh) and a 
sample that showed more typically high correlations between VSAT and QSAT scores, Shah and Miyake would 
have found less separability between verbal and spatial WM measures. The authors themselves note that ―. . . 
the use of a cognitively restricted sample may have the advantage of revealing domain-specific effects more 
clearly, which might otherwise be masked by general ability factors.‖ (p. 21, italics added). Of course, in our 
view of WM capacity, such ―general ability factors‖ are precisely what are most interesting. 
